

Lay Reactions to Quantitative Statements about the Weight of Forensic Science Evidence


William C. Thompson
University of California, Irvine



Research Issues



- Do jurors understand statistical testimony?
- Which statistics are “best”?
- What weight do jurors give to qualitative statements about the weight of evidence?



Normative Criteria for Evaluation

- Sensitivity to the strength of forensic evidence
- Susceptibility to fallacious interpretations
 - Prosecutor's fallacy/Source probability error
 - Defense attorney's fallacy
- Logical coherence of judgments

Research


Methods

- Participants—Actual jurors or mTurkers
- Evaluate hypothetical cases
- Judgments before and after receiving forensic evidence
- Experimentally varied:
 - Strength of Forensic Evidence
 - Strength of non-Forensic Evidence
 - Presentation Format
 - Type of forensic Evidence (e.g., DNA vs. shoeprint)
 - Dependent measures

Reports


- Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, J. Empirical Legal Studies (2013)
- Thompson & Newman, Law & Human Behavior (2015)

Sensitivity to Strength of Evidence



Martire et
al. LHB
(2013)

Figure 1. Mean adjusted belief change by presentation method and evidential strength (error bars ± 2 standard errors).



Thompson & Newman, *Law & Human Behavior*, 2015

Table 1.

Percentage of subjects who endorsed the source probability error, defense attorney's fallacy, both errors or neither error and conviction rates, log change scores and implicit LRs within each group.

Error Endorsed	Percentage Endorsing Fallacy	Conviction Rate	Log Scale Change Score	Implicit LR
Source Probability Only	35.49% (192)	32.29% (62)	1.93 (3.19)	12.1 (22.18)
Defense Fallacy Only	17.93% (97)	3.09% (3)	1.14 (1.84)	3.09 (9.79)
Both Errors	28.10% (152)	5.26% (8)	1.26 (2.21)	1.4 (.58)
Neither Error	12.20% (66)	15.15% (10)	1.46 (3.25)	4.12 (10.91)

Will people understand likelihood ratios if they are explained by a really good expert?



Crime + Initial Guilt

Forensic Evidence

Subsequent Guilt


Crime


High
Prior

Low
Prior



The police asked an expert on forensic voice comparison to help them determine whether Joseph Anton was the man who called the credit card activation center. The expert they chose was Dr. Geoffrey Stewart Morrison. He is the director of a forensic voice comparison laboratory at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. His laboratory does research and casework in forensic speech science, which includes forensic voice comparison and disputed utterance analysis. He has submitted reports on forensic voice comparisons to both prosecutors and defense lawyers and had appeared in court as an expert witness on four previous occasions. About half of the voice comparison work he has done in criminal cases was at the behest of the prosecutors and about half at the behest of defense lawyers.






Perceived Odds of Guilt


You said it was more likely that the caller was Joseph Anton than someone else. How much more likely?

- Between 1 and 10 times more likely (51%-91% chance it was Anton)
- Between 10 and 99 times more likely (91%-99% chance it was Anton)
- Between 100 and 999 times more likely (99%-99.90% chance it was Anton)
- Between 1000 and 9999 times more likely (99.90%-99.99% chance it was Anton)
- Between 10,000 and 99,999 times more likely (99.99%-99.999% chance it was Anton)
- More than 100,000 times more likely (More than 99.9999% chance it was Anton)

Odds Change by all conditions





Odds Change by Transposed Conditional




Will graphics help?

Example: The evidence is 4 time more likely given the same-speaker hypothesis than given the different-speaker hypothesis





Error bars: +/- 1 SE



Correct interpretation of LR?

	No Graphics	With Graphics
It is [30/3000] times more likely that the offender was Mr. Anton than some other speaker from the relevant population.	80%	80%
The acoustic properties found on the offender recording are [30/3000] times more probable if the offender was Mr. Anton than if the offender was some other speaker from the relevant population.	72%	80%
The same-speaker hypothesis is [30/3000] times more likely to be true than the different-speaker hypothesis.	42%	63%

Perceived strength of qualitative statements

“Given the size and quality of the crime scene print,

- it is [moderately probable; highly probable; practically certain] that the suspect is the person who made the crime scene print” (***Source probability***)
- these findings provide [weak; moderate; extremely strong] support for the theory that the suspect is the person who made the crime scene print” (***Weight of evidence***)
- I would expect about one person in [10; 1000; 100,000] to have a fingerprint similar enough to be indistinguishable from it” (***RMP***)

Perceived Order of Strength

- Practically certain-- 82%
- RMP=1 in 100,000-- 74%
- Extremely Strong Support-- 74%
- Highly probable-- 63%
- RMP=1 in 1000-- 51%
- Moderately probable-- 36%
- Moderate Support-- 36%
- RMP=1 in 10-- 20%
- Weak support-- 13%


Future Studies

- Can we reduce fallacious reasoning and improve sensitivity to relevant variables with:
 - Graphic exhibits?
 - More extensive, realistic testimony?
 - Lawyers' arguments?
- Advantages and disadvantages of statistical characterizations, relative to traditional categorical conclusions
- Can we develop better theoretical explanations for
 - Judgments about the credibility/strength of evidence?
 - Modality effects?

Issues for Discussion

- Numbers or not?
 - Empirical data
 - Subjective estimates
- Form of Conclusion
 - Source probability (posterior probability)
 - Strength of Evidence Statement
 - LR; Verbal Equivalent to LR; other possibilities?
 - Random match/inclusion probability
 - Sensitivity/Specificity
 - Other possibilities?

Are numbers necessary?




2009 National Research Council Report on Forensic Science

- Forensic science reports, and any courtroom testimony stemming from them, must include clear characterizations of the limitations of the analyses, *including associated probabilities* where possible. (p. 186)

Numbers Necessary?

“When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts advanced to the stage of science.”

– Lord Kelvin (William Thomson)



Disjunction

What the expert can say:




What the jury wants to know:

What's the probability it came from the defendant?



Leap of Logic

The items share
unusual or rare
characteristics



The items have, or
probably have, a
common source

How rare do the shared characteristics need to be
to justify concluding that the items have a
common source?

How rare do they need to be to justify the
conclusion that the items probably have a common
source?

Should we allow experts to opine on source probabilities?

- A scientific expert can never opine on the probability that two items have a common source without
 - making an assumption or taking a position
 - on the strength of the non-scientific evidence in the case.
- Is that something we should allow experts to do?
- If not, what should experts say?

Does testimony about
source probabilities
usurp the role of the
jury?



- And what should be the fate of usurpers???


A Random Match Probability

18



A Frequency Estimate

19



Diagnostic Statistics: Sensitivity and Specificity


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THE CHANCES
YOU'D FIND A HEAVILY
WORN, SIZE 10, WAFFLE TREAD,
PRINT AT THE CRIME SCENE ARE
100% IF THE SUSPECT'S SHOE
MADE THE PRINT--BUT ONLY
1% OF SOME RANDOM SHOE
MADE THE PRINT.

A Likelihood Ratio

21



SO THE EVIDENCE
IS 100X MORE LIKELY IF
THE PRINT WAS MADE BY
THE SUSPECT'S SHOE
THAN A RANDOM
SHOE.

“Verbal Equivalents” to Likelihood Ratios

Standards for Numerical and Verbal Expression of Likelihood Ratios (Association of Forensic Science Providers, 2009)

Recommended likelihood ratio terminology	
Numerical expression	Verbal expression (support)
> 1–10	Weak or limited
10–100	Moderate
100–1,000	Moderately strong
1,000–10,000	Strong
10,000–1,000,000	Very strong
> 1,000,000	Extremely strong

Issues for Discussion

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How should forensic scientists report their findings?

- Categorical Approach
- Quantitative Approach
 - Empirical
 - Subjective



Traditional Categorical Characterizations

- Individualization/Identification
(sometimes to “a reasonable scientific certainty”)
- Match/Inclusion/Consistent with...
- Inconclusive
- Exclusion

Elaborated Categories (SWGDOC)

- Identification (definite conclusion of identity)
- Strong probability (highly probable, very probable)
- Probable
- Indications (evidence to suggest)
- No conclusion (totally inconclusive, indeterminate)
- Indications did not
- Probably did not
- Strong probability did not
- Elimination

SWGTRAD Categories (A reasonable alternative?)

- Lacks sufficient detail
- Exclusion
- Indications of non-association
- Limited association of class characteristics
- Association of class characteristics
- High degree of association
- Identification


Perceived Benefits of Numbers

- Valid
- Transparent
- Precise

What kind of numbers?

- *Frequencies /Match Probabilities (RMPs)*
 - E.g., "...the shared genetic characteristics would be found in 1 person in 10 million" (in some reference population)
 - E.g., "...the probability of finding these characteristics in a random individual (from a reference population) is 1 in 10 million"
- *Likelihood Ratios*
 - E.g., "The evidence is x times more likely under the proposition that *defendant is the source* than under the proposition that *someone else is the source*."
- Verbal Equivalents (to Likelihood Ratios)

Figure 5: Bayesian Network Model for Evaluating the Probative Value of the Forensic Evidence Based on Individual Perceptions of the RMP, FRP and FUP



	Framed (F)		Not Framed (NF)	
	G	NG	G	NG
Match (M)	1	1	1	RMP
No Match (NM)	0	0	0	1-RMP

	Guilty (G)	Not Guilty (NG)
Framed (F)	FUP	FUP
Not Framed (NF)	1-FUP	1-FUP

	Match (M)	No Match (NM)
Match Reported (R)	1	FRP
Not Reported	0	1-FRP

- Will jurors understand forensic statistics?

