

Dear EAC/TGDC members, my best wishes for a prosperous New Year to you and to all who are working for the wellbeing of America, and hoping that the holidays have refreshed your spirits for the promising months ahead. I have, good news: NOBODY has been able to prove, nor has there been anybody who could articulate how, when, where or in what circumstances the “One Smart Card per Voter” fails to provide any one of the following functionalities, as they provide the highest level of security and transparency to the electoral process.

- Allow voters to verify their entire ballot after Election Day
- Allow voters to cast a vote at the precinct or outside the precinct
- Allow an absentee voter to cast a vote while being observed, and yet in total confidentiality
- Allow overseas voters to cast votes by phone in total confidentiality
- Allow ballots to keep their votes secret until tally time
- Allow ballots to stand up for a correct tally of the votes entrusted to them
- Allow all political parties to oversee the entire process with step by step audit trails
- Allow the Court to remove from the ballot box a ballot that was cast by an impugned voter without revealing the vote

Therefore it is safe to assume that not only are these functions desirable but that they are also attainable using currently available hardware. In light of this, I don't doubt the inclusion of these functionalities, features and procedures in the Voluntary Voting Guidelines document that is under your responsibility.

I believe that the electoral industry is prepared to readily modify/upgrade their products to comply with those guidelines. To this effect, I'd like to provide a brief description of what, in my opinion, are basic guidelines.

- 1) A transparent electoral administration needs to be responsible for the overall creation, control, and supervision of the elections. This entity, hereafter called G3, shall equally consist of representatives from three (3) equally important groups (the government Board of Elections and the two leading political parties) and shall be controlling the process at each of the precincts throughout the country.

- 2) The security of the electoral process shall be protected by the use of secret codes, random numbers and encrypted files. 1) No less than two types of voter's personal codes, the Voter's Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) and the Voter's Personal Voting Codes (PVC), shall be created and stored in secure computers by each voter. Voter's codes shall be used to guarantee the legitimacy and confidentiality of the vote. 2) G3 codes shall be created and stored in secure computers by each individual G3 representative. G3 codes shall be used to guarantee the security, legitimacy and confidentiality of each vote. 3) A random number shall be generated after voting to become the Voter's Verification Numbers (VVN). The VVN shall protect the identity of the voter while allowing them to verify their ballot after Election Day. 4) A VVN-PIN-encrypted file, for the purpose of publishing it in the Internet after the votes are tallied, shall be created after the ballot is cast. Each VVN-PIN-decrypted file shall reveal only the ballots' questions with the corresponding PVC's as selected by the voter.
- 3) The G3 shall ensure full transparency of the electoral process by verifying, authorizing, and controlling a) the listing of the voters of each precinct, b) the issuing of ballots of each precinct c) the tallying of ballots of each precinct, d) the publishing of results (precinct, county, state and country level) on their respective websites, e) the publishing of all electoral software application's source-code and/or the algorithms and/or the encryption techniques used on the EAC/NIST website, f) the publishing of all election related information, guidelines, and procedures (including how and where the voter's and G3 codes are securely stored) on the EAC/NIST website, g) and the publishing of all voter's encrypted ballots on each individual G3 precinct's websites to allow voters to verify their votes after Election Day.
- 4) People with disabilities shall have the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges to access and use PIN and PVCs to cast his/hers votes.
- 5) The electoral system, shall guarantee the same level of security, legitimacy, secrecy and transparency achieved at typical precincts to all voters who cast their

- votes outside of the precinct (whether overseas or disabled); regardless of the means utilized to deliver their vote (USPS, existing telecommunication network or Internet).
- 6) Ballots used in the electoral system shall have means to convince all precinct G3 members, at any time, that the votes were cast by a legitimate voter.
 - 7) Ballots used in the electoral system shall have means to keep the cast votes secret at all times, except for tallying.
 - 8) Ballots used in the electoral system shall have secret means designed specifically for tallying the votes only when all precinct G3 members agree to count them.
 - 9) Ballots shall incorporate a mean to track the number of times the voter's selections have been revealed.
 - 10) The Justice system shall have a mean to remove ballots that were cast by impugned voters, without compromising the secrecy of the vote.

EAC/TGDC members, the world sees America as the beacon for democracy; in your hands is the historic responsibility to gather, analyze and adopt the measures that can make that light shine brighter.

Respectfully submitted on January 4, 2005 by,

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