Federal Information Security Educators (FISSEA) Winter Forum

STRONGER TOGETHER

February 15, 2022

1:00pm – 4:00pm ET

#FISSEA | nist.gov/fissea

fissea
FEDERAL
CYBERSECURITY | INNOVATION . AWARENESS . TRAINING

NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

Welcome and Opening Remarks from FISSEA Co-Chair

Maureen Premo

FISSEA Co-Chair
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department of Homeland Security

Get Involved

✉ Subscribe to the FISSEA Mailing List
FISSEAUpdates@list.nist.gov

Volunteer for the Planning Committee

🏆 Serve on the Contest or Award Committees for 2022
Email fissea@nist.gov

FISSEA Call for Proposals

OPEN year-round

March 18, 2022 – deadline for FISSEA Spring Forum priority consideration

Submit proposals at:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/fisseacallforpresentations

FISSEA Innovator of the Year Award

Recognize an individual who has made significant contributions in inspiring the strategic planning, building, and management of innovative cybersecurity awareness and training programs.

Nominations due **April 4, 2022**

Submit nominations at:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/fisseainnovatorform

Best Practices for Diversity and Inclusion in Training

Diann W. McCants, Ph.D.
Strategic Analysis, Inc.
Contractor Support to Laboratories and Personnel
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

Best Practices for Diversity and Inclusion in STEM: A Guide by and for Federal Agencies

A REPORT BY THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON INCLUSION IN STEM

DR. DIANN W. MCCANTS

LABORATORIES AND PERSONNEL OFFICE, DOD (CONTRACTOR SUPPORT)

Overview

- The IWGIS was established according to the American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (2017)
- An interagency working group under the Committee on STEM Education (CoSTEM) and the Federal Coordination in STEM Education (FC-STEM) Subcommittee
- Collaborative effort of representatives from 19 Federal agencies
- Why this document now
  - Executing a strategic approach
  - Critical role of diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility : Priority of current Administration
    - Executive Order 14035: ***Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce***
- The process for developing this summary of best practices that can be employed by Federal agencies as they implement strategies to promote diversity and inclusion in the Federal STEM workforce included:
  - Developing definitions
  - Reviewing the literature
  - Soliciting best practices from Federal agencies

Overview of CoSTEM



Committee on STEM Education (CoSTEM)*

Alondra Nelson (OSTP), Sethuraman Panchanathan (NSF)

Federal Coordination in STEM Education (FC-STEM) Subcommittee

Nafeesa Owens (OSTP), Sylvia Butterfield (NSF), Mike Kincaid (NASA)

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUPS (IWGs) (6)

- Convergence
- Computational Literacy
- Strategic Partnerships
- Transparency and Accountability
- Inclusion in STEM *
- Veterans in STEM *

FC-STEM-supported Communities of Practice:

- Federal Internships
- STEM Communications

***Congressionally Mandated**

Key Contributors

Report Writing Team	Other Key Contributors
Dr. Maria Carranza, HHS/NIH	**Ms. Grace Hu**, OMB
Dr. Amy D’Amico, SI	**Dr. Marlene Kaplan**, DOC/NOAA
Ms. Tajjay Gordon, NSF	**Mr. Greg Simmons**, DHS
Mr. Noller Herbert, USDA	**Ms. Dawn Tucker-Thomas**, DOT
Dr. Sylvia Butterfield, NSF	**Dr. Julie Carruthers**, DOE
Dr. Charlene Le Fauve, HHS/NIH	**Ms. Leslie Wheelock,** FDA
Ms. Yuliya Manyakina, NSF	**Mr. Bryant Maldonado**, HHS/NIH
Dr. Diann McCants, DOD	**Dr. Dane Samilo**, DOD
Dr. Eleanour Snow, DOI/USGS	
Dr. Natasha White, NOAA	

Key Topics Covered

- Definitions
- Current Status of the Federal STEM Workforce
- Barriers to Diversity and Inclusion in STEM
- Key Areas for Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in STEM
- Promising and Emerging Practices
- Recommendations to Help Increase Recruitment, Retention, Achievement, and Advancement of Underrepresented Groups

Introduction

- Understanding and identifying barriers within Federal agencies and STEM pathways is integral to developing and implementing best practices.
- This content was assembled from an extensive STEM literature review.
- It provides an overview of leading institutional and individual barriers to diversity and inclusion in STEM.

Barriers Cover Numerous Areas

- Policies
- Workplace Climate
- Differential Compensation Packages
- Availability and Use of Data
- Cost of Education
- Workplace Interactions
- Individualized STEM Workforce Barriers
- Perceptions of STEM Programs
- Stereotypes and Stereotype Threat
- Biases
- Science Identity
- Accessibility for Individuals with Disabilities

Key Areas for Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in STEM



STEM Pathways

Access and Recruitment

Achievement and Advancement

Retention

Key Areas for Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in STEM

STEM Pathways

Career paths are not always linear

Guided Pathways

Pathways for specific groups: Military Veterans

Appealing STEM Pathways

Example

The NASA Community College Aerospace Scholars (NCAS) is a nationwide activity designed for post-traditional learners enrolled in an accredited 2-year institution in the U.S. who are interested in a STEM career.

- Helps students make the connection between a STEM degree and NASA career opportunities
- Prepares and motivates students to participate in other competitive NASA projects, programs, and internships
- Encourages community college students to finish their 2-year degree and pursue a 4-year degree or career in a STEM field

Key Areas for Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in STEM

Access and Recruitment

Broad access and Intentional Recruitment are Critical

Partnerships in support of individuals from groups currently underrepresented in STEM

Leverage Human Resources Departments

Human Resources Departments can play a key role:

- Identify and change recruitment and hiring practices that fail to be inclusive
  - Consider marketing materials, recruitment sources, qualifying questions and candidate scoring rubrics, make-up of hiring committees, and the interview processes
- Address unconscious bias. For example, rather than viewing hiring persons with disabilities as just being “the right thing to do,” it must be viewed as part of a talent strategy that will benefit the organization
- Use appropriate data for comparison when assessing diversity and inclusion internal to your agency
  - For example, only 13% of companies in the U.S. have reached the Department of Labor’s target of having 7% disability representation in their workforce

Key Areas for Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in STEM

Retention

Retention is key in maintaining D&I

Alignment of institutional culture and climate

Institutional Commitment and Accountability

Data Disaggregation and Intersectionality

Data Disaggregation and Intersectionality:

To adequately understand the issues that impact retention, institutions must look at differences by population and STEM discipline as an important factor in implementing effective strategies for change

- Data disaggregated by populations, geographical regions, and race/ethnicities is critical to STEM participation, identifying target populations, and capturing their unique characteristics
- Furthermore, data must be disaggregated by sex within race/ethnicity, disability, citizenship, and STEM discipline to understand the experiences at the intersection of different identities
- Evaluation studies with disaggregated data can help leaders set goals related to their duties and responsibilities and be more reflective about their decision-making processes

Key Areas for Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in STEM

Achievement and Advancement

Achievement can be related to individuals, but the opportunity for achievement is systemic

Establish clear guidelines for evaluation and promotion

Develop robust systems of support

Create opportunities and pathways for growth

Example

The NIST International and Academic Affairs Office (IAAO) implements several best practices to support inclusion in STEM through achievement and advancement, as well as retention

- IAAO utilizes affinity groups and employee resource groups to raise awareness and expand networks for diversity and inclusion in STEM
- The mission of the Steering Group for Equity in Career Advancement is to identify the causes of apparent inequities in **promotions at NIST for women and minority researchers** and make recommendations

Recommendations

- Recommendations are grouped into four categories to address:
  - Use of definitions for evidence-based, emerging, and promising practices
  - Barriers to participation in STEM
  - Ways to increase diversity and inclusion in STEM
  - Incorporating emerging and promising practices

To Use Definitions

- Use the definitions of evidence-based, emerging, and promising practices to explain the best practices that are used
- These definitions will:
  - Clarify what works and why a practice is adopted for a specific group
  - Substantiate the expectations of effectiveness

To Address Barriers to Participation

- Identify barriers to access and participation in STEM programs and partner with other agencies, institutions, and professional organizations
- Create a comprehensive plan that includes incentives for participants and grantees to demonstrate progress.

To Address Barriers to Participation

- Focus on one or more institutional barriers to STEM such as policies, workplace climate, differential compensation packages, data, and peer-to-peer interactions.
- Require program participants and grant recipients to share how they will reduce or eliminate institutional barriers to diversity in STEM.

To Address Barriers to Participation

- Focus on one or more individualized barriers to participation in STEM and develop programs that address areas such as mentoring, support systems, discrimination, perception of STEM programs, stereotypes and stereotype threat, bias, and STEM identity
- Focus on one or more barrier impacting STEM participation for individuals with disabilities
  - Develop policies and practices to ensure their representation in leadership and decision-making bodies

To Increase Diversity and Inclusion

- Develop a pathways approach to STEM academic and career programs that allows multiple entry points allowing participants to build on their academic achievement and research expertise
- Identify barriers to access and participation in STEM programs then develop strategies to reduce or eliminate them by partnering with other agencies, institutions, and professional organizations

To Increase Diversity and Inclusion

- Create a plan and provide opportunities for leadership training and skills development
- Use existing Federal leadership programs or create leadership development efforts
- Provide unconscious bias training for existing managers to raise awareness about the impact of implicit bias

To Increase Diversity and Inclusion

- Use existing hiring authorities to diversify the Federal STEM workforce at all levels
- Develop more flexible hiring pay authorities, particularly for entry level positions
- Create authority for Federal scholars and fellows to be hired noncompetitively into Federal service

Questions

Thank You!

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/091621-Best-Practices-for-Diversity-Inclusion-in-STEM.pdf

FISSEA Trivia Competition

Susan Hansche

FISSEA Chair
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Department of Homeland Security

Standards and Guidance for Cybersecurity Training Program: *Updates to NIST Special Publications 800-50 and 800-16 Creating a Cybersecurity and Privacy Awareness and Training Program*

Marian Merritt

Deputy Director
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE)
National Institute of Standards and Technology

Jess Dickson

IT Specialist (Privacy)
Privacy Engineering Program
National Institute of Standards and Technology

NICE

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Update to NIST SP 800-50/800-16

Marian Merritt and Jess Dickson

Outline

- Overview of the project
  - History of the publications
  - Why update now?
- Key Objectives
- Work to Date
- Take-aways from pre-draft comments
- Next steps
- Q&A

Overview: History of the publications:

NIST Special Publication 800-50

NIST
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
Technology Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce

Building an Information
Technology Security Awareness
and Training Program

Mark Wilson and Joan Hash

COMPUTER SECURITY

Computer Security Division
Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8933

October 2003

U.S. Department of Commerce

Donald L. Evans, Secretary

Technology Administration

Phillip J. Bond, Under Secretary for Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director

- 800-50: “Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program”
  - October 2003
  - Foundational document to guide creation of an organization’s cybersecurity A/T program

Overview: History of the publications (cont):



NIST Special Publication 800-16

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE
Technology Administration
National Institute of Standards
and Technology

Mark Wilson — Editor
Dorothea E. de Zafra
Sadie I. Pitcher
John D. Tressler
John B. Ippolito

**Information Technology Security
Training Requirements:
A Role- and Performance-Based Model**

- 800-16 “Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A Role and Performance-Based Model”
- April 1998
- Revised:
  - V1 3rd draft 2014
  - Prelim draft R2 2020 (not published)

Overview: Why Update Now?

- Opportunity to sync NIST guidance with latest updates and recommendations from outside guidance informing this work
  - OMB A-130
  - National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2021
  - Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014
- Opportunity to address gaps and open questions within existing guidance

Key Objectives

- Update to security awareness and training program lifecycle
- Incorporating privacy awareness and training programs in parallel with security
- Consolidation of 800-50 and 800-16
- Incorporate NICE Workforce Framework KSTs

Work to Date

- Co-authoring team formed:
  - NIST (NICE and Privacy Engineering), DHS, OPM, DOT
- Pre-draft Call for Comments
  - Issued Sept. 21, 2021
  - Closed Nov. 5, 2021
  - Adjudication completed Jan. 2022

Take-aways from pre-draft comments

- Interest in an iterative lifecycle approach
- Desire for flexibility, scalability
- Standardized, clearly defined terms
  - E.g., awareness, literacy training, role-based training
- Wider stakeholder and SME input
- Reflect current work environment and requirements (i.e. remote workforce)

Take-aways from pre-draft comments (cont)

- Importance of tying A&T programs together with security & privacy risk management efforts
- Metrics – what is useful, what can be measured
- Feedback mechanisms
- Post-implementation assessment steps

Today:

- Incorporating Julie Haney/Jody Jacobs research
  - Focus groups with Cybersecurity Training/Awareness Managers
- Finalizing outline
- Assigning sections to SMEs on authoring team

Next Steps: Rough Timeline

- February - Co-authors collaborate on a draft
- March - Internal review NIST and other agencies
- Late March – **publish for comments (45 days)**
- May – June: adjudicated comments/revise
- July – internal review
- August/September – final version

Questions?

NICE

NATIONAL INITIATIVE FOR **CYBERSECURITY** EDUCATION

Thank You!

Federal Information Security Educators (FISSEA) Fall Forum

STRONGER TOGETHER

BREAK

The Forum will resume at 2:45pm ET

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Welcome Back!

Susan Hansche

FISSEA Chair
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Department of Homeland Security

An Overview of SMS/Text Scams Impersonating State and Federal Agencies During the Pandemic

Mark Henderson

Online Fraud Detection and Prevention
Internal Revenue Service

An Overview of SMS/Text Scams Impersonating State and Federal Agencies During the Pandemic

Mark Henderson

Internal Revenue Service

Online Fraud Detection and Prevention

OS:CTO:C:O:OFDP

Desk: 202-556-2615

mark.w.henderson@irs.gov

Disclaimer

Any views or opinions are my own and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the U.S. Treasury.

What is SMS?

- Short Message Service (SMS)
- Message size is limited (160 characters)
- Supports multiple alphabets
- Makes use of “short codes”

Phishing lifecycle [US-CERT – ST15-001]

- **A Lure**: enticing email content
- **A Hook**: an email-based exploit
  - Email with embedded malicious content that is executed as a side effect of opening the email
  - Email with malicious attachments that are activated as a side effect of opening an attachment
  - Email with “clickable” URLs: the body of the email includes a link, which displays as a recognized, legitimate website, though the actual URL redirects the user to malicious content
- **A Catch**: a transaction conducted by an actor following a successful attempt
  - Unexplainable charges
  - Unexplainable password changes

What is smishing?

- MMS/SMS/text + social engineering (“phishing”) = “smishing”
- These text messages will typically contain a domain/URL
- This domain/URL will typically lead directly/indirectly to a phishing site (“landing page”)
- In some cases, the text message will only include a telephone number that the recipient needs to “text”, with no domain/URL to “click”

Why the uptick in SMS phishing?

- **Exploiting work-from-home (WFH)** - “It’s far easier to block email phishing on corporate-owned PCs, but today’s remote workers are now using their personal devices to access corporate apps and data.”
- **“fish in a barrel”** - “The devices are literally everywhere, providing a vast, exploitable threat landscape for hackers [2.8B devices worldwide].”
- **Higher click rates** - “Consider that 90 percent of text messages are opened and read almost immediately; meanwhile, the average open rate for email hovers around 20 percent.”
- **Lack of security protections** - “Personal devices typically lack the robust security used to protect corporate devices.”
- **Distraction** - “… we’re just not paying attention.”

[Source: “Smishing: Why Text-Based Phishing Should Be on Every CISO’s Radar”
https://threatpost.com/smishing-text-phishing-ciso-radar/165634/]

Smishing requires different abuse handling

- Smartphones have limited screen real-estate
- SMS messages aren’t typically provided in their raw text form
- Typosquatting makes identifying the URL from a screenshot difficult
- SMS messages can be difficult to trace

Reporting smishing

- Reporting the text of the SMS/text is best: press on a blank area of the message and select “Copy”
- IRS-related smishing can be reported:
  - via SMS using 202-552-1226 and/or email to phishing@irs.gov (e.g., plain ASCII or screenshot)
- IRS-related and non-IRS smishing can also be reported:
  - via the messaging app
  - by copying the message and sending to **7726** (SPAM)
  - to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) at ftc.gov/complaint

Caveat about 7726

- Forwarding to 7726 does **not** remove the actual phishing content
    - 7726 provides details of the message to the telecommunications provider
- Filing a complaint with the FTC typically does **not** action the phishing content
- You will need to report the numbers and the domains/URLs separately

“Joe Biden” Pandemic smish

- “406-559-0719” = Verizon
- “forms.zohopublic.com” is a free online form builder
- Potential “man in the mailbox” phishing attempt



+1 (406) 559-0719

Text Message
Today 8:56 AM

CLAIM YOUR COVID 19 RELIEF BONUS FUNDS
This is an opportunity for you to be among the people who will benefit from extra pandemic relief bonus set up by Joe Biden with a sum of $1400 every week as pandemic relief bonus.

Apply here for more information about the procedure:

https://forms.zohopublic.com/pandemicrelief2/form/UNEMPLOYMENTINSURANCERELIEF/formperma/ZITMZ0x_p-rcxi1UhmxmOVImMspoPKQVd3zAn6vRc8Y

hxxps://forms[.]zohopublic[.]com/pandemicrelief2/form/UNEMPLOYMENTINSURANCERELIEF/formperma/ZITMZ0x_p-rcxi1UhmxmOVImMspoPKQVd3zAn6vRc8Y

“Joe Biden” Pandemic smish

- “Unemployment Insurance Relief”
- “Unemployment Insurance Application Form”



UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE RELIEF

DURING COVID-19 OUTBREAK

$1,400

payments per person with more than 5 million in mixed-status families eligible

$40B*

to keep families in their homes including $100 million for housing counseling, and $10B for mortgage assistance. A relief to the 64% of Latinos worried about making their next

$109B*

to fight poverty including the 9.9 million Latino children newly eligible for the full Child Tax Credit

$54.5B*

to give people access to the health care they need with lower-cost health coverage and funding for community health centers

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPLICATION FORM

Before filing, make sure you have the following information available:

- **Social Security number**
- **Driver’s license or State ID number**

You do not need to do anything to receive your payment. It will arrive by mail in the form of a paper check or debit card or direct deposit to your bank account.

hxxps://forms[.]zohopublic[.]com/pandemicrelief2/form/UNEMPLOYMENTINSURANCERELIEF/formperma/ZITMZ0x_p-rcxi1UhmxmOVImMspoPKQVd3zAn6vRc8Y

“Joe Biden” Pandemic phishing site (cont.)

- “Front of your State ID/License”
- “Back of your State ID/License”
- “Front of your SSN CARD”
- “Back of your SSN CARD”



Race - Please select all that apply:

□ African American/Black American

□ Indian/Alaskan Native

□ As an Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander

□ White

□ I do not wish to answer

Front of your State ID/License

Drag & Drop (or) Choose File

Back of your State ID/License

Drag & Drop (or) Choose File

Front of your SSN CARD

Drag & Drop (or) Choose File

Back of your SSN CARD

Drag & Drop (or) Choose File

Submit

Do not submit confidential information such as credit card details, Mobile and ATM PINs, account passwords, etc. Report Abuse

smishing scams sent to phishing@irs.gov

- phishing@irs.gov receives a variety of online scams including smishing scams
- Smishing sent to phishing@irs.gov often references:
  - IRS, Treasury and/or is tax-related
  - USG programs (e.g., CARES Act)
  - One or more other USG agencies
  - State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) (e.g., State Workforce Agencies)
  - None of the above (e.g., banks, telcos, etc.)

# of reported IRS-related smishing incidents



Current as of 2022-01-24

IR-2020-167: Press release


Home / News / IRS Tax Tips / IRS warns people about a COVID-related text message scam
English | Español | 中文 (繁體) | 한국어 | Русский | Tiếng Việt
Topics in the News
News Releases
Multimedia Center
Tax Relief in Disaster Situations
Tax Reform

IRS warns people about a COVID-related text message scam

COVID Tax Tip 2020-167, December 8, 2020

The IRS and it's Security Summit partners are warning people to be aware of a new text message scam. The thief's goal is to trick people into revealing bank account information under the guise of receiving the $1,200 Economic Impact Payment.

Here's how this scam works

People get a text message saying they have "received a direct deposit of $1,200 from COVID-19 TREAS FUND. Further action is required to accept this payment… Continue here to accept this payment …" The text includes a link to a phishing web address.

Smishing versus Vishing complaint volume



Current as of 2022-01-24

% of IRS smishing that is “stimulus”-themed



Current as of 2022-01-24

Examples of observed techniques

- AT&T Email to Text
- Fraudulent domains serving as a redirects
- Redirection leveraging trusted sites (i.e., legitimate URL shorteners redirecting to phishing URLs)
- “Numbers-only” smish (i.e., no URL or domain)

AT&T email-to-text

If you create an email with an AT&T telephone number as the username, you can send a text message from your email

“[1234567890]@txt.att.net”

1410100013



Text Message
Today 3:23 PM

FRM:Mark
SUBJ:Test
MSG:

Sent from my iPhone

AT&T Smish - Fraudulent domain as redirect

- 1410100025 = AT&T email-to-text
- f2c[.]host is a fraudulent domain
- Domain redirected to a “Get My Payment” phishing site
- Phishing landing page asked for screenshot of the victim’s Driver’s License, front and back



Text Message
Today 1:40 PM

FRM:IRS-Follow:www.f2c.host/?IRS10471482128.
SUBJ:COVID-19 Relief Fund
MSG:File For $1400.00 Stimulus Check Today. MSGNo:36171077

hxxp://www[.]f2c[.]host/?IRS10471482128

“Chaining” multiple redirects is common

```
curl –vv ‘hxxp://www[.]f2c[.]host/?IRS10584232211’
…
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: hxxps://f2c[.]uno/redi/3? IRS10584232211’
```

f2c[.]{host,uno}

Registrar: Hostinger

Creation Date: 2021-02-26

Leveraging Trusted Sites (e.g., lnkd.in)

- 309-512-3852 = AT&T
- lnkd[.]in is a LinkedIn URL shortener
- See the Living off Trusted Sites Project (lots-project.com)
- Redirected to a website using dynamic DNS



Text Message
Today 1:55 PM

You have received a direct deposit in the amount of $1,400 from COVID-19 TREAS FUND:https://lnkd.in/euHT2Bg Claim Payment.

hxxps://lnkd[.]in/euHT2Bg

“Get My Payment” phishing website



An official website of the United States Government

IRS

Español Help

Get My Payment

If you need additional help, please visit our Frequently Asked Questions page.

All fields marked with an asterisk(*) are required.

First Name *

M.I.

Last Name *

Driver's License Number *

Expiration date *

State Issued *

Select one

Social Security Number (SSN) or Individual Tax ID Number (ITIN) *

Date of Birth *

MM/DD/YYYY

Street Address *

ZIP or Postal Code (* Required except for countries without ZIP or postal codes)

Phone Number *

Phone Carrier Pin

Phone Carrier e.g.(Verizon, AT&T) *

Mother's Maiden Name

CONTINUE

IRS

IRS Privacy Policy

Accessibility

myaccount-gov[.]sytes[.]net/?access_protect

IRS EIP “numbers-only” smish

- 336-524-3275 = Verizon
- 920-341-5658 = Bandwidth
- No domain and/or URL in the message
- Small number of recipients



Text Message
Today 5:22 PM

+1 (336) 524-3275

Economic Impact Payments from IRS on a weekly basis. You are eligible to receive the plus-up payment of $5500 from the Department of Treasury& BIS. To get your payment, you only need to verify your identity with a VALID I.D. Be informed that no payment is required. To complete your verification and get more information, TEXT your Full Name to 9203415658

State, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) agencies

Overview

- Fraudsters continue to send a variety of scams to taxpayers via email, text and social media
- During the pandemic, a subset of complaints we received were from individuals reporting scams targeting various state benefits programs
- Fraudsters are creating phishing websites (e.g., fake State unemployment web portals)
- Fraudsters are collecting victim information (e.g., email credentials, driver’s license, etc.)
- This information is then used to conduct different types of fraud (e.g., unemployment insurance fraud)

What States have (already) observed

- California (CA) - “DMV warning customers about a text message scam”
- Florida (FL) – “Text scammers have new ploy posing as the DMV”
- Illinois (IL) – “Illinois residents targeted by scam text messages” [“... scam text messages from the DMV”]
- New York (NY) – “New York State DMV warns of new text messaging scam”
- Texas (TX) - How to Spot the Latest Scam Texts, Emails Targeting Texans [“Texas Department of Motor Vehicles”]

Arkansas smishing lure

“Your Arkansas Unemployment Insurance Claim account is currently on hold for verification, Please complete your verification by following the instructions in the link below: hxxps://tinyurl[.]com/n5emccpf to reactivate your account.”

hxxps://tinyurl[.]com/n5emccpf

Arkansas smishing landing page



Arkansas.gov
Agencies | Online Services | Policies
DWS DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
ADWS Home
AR Claim Help
FAQ
Log In

Welcome to **ArkNet** *(Arkansas Internet Continued Claims System)* En español

Please log in: (If you set a PIN on Arkline use that PIN here)

ID (Social Security Number)
DOB (MMDDYYYY)
PIN (Personal Identification Number)
If you have not already established a four-digit PIN using Arkline, enter your new PIN above and click this box: □

LOG IN

Bookmark this site!

Warning:

ADWS does not send text messages, emails or initiate calls to claimants requesting they provide us with their Social Security Numbers and/or personal banking information.

Individuals seeking to file unemployment insurance claims should only use ADWS secured websites accessible through dws.arkansas.gov

Servicios de Interpretación/Traducción disponibles por medio de su oficina local.
Ewōr ka'kōl in ukok ilo jikin jeje im kamanan ilo opij ko ija kwoj pad ie.
Các Dịch Vụ Thông Dịch/Phiên Dịch có sẵn qua văn phòng địa phương của quý vị.
[illegible]
Interpretation/Translation services available through your local office.

Use of this system may be monitored to detect improper use and potential violations of state policy.

ArkNet is restricted to users who have established a current and valid Arkansas Unemployment Insurance Claim. **Unauthorized use of this system constitutes a security violation.** Violators may be subject to disciplinary or civil action, or criminal prosecution under applicable Federal and State laws.

This site is best suited if used with Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 or higher or Mozilla Firefox 2.0

Contact ADWS ADWS Privacy Policy
Copyright © 2007 Arkansas Department of Workforce Services

hxxps://designcoders[.]com/aa/arknet/arkansas/gov/

California smish

- 347-785-0194 = Verizon
- mybenefitclaims[.]com: Namecheap
- “Rita L. Saenz Director Employment Development”



Text Message
Today 7:45 AM

Congrats, We are pleased to inform you that your information was picked up for COVID-19 Stimulus payment from the Federal Government by JOE BIDEN https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=-SBvRS28h9s. You're Eligible to the payment. Kindly follow the link to complete the form http://www.mybenefitclaims.com/ When you've submitted your details, Bob Jewell from Employment Department will contact you for more details on how you will receive your money ASAP. Thanks Rita L. Saenz Director Employment Development

hxxp://www[.]mybenefitclaims[.]com/

Illinois smish

- t[.]co = URL shortener (Twitter)

Office secretary of state(IL):

DL Details seems to be missing or lncorrect.

Follow steps:hxxps://t[.]co/wMC1usiAwx

hxxps://t[.]co/wMC1usiAwx

Illinois smishing landing page

- Picture of “Jesse White”, IL Secretary of State
- “Driver’s License Number”
- “Social Security Number (000-00-000)*”
- Contact Number



Office of the Illinois Secretary of State
Jesse White
Secretary of State
Seal of the State of Illinois

Illinois secretary of state important message.

Illinois license department routine check has found some irregularities in your current Driver's License Profile Which indicates that the information given is no longer accurate or up to date.

To avoid termination of your Driver's License Please complete the form.

Note: You must use your current valid and official information to complete this form

Sincerely,

Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.

* Required

hxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSe88iCqdgV0FW5PYB03NQRqjC4lq7-WOb-1AVff48kwU3ow0g/viewform

Maryland smish

- 833-851-0738 = Vonage
- “beacon.labor.maryland.gov” is the sub-domain but not the actual domain
- labor-maryland[.]com = Tucows



+1 (833) 851-0738 ›

Text Message
Today 11:09 PM

claim 4th impact payment of $ 1600. Entering here https://beacon.labor.maryland.gov.labor-maryland.com/

The state of Maryland makes an impact payment of $ 1600 by entering here https://beacon.labor.maryland.gov.labor-maryland.com/

Maryland smishing landing page



Welcome to the Maryland Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance BEACON system. To login to your account enter your username and password below and select 'Login'.

Important Notice: The four federal unemployment insurance programs -- PUA, PEUC, FPUC, and MEUC -- will end in Maryland on Saturday, July 3, 2021. For more information, please visit MDUnemployment.com

Username:

Password:

Captcha

□ Remember Me

Forgot Username

Forgot Password

□ Web Accessibility Mode for the Visually Impaired

Login

Click here to file an unemployment insurance claim if you do not have an existing account.

Click here to activate your existing unemployment insurance account. If you activated your account in the One-Stop application, you will access your BEACON account with the same username and password.

hxxps://beacon.labor.maryland.gov.labor-maryland[.]com/

Resources

- CISA (“Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks”)
- FCC (“Consumer Tips to Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Avoid Phone Scams”)
- FCC (“FCC Smartphone Security Checker”)
- FTC (“How To Recognize and Report Spam Text Messages”)
- IRS (“Here's How To Avoid IRS Text Message Scams”)

What can your organization do about it?

- Recognize fraudulent components of common scams (e.g., domains, emails, URLs, numbers, social media profiles/sites, etc.)
- Establish workflows to record/report abuse to the appropriate service providers
- Provide an email alias and/or online form to report scams to your organization
- Provide victims with additional resources for reporting (e.g., IC3.gov) on your website and/or in your auto-reply
- Identify victim information if possible and then share with appropriate groups
- Share lessons learned with others

Questions?

mark.w.henderson@irs.gov

Showcasing the Use of a Cyber Range for the President's Cup Competition

Michael Harpin

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Department of Homeland Security

★ ★ ★

PRESIDENT'S CUP

CYBERSECURITY COMPETITION

CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY

CISA

PRESIDENT'S CUP
CYBERSECURITY COMPETITION

President's Cup Cybersecurity Competition

Building a Competition Across the Federal Workforce

CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY
CISA

What is the President’s Cup Cybersecurity Competition?

- America’s Cybersecurity Workforce E.O. 13870 mandates DHS to hold the competition annually.
- The goal of the competition is to identify and reward the top cybersecurity talent in the federal workforce.

2021 Winners		
Individual Track A USMC	**Individual Track B** USAF	**Team** 780th Military Intelligence Brigade

- Any federal executive department or agency employee can participate, including uniformed service members.
- Participants can compete as an Individual, on a Team of up to five members, or both.

Considerations for President’s Cup Platform

- Accessible anywhere from a standard web browser
  - Minimum Hardware/Software requirements for end users
- Scalable to support potentially thousands of concurrent participants across the federal .gov/.mil
- Open-Source Resources
  - TopoMojo – https://github.com/cmu-sei/TopoMojo
  - Gameboard - https://github.com/cmu-sei/Gameboard
  - Identity - https://github.com/cmu-sei/Identity

President's Cup Challenge Development

- Each challenge is tied to a NICE Work Role
- Built within TopoMojo
  - Multiple variants of each challenge created and deployed at random
  - "Infinity challenges" – variants within challenge randomized by TopoMojo
- Quality Assurance for each challenge
  - Playtesting conducted by National Labs with support of DOE
- Session timer
  - Influences challenge development and competitor strategy



Where's the site?

There was an update to a mission critical website, but we don't know where the new site is. Can you help?

NICE Work Roles:

Exploitation Analyst

NICE Tasks:

- T0266 - Perform analysis for target infrastructure exploitation activities.

Accessing the Challenges



Status

Game window closes in 325d

Space Pirate

Rank	Score	Cumulative Time	Completes	Partials
0	0	00:00:00	0	0

After starting the session, the clock expires after 60 minutes.

Session Forecast

Shows when sessions become available. (Green means available.)

13:53
14:23
14:53
15:23
15:53
16:23
16:53
17:23
17:53
18:23
18:53
19:23
19:53
20:23
20:53
21:23



Analyze This!

Analyze a Packet Capture (pcap) file.

NICE Work Roles:

Cyber Defense Analyst

NICE Tasks:

- T0023 - Characterize and analyze network traffic to identify anomalous activity and potential threats to network resources.

Background

We recently collected this pcap file and we need you to answer some questions about it!

Getting Started

Using the provided workstations, visit http://challenge.us to download the pcap file. You can analyze the pcap any way you'd like in order to answer the questions.

Submission Format

There are four (4) questions for this challenge. Enter the IP address that answers each question correctly below.

Note

Attacking or unauthorized access to challenge.us (10.5.5.5) is forbidden. You may only use the provided web page to view challenge progress and download any challenge artifacts that are provided.

System Credentials

system	username	password
kali-workstation	user	tartans
win10-workstation	user	tartans

Gamespace Resources



Challenge Questions

1. (30) Which IP address received the most packets?

2. (30) Which IP address sent the least packets?

3. (40) Which IP address sent the most bytes?

(Session ends in 58m)

Score: 0 of 100

Support Code: eb89709f d02

Gameboard Updates in 2021

- Consolidated Gameboards into a single application
- Integrated challenge metadata
- Migrated email functionality away from Gameboard
  - PII protections



President's Cup Cybersecurity Competition

Live!

Upcoming Games

Completed Games

PRESIDENT'S CUP
CYBERSECURITY COMPETITION

Foundry Appliance

- Pre-configured VM that packages President's Cup applications
- Single-host Kubernetes cluster to replicate production deployment
- Uses VMware ESXi to serve virtual challenge environments
- https://github.com/cmu-sei/foundry-appliance



Carnegie Mellon University
Software Engineering Institute

Foundry Appliance v0.4.0

Welcome to the Foundry Appliance. This virtual machine hosts workforce development apps from the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University.

Getting Started

The appliance advertises the *foundry.local* domain via mDNS. All apps are served as directories under this domain.

To get started using the virtual appliance:

1. Download root-ca.crt and trust it in your keychain/certificate store. This removes browser certificate warnings.
2. Navigate to any of the apps in the following two sections.
3. Unless otherwise noted, the default credentials are:

```
user: administrator@foundry.local
pass: foundry
code: 123456
```

Foundry Apps

The following Foundry applications are loaded on this appliance:

Outlook for President's Cup System

- Moving system to DHS cloud environment.
  - Potential for additional competitions and challenge developers.
- Standing up archive site.
- Releasing source code of challenges to public after each competition.
- Continued development of Foundry Appliance



PCCC Practice Area

Practice demo challenges and content from past President's Cup competitions

2021 Practice
Gameboard

Challenge Archive
Gameboard

Open Source Challenges
GitHub

Walkthrough Videos
YouTube

PRESIDENT’S CUP

CYBERSECURITY COMPETITION

President's Cup Format

- The competition has three rounds – two Qualifying Rounds and Finals.
- Qualifying Rounds
  - Must succeed in first qualifying round to participate in second round
    - Teams – best team from each Department, plus top 20% based on score
    - Individuals – Top 100
- Final Round
  - Top 5 Teams and Top 10 Individuals in Tracks A/B
  - Day 2 of Teams Finals Livestreamed via YouTube

Insider Threat Program Training: Gaining Management Awareness and Support

Rebekah Ibarra
Insider Threat Program Manager
Social Security Administration

Joe Hoofnagle
Senior Advisor Cybersecurity & Intelligence
Social Security Administration

Insider Threat Program Training

Gaining Management Awareness and Support

February 15, 2022

Rebekah Ibarra
Insider Threat & Intelligence

Joe Hoofnagle
Insider Threat & Intelligence

Managing the Effort: Insider Threat Program Manager

- Over 23 years working with the US Army as an active duty and civilian counterintelligence (CI) special agent and as intelligence professional and manager.
- Experience with countless CI and Insider Threat inquiries and investigations for the DoD in the US, Europe and deployed in multiple combat zones in support of US contingency operations.
- Selected as the Program Manager for the Insider Threat Program due to background, training and experience.

Managing the Cyber Effort: Senior Subject Matter Expert

- Over 25 years of experience assessing and building programs and expert teams (Fortune 10 through 500 and Gov).
- Experience with handling hundreds of insider threat inquiries; intellectual property theft, economic espionage, PII/PHI theft, insider trading.
- Testified before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on insider threat and intellectual property theft.
- Senior consultant to public and private sectors.



Washington Field Office (WFO)

Home • Washington • Press Releases • 2012 • Former FDA Chemist Sentenced to 60 Months in Prison for Insider Trading

Former FDA Chemist Sentenced to 60 Months in Prison for Insider Trading

U.S. Department of Justice
March 05, 2012

Office of Public Affairs
(202) 514-2007/ (202) 514-1888

WASHINGTON—Cheng Yi Liang, a former Food and Drug Administration (FDA) chemist from Gaithersburg, Maryland, was sentenced today to 60 months in prison for engaging in insider trading on multiple occasions based on material, non-public information he obtained in his capacity as an FDA scientist. Liang was previously ordered to forfeit $3.7 million representing the proceeds of the insider trading scheme.

The sentence was announced today by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland Rod J. Rosenstein; James W. McJunkin, assistant director in charge of the FBI's Washington Field Office; and Elton Malone, special agent in charge, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General (HHS-OIG), Office of Investigations, Specials Investigations Branch.

Washington Field Office Links

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Wanted by the FBI - WFO

FBI Jobs

Typical Insider Threat Program

Per Executive Order 13587, October 2011, Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information required to:

- Establish an Insider Threat Program and HUB
- Appoint an Insider Threat Senior Official
- Establish an Information Sharing and Safeguarding Program
- Appoint an Information Sharing and Safeguarding Senior Official
- Appoint a Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator

Why Should Everyone be included

The more employees know and understand their organization has a mature insider threat program and their role in the program the more empowered they feel to contribute by:

- Having more awareness of their importance in spite they may perceive it a small piece
- Understanding what/why certain indicators and outliers could be a potential insider
- Knowing that external adversaries will attempt to elicit information from them no matter how seemingly insignificant, and
- Where and when to report suspected activities.

What Does Training Entail?

Although in this training example we chose elicitation as the subject for this exercise, there are certainly more topics that will provide the right message to the working staffs to include but not limited to:

- Where and when to recognize when a fellow employee may be on the wrong track.
- Knowing the signs of employee(s) behavior that may escalate into potential workplace violence.
- Observing potential systems misuse that could be interpreted as destructive or malicious

Onto the Training!

What is an “Insider Threat”?

The stakes are simply too high **NOT** to report incidents of possible insider threat as soon as they occur.

Insider: Any person with authorized access to any government or contract resource to include personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, or systems. This can include employees, former employees, consultants, and anyone with access.

The National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) defines an "insider threat" as:

The threat that an insider will use his or her authorized access wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States. This threat can include damage through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of department resources or capabilities.

NITTF Categories of Insider Threat

LEAKS
SPILLS
NEWS
ESPIONAGE
COMPANY PROPRIETARY
SABOTAGE
TARGETED VIOLENCE

Possible Indicators of Insider Threat



Vulnerabilities

Examples of vulnerabilities include:

- Financial stress
- Exploitable promiscuity
- Addictive behaviors (e.g., drug/alcohol abuse, gambling, pornography)
- Loneliness
- Disgruntlement

Elicitation Methods – as an example



Why Elicitation Works

A trained elicitor understands certain human or cultural predispositions and uses techniques to exploit them. Natural tendencies an elicitor may try to exploit include:

- A desire to be polite and helpful, even to strangers
- A desire to appear well-informed
- A desire to feel appreciated and believe we are contributing something important
- A tendency to expand on a topic when given praise or encouragement; to show off
- A tendency to gossip
- A tendency to correct others
- A tendency to underestimate the value of the information being sought or given, especially if we are unfamiliar with how else that information could be used
- A tendency to believe others are honest; a disinclination to be suspicious of others
- A tendency to answer truthfully when asked an "honest" question
- A desire to convert someone to our opinion



Elicitation Methods



Do These Techniques Work?

Since the end of the Cold War (1991):

- 67% of spies have been civilians
- 37% had no security clearance
- 84% of spies were successful
- 40% were caught immediately or in less than one year
- 19% were active for five or more years
- 67% volunteered to commit espionage
- 81% received no money for their services
- 94% went to prison

Source: Raytheon's pamphlet "What Employees Should Know About Elicitation and Foreign Intelligence Approaches"

$300,000,000,000 worth of American intellectual property and business intelligence are annually stolen by China, Russia, Iran, and others.

Catch Me if You Can!

- Nefarious activity associated with trans-national criminal groups, nation-state, and fraudster types has surged over the last 5 years.
- With the advent of social media and the like it's become very easy to connect with people of similar interests. The groups listed above are taking advantage of social media and the cooperative nature of today's connected society.
- Many recent examples are readily available on the Internet of individuals who have been caught posing as someone else in order to gain something illegally.

Seems Legit!



Claire Divas · 2nd

Professional Freelancer at Xilinx

Srinagar, Jammu & Kashmir, India · 425 connections · Contact info

Xilinx

MIET JAMMU

Highlights

4 Mutual Connections

You and Claire both know Muhannad Elhabbal, Deborah Tang, and 2 others

Not So Fast – Another Case Revealed

Experts: Spy used AI-generated face to connect with targets
By RAPHAEL SATTER June 13, 2019

LONDON (AP) — Katie Jones sure seemed plugged into Washington's political scene. The 30-something redhead boasted a job at a top think tank and a who's-who network of pundits and experts, from the centrist Brookings Institution to the right-wing Heritage Foundation. **She was connected to a deputy assistant secretary of state, a senior aide to a senator and the economist Paul Winfree, who is being considered for a seat on the Federal Reserve.**

But Katie Jones doesn't exist, The Associated Press has determined. Instead, the persona was part of a vast army of phantom profiles lurking on the professional networking site LinkedIn. And several experts contacted by the AP said Jones' profile picture appeared to have been created by a computer program.

"I'm convinced that it's a fake face," said Mario Klingemann, a German artist who has been experimenting for years with artificially generated portraits and says he has reviewed tens of thousands of such images. "It has all the hallmarks."

HUB PROCESS



POSSIBLE INSIDER THREAT DETECTED: REPORTED TO ITP

ITP EVALUATES AND REPORTS RECCOMENDATIONS TO ISSO

ISSO RECCOMENDS HUB CONVENE

INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM HUB

Counterintelligence

Security

Information Assurance/Cyber

Law Enforcement

Office of the Chief Information Officer

Human Resources

Office of the Inspector General

Office of Professional Responsibility

FURTHER INFORMATION REQUIRED

INFORMATION PROVIDED UTILIZED IN ITP INQUIRY

ITP INQUIRY DETERMINATION

ACTION TAKEN

AMINISTRATIVE REFERRAL

LAW ENFORCEMENT REFERRAL (INTERNAL)

SECTION 811 REFERRAL (FBI)

NO ACTION TAKEN

Insider Threat – Mature Program



★ **Network Activity**
- Excessively large downloads
- Access request denials

★ **Compliance Cases**
- Noncompliance with training requirements
- Policy violations

★ **Data Exfiltration**
- Spikes in outbound email traffic volume
- Attachments sent to suspicious recipients
- Removable media alerts

Time & Expense
- Expense violations
- Time entry violations

★ **Access Attributes & Behaviors**
- Access levels
- Security clearances
- Privileged user rights

Personnel Management
- Declining performance reviews
- Notice of resignation or termination
- Disciplinary action

Source: "Insider threats: What every government agency should know and do," Deloitte Dbriefs, March 2016.

Physical Security
- Physical access request denials
- Physical access anomalies

External Data
- Social media posts
- Financial duress
- Criminal/civil history
- Foreign contacts/travel

★ = Cyber Area of Responsibility

Typical Cyber Intelligence

- Created processes to better identify and respond to risks and threats.
- Comprised of:
  - Open source (OSINT)
  - Dark web
  - Cyber
  - Insider threat
  - Supply chain risk
- Activities:
  - Cultivate threat intelligence sources
  - Identify & recommend threat intelligence distribution channels and processes
  - Analyze enterprise for newly identified indicators of compromise

Resources: NITTF

- The National Threat Task Force (NITTF) released the Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework on November 1, 2018. The Framework is an aid for advancing federal agencies’ programs beyond the Minimum Standards, and builds upon best practices found in the 2017 NITTF Insider Threat Guide. The goal is to help programs become more proactive, comprehensive, and better postured to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threat risk.
- NITTF has developed technical bulletins to provide additional information to the insider threat community on technical topics existing within the Insider Threat community. Please review the NITTF Technical Page to view these bulletins.
- NITTF has added additional resources to the NITTF Resource Library in the Additional Insider Threat Resources section (formerly known as Briefings to the Insider Threat Community section). Please take some time to review these resources provided by members of the Insider Threat Community.

INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM
EFFECTIVE MITIGATION
REPORT POTENTIAL RISK FACTORS
BEFORE A NEGATIVE EVENT OCCURS
Visit https://www.cdse.edu/catalog/insider-threat.html for Insider Threat Training
CDSE

Resources: Center for the Development of Security Excellence

1. National Insider Threat Awareness Month (NITAM) 2021
2. 2021 Insider Threat Virtual Conference
3. Insider Threat Awareness INT101.16
4. Establishing an Insider Threat Program INT122.16
5. Insider Threat Toolkit
6. https://www.cdse.edu/Training/Insider-Threat/



Closing Remarks from FISSEA Chair

Susan Hansche

FISSEA Chair
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Department of Homeland Security

Complete Survey After Event

https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/FISSEAWinterForum2022

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May 17, 2022

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