A Generalized Framework for Privacy and Security Assessment of Biometric Template Protection

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Content

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  the systematic evaluation framework
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Biometric Systems

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- Privacy and security risks
  - Identity theft
  - Unchangeability
  - Cross matching
  - Harm of privacy

Biometric Template Protection

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

- Properties of protected templates (PT)
  - Irreversibility
  - Robustness
  - Diversity
  - Unlinkability

State of the Art of Template Protection

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- Transformation-based algorithms
  - Biometric salting
    - Biometric encryption [Soutar99, Savvides04, Takaragi07 etc.]
    - Biohashing [Teoh04, Teoh09, Ao09 etc.]
  - Cancelable biometrics [Ratha01, Zuo08, Bolle09 etc.]
- Biometric cryptosystems
  - Fuzzy extractor [Dodis03]
    - Fuzzy commitment scheme [Juels99]
    - Helper data scheme [Tuyls04]
    - Fuzzy vault scheme [Juels02]
  - Quantization index modulation [Linnartz03, Buhan08]



Biometric Template Protection

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ISO Architecture*



- Pseudonymous Identifier Encoder (PIE): $[PI, AD] = PIE(M)$, M is observed biometric data in enrolment
- Pseudonymous Identifier Recorder (PIR): $[PI'] = PIR(M', AD)$, M' is probe biometric data
- Pseudonymous Identifier Comparator (PIC): $v = PIC(PI, PI')$, v is comparison result
- Stored protected template $[PI, AD]$, where PI is pseudonymous identifier and AD is auxiliary data

*** ISO/IEC 24745 (2011) Information technology - Security techniques - Biometric Information protection**

How to Assess Template Protection

- Protection goals - Evaluation criteria
  - Security of PI: Hardness to find an M^* (“pre-image” of PI), which can pass PI- verification process
  - Privacy protection ability:
    - Irreversibility: Hardness to find an M^*, which is very close to the original M
    - Privacy leakage: Information about M contained in protected templates
  - Unlinkability:
    - Cross matching: Personal identifiable information contained in protected templates
    - Leakage amplification: Additional information about M or pre-image of PI gained when combining protected templates of the same subject

How to Assess Template Protection

- Threat models - description of an adversary
  - Naive Model: Adversary has no information about the system
  - Advanced Model: Adversary has full knowledge of the algorithm (Kerckhoffs’ principle) and properties of biometric data
  - Collision Model: Adversary owns a large amount of biometric data and can exploit inaccuracies of the biometric system
- Distribution of biometric features
  - Important a priori information for an adversary
  - Essential for security and privacy assessment

How to Assess Template Protection

Evaluation framework



How to Assess Template Protection

- Definition of security:
  - Let $A(AD, PI)=[M', PI']$ be a reconstruction function, where $PI'=PIR(M', AD)$. T_A is the computational time required in one reconstruction and n is the average number of reconstructions needed to get a $[M', PI']$ such that $PIC(PI,PI')=1$ for a positive authentication result.
  - Then, a template protection algorithm is (T, ε)***- secure***, if for all A

$$T_A \geq T$$
$$\log_2 n \geq \varepsilon$$



How to Assess Template Protection

- Definition of security:
  - Let $A(AD, PI)=[M', PI']$ be a reconstruction function, where $PI'=PIR(M', AD)$. T_A is the computational time required in one reconstruction and n is the average number of reconstructions needed to get a $[M', PI']$ such that $PIC(PI,PI')=1$ for a positive authentication result
  - A template protection algorithm is (T, ε)- ***secure***, if for all A

$$T_A \geq T$$
$$\log_2 n \geq \varepsilon$$

- Definition of privacy:
  - Let $A(AD, PI)=[M', PI']$ be a reconstruction function, where $PI'=PIR(M', AD)$. T_A is the computational time required in one reconstruction; for a given threshold t, n is the average number of reconstructions needed to get a $[M', PI']$ such that for a distance function $dist(M, M')<t$
  - A template protection algorithm is (t, T, ε)- ***preserving***, if for all A

$$T_A \geq T$$
$$\log_2 n \geq \varepsilon$$

Assessment of Different Protected Systems

- The fuzzy commitment scheme for 3D face recognition
- The fuzzy commitment scheme for iris recognition



- The fuzzy vault algorithm for fingerprint recognition



Assessment of Different Protected Systems

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- Security assessment

System	L_S	Naive Model: $\varepsilon=L_S-1$	Naive Model: T	Advanced Model: ε	Advanced Model: T	Collision Model: $\varepsilon=-\log_2(FAR)$ $FAR@FRR$	Ranking
3D Face Fuzzy Commitment	71 bit	70	$O(1)$	11.13	$O(1)$	6.48 1.12%@19.97%	
Iris Fuzzy Commitment	72 bit	71	$O(1)$	14.25	$O(1)$	7.41 0.59%@22.74%	
*Fingerprint Fuzzy Vault**	128 bit	127	$O(1)$	34.54	$O(n \log^2(n))$	13.29 0.01%@9%	

* "Fingerprint-Based Fuzzy Vault: Implementation and Performance", Nandakumar, Jain and Pankanti, IEEE Trans. on Info. Forensics and Security, 2007

Assessment of Different Protected Systems

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- Privacy protection ability in the advanced model:
  - High privacy leakage, which can cause cross matching and leakage amplification
  - Irreversibility is measured with the privacy definition for t=0. It shows computational complexity to retrieve the original biometric features

System	L_S	Privacy leakage	Irreversibility: ε	Irreversibility: T
3D Face Fuzzy Commitment	71 bit	77.5 bit	74.2 bit	$O(1)$
Iris Fuzzy Commitment	72 bit	4311 bit	14.25 bit	$O(1)$
*Fingerprint Fuzzy Vault**	128 bit	892.59 bit	34.54 bit	$O(n \log^2(n))$

* "Fingerprint-Based Fuzzy Vault: Implementation and Performance", Nandakumar, Jain and Pankanti, IEEE Trans. on Info. Forensics and Security, 2007

Assessment of Different Protected Systems

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- Unlinkability in the advanced model:
  - Cross matching is a serious problem
  - It should be avoided to use any personal identifiable information in the systems
  - Additionally, the privacy leakage is unavoidable in these system due to error tolerance, but it should be minimized

System	Cross matching	Leakage Amplification
3D Face Fuzzy Commitment	 EER=5%	 no feasible attack yet
Iris Fuzzy Commitment	 EER =16.34%	
*Fingerprint Fuzzy Vault**	 no assessment in the paper	 no assessment in the paper

* “Fingerprint-Based Fuzzy Vault: Implementation and Performance”, Nandakumar, Jain and Pankanti, IEEE Trans. on Info. Forensics and Security, 2007

Conclusions

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- The framework is useful to detect vulnerabilities of the existing algorithms
- The framework enables rigorous assessment, which is important and necessary for the development of template protection
- All the protection goals need to be taken into account
- Threat models are the important prerequisites. Security and privacy protection ability of a system can be overestimated, if unrealistic assumption is made
- Unique and measurable metrics such as the metrics used in the security and privacy definitions, are necessary for ranking of different algorithms

Future Work

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- Universal and constructive criteria, which can guarantee security and privacy performance of template protection
- An extended evaluation including both security and recognition performance
- Benchmarking and certification for template protection

References

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