

Call for cooperation: network of biometric testing laboratories

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The idea of testing labs network - how it evolved

- **Biometrics projects**
 - Evident need for cooperation
- **Databases**
 - Collection problematic and costly
 - Scattered and heterogeneous data (e.g. different race)
- **Enlarging number of teams and testing activities**
 - Hard to follow the knowledge
 - Different testing protocols
- **Security concerns**
 - Large scale of new deployments
 - Inadequate harmonization
 - Need to increase society awareness – who is currently the best authority to do it?

- **Who will suffer the consequences of frauds in biometrics?**
 - Failure of biometrics X influences entire biometric business (even vendors of biometrics Y)
- **Knowledge exchange in the underground world is much faster than in academia or industry**
- **It seems there is no place where the information about biometric frauds, attacks and vulnerabilities is systematically collected and published**
 - Purpose: identification of trends, threats, statistics etc.
- **There is no contradiction between cooperation and competitiveness among the players**
- **Economical aspects**
 - Reducing the costs of biometric systems deployment due to recommendations of trusted testing laboratories
 - Weaknesses disclosure first of all to vendors (and to the public – rather as the last step)

Network security analogy (CERT)

- **The wake-up call: late 1980s, first global worm (Morris)**
 - Sudden awareness of a strong need for global cooperation
- **Over the years IT security specialists worked out the cooperation models of CERT teams**
 - Reactive services (alerts and warnings, vulnerabilities analysis and handling ...)
 - Proactive services (technology watch, security audits security tools ...)
 - Security quality management (risk analysis, security consulting, product evaluation and certification ...)

For further details on CERTs cooperation see: „CERT Cooperation and its further facilitation by relevant stakeholders”, ENISA Deliverable WP2006/5.1 (CERT-D3), available at: <http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/cert/background/coop>

Models of cooperation and trust

- **Centralized authority is not a good idea**
 - This idea failed e.g. in CERT model
- **Bilateral team-team cooperation**
- **Association of teams**
- **Cooperation between associations**
- **Sector cooperation**
 - Government, industry, academic, region, ...
- **Legal aspects**
 - NDA, MOU, contract, ToR ...
- **Trust models**
 - Bilateral and multilateral agreements, sponsorship
 - Accreditation (yet has some limitations)
 - procedures take time
 - requirement of independency
 - legal aspects (different in each country)

Things to think over

- **Need for confidence**
- **Financial aspects**
- **Assurance of quality (the base of trust)**
- **Differences in legal systems**
- **Organisational and political support**

Example: Polish Platform for Secure Implementation of Biometrics

■ Areas of cooperation

- Development of testing methodologies (including legal aspects) at three testing levels (lab, real and operational scenarios)
- Information, knowledge and expertise exchange
 - Tools, best practices
- Resources exchange
 - Common multimodal database collection, including data for template ageing assessment

■ Consortium

- Warsaw University of Technology (coordinator)
- Research and Academic Computer Network NASK
- Polish Security Printing Works PWPW S.A.
- Department of Criminalistics, Warsaw University

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What is your opinion ?

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SENSE OF TELECOMMUNICATION
