

10. Community Resilience Metrics

10.1. Background

Community resilience metrics or indicators come in a wide variety of types. They can be descriptive or quantitative; they can be based on interviews, expert opinion, engineering analysis, or pre-existing datasets. They can also be presented as an overall score or as a set of separately reported scores across a broad spectrum of physical, economic, and social dimensions. Regardless of the methodologies used to develop and summarize the results, effective community resilience metrics must address two questions (National Academies 2012a):

1. *How can community leaders know how resilient their community is?*
2. *And how can they know if their decisions and investments to improve resilience are making a significant difference?*¹

In 2012, the National Academies Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters and the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy evaluated 17 approaches to measuring various aspects of resilience. The authors concluded that none of the 17 existing methodologies satisfactorily addressed the two basic questions posed above. As a result, one of the six main recommendations coming out of the report was the development of a “national resilience scorecard, from which communities can then develop their own, tailored scorecards” (National Academies 2012b). Similar recommendations can be found in other recent reviews of disaster risk reduction and disaster resilience (Government Office for Science 2012; UNISDR 2012). The need for a tailorable or locally relevant scorecard recognizes that a single prescriptive scorecard is unlikely to be appropriate for communities of all sizes and types (e.g., from small tourism- or agriculture-centric communities to large financial- or industrial-centric cities) and for all planning scenarios (e.g., from preliminary scoping studies to comprehensive planning with ongoing follow-up assessments).

10.2. Desirable Characteristics for Community Resilience Metrics

From the community perspective, effective community resilience metrics should be accurate, reliable, comprehensive, scalable, affordable, and actionable indicators of the community’s capacity to respond to and recover from a specified disaster scenario. Cutter (2014) suggests that communities seek a resilience measurement tool that meets the following criteria:

- Open and transparent
- Aligns with the community’s goals and vision
- Measurements...
 - are simple, well documented
 - can be replicated
 - address multiple hazards
 - represent community’s areal extent, physical (manmade and environmental) characteristics, and composition/diversity of community members
 - are adaptable and scalable to different community sizes, compositions, changing circumstances

For purposes of this framework, we are specifically interested in community resilience metrics or tools that will reliably predict the physical, economic, and social implications (either positive or negative) of community decisions (either active or passive) made with respect to planning, siting, design, construction, operation, protection, maintenance, repair, and restoration of the built environment.

¹As stated in (National Academies 2012b), “measuring resilience is challenging but essential if communities want to track their progress toward resilience and prioritize their actions accordingly.”

43 **10.3. Types of Metrics**

44 As defined in PPD-21 (White House 2013) and emphasized throughout this framework, the concept of
45 disaster resilience extends well beyond the magnitude of direct physical damage sustained by the various
46 components of the built environment under a specified disaster scenario. The centrality of community
47 impacts and community recovery to the concept of community resilience demands that community
48 resilience be evaluated and measured in much broader terms than, for example, critical infrastructure
49 vulnerability.

50 Looking beyond direct physical damage and direct repair costs for the built environment, at least three
51 broad categories of metrics should be considered by communities: (1) recovery times, (2) economic
52 vitality metrics, and (3) social well-being metrics. A community can use these end result metrics to
53 measure improvements through proactive planning and implementation. Resilience planning and
54 implementation of plans will produce a faster and more robust recovery that avoids or minimizes the
55 expected negative economic and social impacts of hazard scenarios. However, predicting how these end
56 result metrics will be impacted by specific community planning and implementation decisions is a
57 challenging and ongoing area of research.

58 Many indicators of community resilience may have a direct and quantifiable cause-and-effect influence
59 on resilience; whereas others may either have some postulated influence on resilience or simply be
60 correlated with resilience. Examples of indicators that may influence or correlate with recovery times,
61 economic vitality, and social well-being are provided below.

62 **10.3.1. Recovery Times**

63 Recovery times for the built environment are easy to grasp as resilience goals, but difficult to predict with
64 precision or confidence. Predicting recovery times under different planning scenarios should consider:

- 65 • Designated performance level or restoration level for each building cluster and infrastructure
66 system
- 67 • Original criteria used in the design of the various components of the built environment and their
68 condition immediately prior to the specified disaster scenario
- 69 • Loading conditions applied to the built environment during and after the specified hazard
70 scenario
- 71 • Spatial and logical distribution of physical damage to the built environment
- 72 • Availability of resources and leadership to strengthen (pre-event) or repair (post-event) the built
73 environment
- 74 • Critical interdependencies among the built environment and social structures within a community
75 (See Chapter 2)

76 Recovery times have a direct bearing on many economic and social functions in a community. As such,
77 explicit estimates (or at least a general sense) of system recovery times become a prerequisite for most, if
78 not all, other measures of community resilience. Due to the large volume of data required and the inherent
79 complexity of “system-of-systems” modeling, recovery times are likely to be estimated based on some
80 combination of simplified modeling, past experience, and/or expert opinion.

81 Examples of community-level recovery time goals by building cluster and infrastructure system are
82 provided in Table 3-10 through Table 3-12 in Chapter 3. These community-level recovery times are built-
83 up from the buildings and sector-level recovery time examples discussed in Chapters 5 through 9. Each
84 community should define its own set of building clusters, infrastructure systems, and designated
85 performance levels that reflect its makeup and priorities.

86 **10.3.2. Economic Vitality**

87 Economic health and development are major concerns for communities. Economic development concerns
88 include attracting and retaining businesses and jobs, building the tax base, addressing poverty and

89 inequality, enhancing local amenities, and economic sustainability. These factors are discussed below.
90 Further background on economic modeling approaches and issues appears later in Section 10.5.

91 **10.3.2.1. Attracting and Retaining Businesses and Jobs**

92 Attracting and retaining businesses and jobs is a major concern of most communities. A community that
93 cannot attract and retain businesses and jobs is in decline. Communities also prefer businesses that
94 produce high-paying jobs. Metrics for this would include the employment rate, per capita income or, per
95 capital Gross Domestic or Regional Product, and education attainment rate.

96 Metrics indicative of a community's ability to continue attracting and retaining businesses and jobs
97 through and after a hazard event would include the resiliency of infrastructure systems.

98 **10.3.2.2. Tax Base**

99 For most cities, local revenue sources consist of property tax and/or sales tax. Sales tax revenue is
100 increased by attracting commercial businesses and jobs, and property tax revenue is increased by
101 increasing property values.

102 Tax base indicators include real-estate prices, rents, and amount of tourism (for hotel tax revenues).
103 Metrics indicative of how a community's tax base would be affected by a hazard event include the extent
104 of property insurance coverage across the community, percent of property in areas susceptible to hazards
105 (like flood plains), adopted building codes, and the number of buildings that fail to meet current codes.

106 **10.3.2.3. Poverty and Income Distribution**

107 Poverty and income distribution are a major concern of local communities. Many projects communities
108 pursue aim to decrease poverty in their neighborhoods, and a significant amount of external funding
109 available to communities aim to alleviate poverty. This concern intersects with community resilience
110 because the disadvantaged are often the most vulnerable to disasters. Metrics of poverty and income
111 distribution include the poverty rate and the Gini coefficient, a measure of income dispersion.²

112 Metrics that indicate or influence how a hazard event might affect poverty and income distribution
113 include the poverty rate itself because poor people tend to fare worse in disasters.

114 **10.3.2.4. Local Services and Amenities**

115 Local services and amenities include the infrastructure systems discussed in Chapters 6-9, but also
116 include a variety of other characteristics and services associated with communities, such as public
117 transportation, parks, museums, restaurants, theaters, etc. Local services and amenities improve the
118 quality of life for local residents. In addition, there is an expectation that improving local amenities will
119 indirectly help attract and retain businesses and jobs. Amenities are provided by multiple sources. Some
120 are provided by local governments, some are privately provided, and some are environmental. Metrics for
121 infrastructure systems are discussed in Chapters 6-9 and in Section 10.3.5 of this chapter. Metrics for
122 amenities will depend on the community.

123 **10.3.2.5. Sustainability**

124 Local communities are interested in ensuring that their community is sustainable. Sustainability includes
125 two distinct ideas: 1) protecting and improving the environment (i.e., being "green" and maintaining a
126 small footprint); and 2) producing a vibrant and thriving economy. It is desirable that a community
127 remain sustainable, even amid disasters. Metrics of economic sustainability include population growth
128 rates and growth rates of Gross Domestic or Regional Product.

² <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

129 Factors that might affect a community’s sustainability in the presence of hazard events include the degree
130 to which the local economy depends on a single industry. Metrics could include percent of jobs in the
131 service industry or percent of jobs in agriculture and mining.

132 **10.3.2.6. Other Economic Indicators**

133 There are a number of economic indicators that are associated with or affect non-economic aspects of
134 community resilience. For example, debt ratios generally impact a community’s ability to deal with
135 disasters. Poverty impacts the probability that people will rebound from a disaster, as do ownership of a
136 car or phone. Similarly, job continuity and economic sustainability will strongly influence the continuity
137 of social networks.

138 **10.3.3. Social Well-being**

139 Reflecting the hierarchy of human needs presented in Section 2.3, social metrics should address:

- 140 • *Survival* – preservation of life and availability of water, food, clothing and shelter
- 141 • *Safety and security* – personal safety, financial (economic) security, and health/well-being
- 142 • *Sense of belonging* – belonging and acceptance among family, friends, neighborhoods, and
143 organizations
- 144 • *Growth and achievement* – opportunities for recognition and fulfillment

145 The resilience of a community following a hazard event depends on how well these needs are met.
146 Examples of indicators or metrics for each of these needs are provided below. An example of a resilience
147 plan that includes several of these indicators is the Canterbury Wellbeing Index (CERA 2014).

148 **10.3.3.1. Survival**

149 Survival depends on the ability of a community’s residents, employees and visitors to possess physical
150 requirements, including water, food, shelter, and clothing. Access to these requirements depends on the
151 functionality of the supporting physical infrastructure, availability of distribution systems, and personnel.
152 These tasks may be performed by the governmental organizations, non-governmental aid organizations,
153 or the private sector. Metrics for survivability could include housing availability and affordability,
154 poverty rates, homeless rates, etc.

155 Metrics affecting a community member’s chance of survival during or after a hazard event include:

- 156 • Building code adoption and enforcement history
- 157 • Existence and effectiveness of warning systems
- 158 • Existence of comprehensive emergency management plans (mutual aid pacts, emergency
159 response resources (e.g., urban search and rescue teams), public shelters)
- 160 • Number of community service organizations that assist in distributing water, food, or clothing or
161 providing shelter in the wake of a disaster
- 162 • Level of household disaster preparation
- 163 • Percentage of homes that are owner occupied (i.e., renters may be more vulnerable in disasters)
- 164 • Percentage of insured homes and businesses
- 165 • Availability of short- and medium-term accommodation
- 166 • Distance to family/friends unaffected by the disaster

167 **10.3.3.2. Safety and Security**

168 Safety and security includes all aspects of personal and financial (economic) security, and health and
169 well-being. People require safety and security in their personal lives from situations of violence, physical
170 or verbal abuse, war, etc., as well as knowing that the safety of their family and friend networks are
171 secure. Individuals also require financial safety, which can include job security, a consistent income,

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11 February 2015
Community Resilience Metrics, Types of Metrics

172 savings accounts, insurance policies, and other safety nets. Finally, people require safety from negative
173 health conditions, so that they can enjoy life and consistent well-being.

174 Examples of metrics for personal safety evaluated before and after a hazard event could include
175 community statistics on assaults, property offenses, re-offending rates, and reports on child abuse or
176 neglect.

177 Examples of metrics for financial (economic) security include employment rates (also covered in Section
178 10.3.2.1 under economic metrics). Additionally, metrics that would be indicative of how a community
179 member's employment would be affected by a hazard event include occupation type (e.g., some
180 occupations, more than others, can be severely affected by a hazard event)³, education levels, percentage
181 of residents that commute other communities for work, and gender (i.e., women may have a more difficult
182 time than men due to employment type, lower wages, and/or family care responsibilities).

183 Examples of metrics for health and well-being of community members include acute medical admissions,
184 immunization rates, cancer admissions, substance abuse rates, and blood donor rates. Additionally,
185 metrics that would be indicative of how a community member's health/well-being would be affected by a
186 hazard event include percentage of the population with health insurance, access to health services (e.g.,
187 health system demand and capacity indicators: emergency room, in-patient beds, out-patient clinics,
188 community health centers, mental health services, etc.), and community demographics (e.g., age
189 distribution, number of individuals with disabilities or access and functional needs, etc.).

190 **10.3.3.3. Sense of Belonging**

191 Social metrics can also address the belonging need, which can represent belonging and acceptance among
192 various groups of people (e.g., family, friends, school groups, sports teams, work colleagues, religious
193 congregation) or belonging to a place or location. Examples of metrics or indicators related to sense of
194 belonging include:

195 Civic participation⁴:

- 196 • Voter registration or voter participation rates
- 197 • Involvement in local action groups
- 198 • Perception of being well-informed of local affairs

199 Social networks:

- 200 • Frequency of contact with friends, family, neighbors, etc.
- 201 • Number of close friends/family (geographically)

202 Social participation:

- 203 • Membership in (and frequency of involvement in) community-wide social, cultural, and leisure
204 clubs/groups including sports clubs
- 205 • Membership in (and frequency of involvement in) religious organizations and other belief
206 systems
- 207 • Volunteering

208 Trust

- 209 • Confidence in leadership (at various levels)
- 210 • Trust in others (similar or dissimilar to member)

³Reference to University of South Carolina – Social Vulnerability Index

⁴Foxton, F. and R. Jones. 2011. *Social Capital Indicators Review*. Office for National Statistics
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_233738.pdf

211 **10.3.3.4. Growth and Achievement**

212 Humans need to feel a sense of achievement and respect in society, accompanied by the need for
213 continual growth and exploration. Examples of metrics or indicators related to growth and achievement
214 include:

- 215 • Education
 - 216 ▪ System capacity (sufficient numbers of teachers, classrooms, books, etc.)
 - 217 ▪ Graduation rates
 - 218 ▪ Memberships to public libraries
 - 219 ▪ Education levels
- 220 • Participation rates in arts and recreation

221 **10.3.4. Hybrids**

222 Some metrics combine several indicators into an overall score. Often, additional types of metrics, beyond
223 the three broad categories discussed above, are included. These other types of metrics, such as system-
224 specific or ecological/environmental metrics, are discussed below in Section 10.3.5.

225 Due to the sparsity of data, the unique aspects of each hazard event, and the lack of generally applicable
226 community resilience models, the scaling and weighting schemes used to aggregate disparate metrics into
227 an overall score of community resilience are largely based on reasoning and judgment. A related
228 technique is to attempt to monetize all of the dimensions (e.g., the statistical value of lost lives, lost jobs,
229 lost business revenue, increased healthcare costs, etc.), but this approach cannot adequately address the
230 social dimensions of community resilience.

231 **10.3.5. Other Metrics**

232 Examples of system-specific metrics include indicators such as:

- 233 • Temporary shelter demand in the housing sector
- 234 • Water pressure level or water quality level in water supply systems
- 235 • Vehicles per hour or shipping tonnage capacities in transportation systems
- 236 • Percentage of dropped calls or undelivered messages in communications systems
- 237 • Percentage of customers without service in electrical power systems

238 In the context of this framework, these system-level indicators can be thought of as performance levels to
239 gauge recovery time for the built environment.

240 Ecological or environmental metrics include indicators such as debris and hazardous waste volumes (by
241 which landfill and waste management requirements can be assessed), indicators of water and soil quality
242 (e.g., salinity), and many more. While very important due their impact to public health, wildlife
243 management, etc., these metrics address impacts and planning issues that are, for the most part, outside
244 the scope of this framework.

245 **10.4. Examples of Existing Community Resilience Assessment Methodologies**

246 As discussed in Section 10.1, a variety of community-wide resilience assessment methodologies was
247 presented in the research literature. In this section, we present brief overviews of nine existing
248 methodologies and evaluate their applicability as tools for assessing both current resilience and plans for
249 improved resilience within the context of planning decisions regarding the built environment. Not all of
250 these methodologies were developed to address community resilience, but they are considered as relevant
251 and potentially applicable in whole or part. This list is not meant to be complete and is expected to evolve
252 along with this framework, as additional research and pilot studies are completed.

253 **10.4.1. SPUR Methodology**

254 The SPUR methodology provides “a framework for improving San Francisco’s resilience through seismic
255 mitigation policies.” The stated goals of the SPUR report (2009) are:

- 256 1. *Define the concept of “resilience” in the context of disaster planning,*
- 257 2. *Establish performance goals for the “expected” earthquake that supports our definition of*
258 *resilience,*
- 259 3. *Define transparent performance measures that help us reach our performance goals; and*
- 260 4. *Suggest next steps for San Francisco’s new buildings, existing buildings and lifelines.*

261 The SPUR methodology focuses on establishing performance goals for several clusters of buildings (i.e.,
262 groups of buildings that provide a community service, such as critical response facilities, emergency
263 housing, or neighborhood services) and establishing target recovery times for a specified earthquake
264 scenario in the San Francisco area. While economic and social metrics are not direct outputs of the SPUR
265 methodology, the building clusters selected and recovery time goals provided are clearly intended to
266 improve both the economic and social resilience of San Francisco. Similarly, although SPUR focuses on
267 earthquakes as the primary hazard, the underlying methodology is applicable to other perils.

268 **10.4.2. Oregon Resilience Plan**

269 In 2011, the Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission (OSSPAC) was directed by House
270 Resolution 3 “to lead and coordinate preparation of an Oregon Resilience Plan that reviews policy
271 options, summarizes relevant reports and studies by state agencies, and makes recommendations on
272 policy direction to protect lives and keep commerce flowing during and after a Cascadia earthquake and
273 tsunami.” The OSSPAC assembled eight task groups (earthquake and tsunami scenario, business and
274 work force continuity, coastal communities, critical buildings, transportation, energy, information and
275 communications, water and wastewater) and assigned the following tasks to each group:

- 276 1. *Determine the **likely impacts** of a magnitude 9.0 Cascadia earthquake and tsunami on its*
277 *assigned sector, and estimate the time required to restore functions in that sector if the*
278 *earthquake were to strike under present conditions;*
- 279 2. *Define **acceptable timeframes** to restore functions after a future Cascadia earthquake to fulfill*
280 *expected resilient performance; and*
- 281 3. *Recommend **changes in practice and policies** that, if implemented during the next 50 years, will*
282 *allow Oregon to reach the desired resilience targets.*

283 The Oregon Resilience Plan (2013) builds on the SPUR methodology and the Resilient Washington State
284 initiative to produce a statewide projection of the impacts of a single earthquake and tsunami scenario.
285 Immediate impacts include lives lost, buildings destroyed or damaged, and households displaced.
286 Moreover, a particular statewide vulnerability identified in the study is Oregon’s liquid fuel supply and
287 the resulting cascade of impacts induced by a long-term disruption of the liquid fuel supply. The study
288 includes recommended actions to reduce the impacts of the selected hazard scenario and shorten the
289 state’s recovery time.

290 **10.4.3. UNISDR Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities**

291 The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) Disaster Resilience
292 Scorecard for Cities “provides a set of assessments that will allow cities to understand how resilient they
293 are to natural disasters.” The Scorecard is “intended to enable cities to establish a baseline measurement
294 of their current level of disaster resilience, to identify priorities for investment and action, and to track
295 their progress in improving their disaster resilience over time.” There are 85 disaster resilience evaluation
296 criteria grouped into the following areas:

- 297 • **Research**, including evidence-based compilation and communication of threats and needed
298 responses

Community Resilience Metrics, Examples of Existing Community Resilience Assessment Methodologies

- 299 • **Organization**, including policy, planning, coordination and financing
- 300 • **Infrastructure**, including critical and social infrastructure and systems and appropriate
- 301 development
- 302 • **Response capability**, including information provision and enhancing capacity
- 303 • **Environment**, including maintaining and enhancing ecosystem services
- 304 • **Recovery**, including triage, support services and scenario planning.

305 Each evaluation criterion is broken down into the aspect of disaster resilience being measured, an
306 indicative measurement, and the measurement scale (from 0 to 5, where 5 is best practice).

307 The formal checklist is organized around “10 Essentials for Making Cities Resilient,” which were
308 developed to align with the five priorities of the Hyogo Framework (UNISDR 2005). The overall score is
309 the percentage of possible points from each of the 85 measures. It is suggested that cities plan on 2 to 3
310 people working for a minimum of 1 week to complete an assessment, ranging up to 2 months for a more
311 detailed and comprehensive assessment.

312 **10.4.4. CARRI Community Resilience System**

313 The Community and Regional Resilience Institute’s Community Resilience System (CARRI CRS 2013)
314 “is an action-oriented, web-enabled process that helps communities to assess, measure, and improve their
315 resilience to ... threats and disruptions of all kinds, and ultimately be rewarded for their efforts. The CRS
316 brings together people, process and technology to improve resilience in individual communities. The
317 system includes not only a knowledge base to help inform communities on their resilience path but also a
318 process guide that provides a systematic approach to moving from interest and analysis to visioning and
319 action planning. It also provides a collaborative mechanism for other interested stakeholders to support
320 community efforts.”

321 The CRS is a DHS/FEMA funded initiative. It began in 2010, convening three working groups:
322 researchers (the Subject Matter Group), community leaders (the Community Leaders Group), and
323 government/private sector representatives (the Resilience Benefits Group). The findings of these working
324 groups culminated in the development of the CRS web-based tool along with pilot implementations in
325 eight communities commencing in the summer of 2011.

326 The CRS addresses 18 distinct Community Service Areas (CSAs) and is designed specifically for use by
327 community leaders. The web process is a checklist driven approach, with questions tailored for each of
328 the CSAs. The answer to a question may trigger additional questions. For many of the questions,
329 comment fields are provided so that communities may answer the questions as specifically as possible.
330 The CARRI team notes that a facilitated approach (i.e., an outside group coming in, such as CARRI), is
331 most effective. “The CRS process works more productively as a “partially facilitated” model where some
332 supportive expertise assists communities in applying aspects of resilience to and embedding them within
333 their community circumstances and processes.”

334 **10.4.5. Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit (CART)**

335 The Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit (CART 2012) was developed by the Terrorism and
336 Disaster Center at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center. It was funded by the Substance
337 Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and
338 the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, U.S. Department of
339 Homeland Security, and by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

340 CART is designed to enhance community resilience through planning and action. It engages community
341 organizations in collecting and using assessment data to develop and implement strategies for building
342 community resilience for disaster prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The CART process
343 uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, and it involves the following steps:

- 344 1. Generating a community profile (CART Team and Partners)

Community Resilience Metrics, Examples of Existing Community Resilience Assessment Methodologies

- 345 2. Refine the community profile (Community Work Groups)
346 3. Develop a strategic plan (Community Planning Groups)
347 4. Implement the plan (Community Leaders and Groups)

348 The CART approach is not hazard specific, and it is applicable across communities of varying size and
349 type. It is innovative, providing a complete set of tools and guidelines for communities to assess their
350 resilience across a number of domains. The toolkit includes the CART assessment survey, key informant
351 interviews, data collection framework, community conversations, neighborhood infrastructure maps,
352 community ecological maps, stakeholder analysis, SWOT analysis, and capacity and vulnerability
353 assessment. The focus of the approach is to provide a process that engages communities in thinking about
354 resilience and provide a foundation to move forward into sophisticated activities.

355 **10.4.6. Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC)**

356 The Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC, Cutter et al. 2014) process builds on prior
357 work by Cutter et al., and is based on empirical research with solid conceptual and theoretical
358 underpinnings. BRIC measures overall pre-existing community resilience. The approach provides an
359 empirically based resilience metric for use in a policy context. Using data from 30 public and freely
360 available sources, BRIC comprises 49 indicators associated with six domains:

- 361 • Social (10 indicators)
362 • Economic (8 indicators)
363 • Housing and infrastructure (9 indicators)
364 • Institutional (10 indicators)
365 • Community Capital (7 indicators)
366 • Environmental (5 indicators)

367 BRIC is not hazard specific, and it has been implemented at the county level. The 49 indicators were
368 selected through conceptual, theoretical, and/or empirical justification as capturing qualities associated
369 with community resilience. Indicators in the aforementioned domains determine areas that policy makers
370 should invest for intervention strategies to improve resilience scores.

371 **10.4.7. Rockefeller Foundation City Resilience Framework**

372 The City Resilience Framework (CRF 2014) is a framework “for articulating city resilience” developed
373 by Arup with support from the Rockefeller Foundation 100 Resilient Cities initiative. One merit of this
374 framework is that it is based on a very extensive literature review involving cities with different
375 characteristics and a substantial amount fieldwork to collect data and develop case studies. The
376 framework organizes 12 so-called “key indicators” into 4 categories:

- 377 • Leadership and strategy
378 • Health and wellbeing
379 • Infrastructure and environment
380 • Economy and social

381 This organization integrates social and physical aspects, and it considers human-driven processes as
382 inherent components of the system-of-systems, making the community fabric of a city.
383 Economic/financial constraints are also considered in an integral way, providing a realistic setting for its
384 application for planning purposes. In turn, the 12 key indicators span 7 qualities of what is considered a
385 resilient city: being reflective, resourceful, robust, inclusive, redundant, integrated, and/or flexible.

386 The CRF will serve as the basis for developing a City Resilience Index in 2015. The CRF report states
387 that the CRI will further refine the 4 categories and 12 indicators of the framework into 48 to 54 sub-
388 indicators and 130 to 150 variables or metrics.

389 **10.4.8. NOAA Coastal Resilience Index**

390 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Coastal Resilience Index (NOAA CRI 2010)
391 was developed to provide a simple and inexpensive self-assessment tool to give community leaders a
392 method of predicting if their community will reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning after a
393 disaster. The tool is completed by experienced local planners, engineers, floodplain managers and
394 administrators in less than three hours using readily available, existing sources of information, in a yes/no
395 question format.

396 The CRI is targeted primarily at coastal storms, particularly hurricanes and other surge or rain induced
397 flooding events with immediate and short-term recovery. More specifically, it focuses on the restoration
398 of basic services and how long a community will take to reach and maintain functioning systems after a
399 disaster. The eight page assessment form addresses six broad areas:

- 400 1. Critical facilities and infrastructure
- 401 2. Transportation issues
- 402 3. Community plans and agreements
- 403 4. Mitigation measures
- 404 5. Business plans
- 405 6. Social systems

406 The resulting assessment is meant to identify problems (vulnerabilities) that should be addressed before
407 the next disaster – areas in which a community should become more resilient and where resources should
408 be allocated. It also estimates the adaptability of a community to a disaster, but is not meant to replace a
409 detailed study. The authors note that “The Resilience Index and methodology does not replace a detailed
410 study.... But, the Resilience Index resulting from this Community Self-Assessment may encourage your
411 community to seek further consultation.”

412 The authors also state that the tool should not be used to compare one community to another. Rather, they
413 recommend using it as an approach to internal evaluation to identify areas in which a given community
414 might increase its resilience. As part of its development process the NOAA Community Resilience Index
415 (CRI) was pilot tested in 17 communities in five states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
416 Texas). In addition to developing their community indices, these pilot tests were also used to further
417 refine and improve the assessment methodology.

418 **10.4.9. FEMA Hazus Methodology**

419 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Hazus tool (FEMA 2014) “is a nationally applicable
420 standardized methodology that contains models for estimating potential losses from earthquakes, floods
421 and hurricanes. Hazus uses Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology to estimate physical,
422 economic and social impacts of disasters. It graphically illustrates the limits of identified high-risk
423 locations due to earthquake, hurricane and floods. Users can visualize the spatial relationships between
424 populations and other fixed geographic assets or resources for the specific hazard being modeled – a
425 crucial function in the pre-disaster planning process.”

426 The Hazus methodology and data sets cover the entire United States, and the study region (i.e.,
427 community) can be defined as any combination of US Census tracts. The specific hazard models included
428 are earthquake (including fire following), flood (riverine or coastal) and hurricane (wind and storm
429 surge). The focus of the model is on immediate physical, economic and (to a lesser degree) social
430 impacts. But, the model does produce outputs on expected loss of use for buildings, loss of use for
431 infrastructure (earthquake and flood only), shelter requirements, casualties (earthquake only), building
432 contents and inventory losses, lost wages and income and indirect economic losses (earthquake and flood
433 only). Estimated repair times are explicitly considered in economic loss estimates produced by the model,
434 but the economic outputs are not tabulated or viewable as a function of time. While Hazus can be used to

Community Resilience Metrics, Examples of Existing Community Resilience Assessment Methodologies

435 assess losses avoided through some mitigation measures, it does not estimate mitigation costs and
436 therefore does not output estimates of return on investment.

437 There are gaps between the results produced by Hazus and the information required for a community-
438 level resilience assessment methodology, particularly in the areas of interdependencies, social impacts
439 and recovery times. However, many of the Hazus methodologies and the types of results they produce
440 could become portions of a larger framework.

441 **10.4.10. Comparison Matrix**

442 A summary comparison of the nine example methodologies discussed in the preceding sections is
443 provided in Figure 10-1. As noted earlier, not all of these methodologies address community resilience,
444 but were evaluated to identify relevant and potentially applicable methods, indicators, or processes.

445 Each methodology was assessed on five broad dimensions: (1) comprehensiveness, (2) utility, (3) impacts
446 assessed, (4) techniques used, and (5) overall merit with respect to the maturity, innovativeness,
447 objectivity, and scientific merit of the methodology. Assessments were made in the context of community
448 resilience planning and assessment, specifically as it pertains to the built environment.

449 Consistent with the findings of previously published assessments, none of the nine methods reviewed is
450 strong in all five dimensions. However, it may be possible to combine the strongest features of existing
451 and emerging methodologies to produce a new community resilience assessment methodology that
452 addresses the needs identified in this chapter.

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Community Resilience Metrics, Examples of Existing Community Resilience Assessment Methodologies

454

Group	Category	Sub-Category	Existing Assessment Methodologies										Group	Symbol	Description	
			SPUR	Oregon Res. Plan (ORP)	UNISDR Scorecard	CARRI CRS	CART	BRIC	Rockefeller CRF & CRI	NOAA CRI	FEMA Hazus					
1	Comprehensiveness	Community size	•	•	+	+	+	+	+	+	•	+	1	+	Addresses a broad range	
		Hazards	•	•	+	+	+	+	+	+	•	-			•	Focused subset, but not inherently limited
		Recovery time scales	+	+	?	?	?	?	+	+	•	-			-	Limitation
		Systems	+	+	?	+	-	-	-	+	•	•			?	Additional information required
		Interdependencies	•	•	?	+	-	-	+	+	•	-				
2	Utility	User friendliness	•	•	+	+	+	+	•	+	•	2	+	High		
		Utility without hired or volunteer SMEs	-	-	+	•?	•?	•?	•	•?	•?			•	Moderate	
		Value of outputs for resilience planning	+	+	•	?	?	?	+	•	•?			-	Low	
		Consistency with PPD-21	+	+	•	+	+	•	•	•	•			-	?	Additional information required
3	Impacts assessed	Physical impacts and recovery times	+	+	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	3	+	Explicitly assessed		
		Economic impacts and recovery times	•	+	•	•	•	•	+	-	•			•	Partially or indirectly assessed	
		Social impacts and recovery times	•	•	•	•	•	•	+	•	•			-	Not assessed	
4	Techniques used	Checklists	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	•	4	+	Yes		
		Interviews, Surveys	-	-	-	•	+	-	+	•	•			•	Optional	
		Ratings	+	+	+	•	+	-	+	•	+			-	No	
		Existing national data sets	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+			?	Additional information required	
		Physical inspections	•	•	•	•	-	-	-	•	•					
		Engineering analysis or expert opinion	+	+	•	•	-	-	-	•	+					
		Statistical inference	•	•	-	•	-	-	-	-	+					
		Simulations	•	•	-	•	-	-	-	-	+					
		5	Critical Assessment	Maturity	+	+	•	+	-	+	•			?	+	5
Unique/innovative	+			•	•	+	+	+	•	-	+	•	Neither a strength nor a weakness			
Objective/repeatable	•			•	•	•	+	+	+	-	+	-	Weakness			
Scientific merit	+			+	-	?	?	?	+	?	+	?	Additional information required			
	+			+	•	+	-	+	•	?	+					

455

456

Figure 10-1. Preliminary Summary Assessment of Nine Existing Community Resilience Methodologies

457 **10.5. Economic Evaluation of Community Resilience Investment Portfolio**

458 This section presents a brief overview of existing economic concepts related to the evaluation of
459 investments to improve community resilience. The focus is on the development of a portfolio of
460 investments that maximize the social net benefits to the community, recognizing constraints, uncertainty,
461 and interdependencies that affect the mix of investments.

462 **10.5.1. Portfolio Considerations**

463 **10.5.1.1. Economic Efficiency**

464 Economic efficiency refers to obtaining the maximum benefit from the resources available. Equivalently,
465 it means not wasting resources.

466 **10.5.1.1.1. Maximization of Net Benefits**

467 Improved community resilience will also increase the level of service economically. Several alternatives
468 may maximize the net benefits to the citizens of the local community.

469 This assessment takes into account the fact that improved levels of service are typically more costly. This
470 type of analysis will identify the level of service where the net benefits (that is, the increased value of the
471 improved level of service minus the cost of obtaining that level of service) are maximized.

472 **10.5.1.1.2. Minimization of Cost + Loss**

473 From an economic perspective, this is an equivalent formulation to maximizing net benefits. Since the
474 “Level of Service” is defined in terms of minimizing costs and losses, it may be a more convenient format
475 for analysis. Expressing the results of this analysis in terms of net benefits is straightforward.

476 **10.5.1.1.3. First-Cost vs. Life-Cycle Cost**

477 Any effort to identify the alternatives that produce a maximization of net benefits depends on accurate
478 estimates of benefits and costs. With regard to the costs of attaining a desired level of service, all costs,
479 covering the entire life-cycle of any mitigation measures, need to be accounted for. It is not sufficient to
480 include first costs only. Operation costs, maintenance costs, replacement costs and end-of-life costs
481 (among others) need to be included.

482 **10.5.1.2. Multiple Objectives**

483 There are several complementary (and overlapping) objectives that are likely to be considered, accounting
484 for the types of losses that a community wishes to avoid. In any analysis of avoided losses, care needs to
485 be taken to ensure that savings are not double-counted.

486 **10.5.1.2.1. Minimize Economic Losses**

487 The simplest consideration is that of minimizing economic losses. Treated in isolation, that simply means
488 making sure that the difference between economic gain (in terms of losses avoided) and costs of the
489 desired level of service are maximized. It is simpler than the other considerations because costs and
490 benefits are both in dollar terms.

491 **10.5.1.2.2. Minimize Loss of Life**

492 The remaining objectives all relate to economic losses of one sort or another. The most important
493 consideration is avoiding loss of life and other casualties.

494 **10.5.1.2.3. Minimize Other Losses**

495 Other losses a jurisdiction might wish to avoid include disruption of key government services, disruption
496 of social networks, and damage to the environment. Including non-economic factors such as these in the
497 optimization is difficult, as benefits and costs are measured in different terms. If loss of life is included in

Community Resilience Metrics, Economic Evaluation of Community Resilience Investment Portfolio

498 the optimization, the benefits are measured in terms of lives saved (or deaths avoided), while the costs are
499 typically measured in dollars. The normal economic way of handling this issue is by assigning a value to
500 the benefits. For lives saved, Value of a Statistical Life is a standard approach. For other benefits, a
501 number of techniques are available to determine the value a community places on those benefits.

502 However, there is a strong reluctance to put a price on a life (which is nominally what Value of a
503 Statistical Life does) and other non-economic amenities. As an alternative, some form of Lexicographic
504 Preferences could be used. Here each objective is strictly ranked, and then optimized in order. For
505 example, an assessment could optimize for loss of life and then for economic losses. This ranking
506 approach would ensure the selection of an alternative that minimizes loss of life (irrespective of costs).
507 Next, the minimum cost alternative that maintained the minimum loss of life would be found.

508 Why not choose zero loss of life? As a practical matter, tradeoffs between safety and costs cannot be
509 avoided.

510 **10.5.1.3. Constraints**

511 To the extent a local community has a limited budget, that budget must be factored into the optimization.
512 Other constraints can also be factored in, largely by screening out potential plans that do not meet the
513 constraints.

514 **10.5.1.4. Economic Interdependencies**

515 The economy in general is affected by the resilience of the built environment. The reverse also holds – the
516 resilience of the community depends on the health and resilience of the economy.

517 **10.5.2. Economic Decision-Making Involving Risk and Uncertainty**

518 **10.5.2.1. Expected Utility Theory**

519 Economists often approach decision-making with expected utility theory. The basic idea is that people
520 will choose the alternative that has the best ‘utility’ or value for them, as indicated by the highest
521 probability-weighted average value. The value is adjusted to account for both time preference and risk
522 preference.

523 **10.5.2.1.1. Time Preference**

524 Most people prefer consumption now over consumption later. The typical way to address that is to
525 discount future consumption.

526 **10.5.2.1.2. Risk Preferences**

527 Most people would prefer to avoid risk – that is, they are risk averse. For people who are risk averse, a
528 large potential loss weighs more heavily than a large number of small losses, which together, add up to
529 the same value as the big event. Someone who is risk neutral would weigh the two equally.

530 Risk aversion is handled in economic theory by weighting the large losses more heavily (or equivalently,
531 by weighting large gains less heavily). The simplest approach, and the one used most often in net benefit
532 analyses, is to assume that the community is risk neutral. Then you simply compute the present expected
533 value. However, when it comes to disasters it seems unlikely that communities will be risk neutral.

534 To account for risk preferences, it will be necessary to measure those risk preferences. A number of
535 widely-accepted methods for measuring risk preferences exist.

536 **10.5.2.2. Behavioral Economics and Cognitive Bias**

537 People are not Expected Utility maximizers; there is a very large body of literature regarding departures
538 from Expected Utility maximization. Expected utility maximization is a difficult problem, and typically,
539 there are not enough resources available to solve it. There are several approaches to thinking about these
540 departures from economic theory, but the most widely accepted is the Heuristics and Biases school. They

541 argue that people use standard shortcuts—heuristics—that work well most of the time. However, there
542 will be cases where they do not work well, and in those situations they will be biased. The biases are
543 generally used to try and identify the heuristics used.

544 There are a number of identified biases, some of which are relevant here. These include Uncertainty v.
545 risk, overconfidence, and small probability events, among others.

546 **10.5.2.3. Uncertainties**

547 Uncertainties regarding estimates of expected damages and recovery times from disasters fall into two
548 categories. First, there are factors that cannot be known with certainty in advance, such as the timing and
549 magnitude of future hazard events. Second, there are things that are in principal knowable, but are not
550 currently known with certainty. For example, while in principal the cost of a particular project can be
551 estimated, the level of uncertainty associated with the estimate can vary and will likely increase with the
552 scope of the project.

553 Mitigation costs, recovery costs, and losses will have uncertainties in their estimates. As community
554 resilience plans are developed and refined, the level of uncertainty may reduce.

555 A particularly high level of uncertainty exists regarding business interruption losses. In cases where they
556 have been estimated, such losses are often as large or larger than direct economic losses. However, they
557 are difficult to estimate, due to the lack of data from past events to support estimates.

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