ANTI-SPOOFING EVALUATION OF DYNAMIC HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE ALGORITHMS

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HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE TOOLBOX

- Genuine and Forgeries Acquisition Process
- 7 Levels of Knowledge when forging
  - Knowledge acquired controlled by the toolbox
- ISO/IEC 19794-7 2nd Generation for storing the samples acquired
- Files stored by:
  - Category (genuine/forgery)
  - User ID
  - Sample number
  - For forgeries, sample level
- Samples stored as individual files
- Availability expected by Q2-Q3 2013

- Requirements:
  - Microsoft Windows
  - Wacom STU-500 Tablet

GENUINE AND FORGER REGISTRATION

- Collects contacting information
- Allows Genuine, Forger or Both
- Personal data non attached to sample files





FORGERIES: LEVEL 1

- No a-priory knowledge about the signature





FORGERIES: LEVEL 2

- Temporal knowledge about static signature (5s)





FORGERIES: LEVEL 3

- Permanent knowledge about static signature





FORGERIES: LEVEL 4

- "Carbon-copy"





FORGERIES: LEVEL 5

- Temporal knowledge about dynamic signature (1 replay)





FORGERIES: LEVEL 6

- Controlled knowledge about the dynamic signature





FORGERIES: LEVEL 7

- Level 6 + Carbon-copy





BASELINE: GENUINE DATABASE

- Real Signatures
- Multi-device:
  - STU
  - Intuos
  - BlackBerry
  - iPad
  - Note (stylus)
- 49 people
- 60 signatures per device
- Biometric reference with the 3 first samples

BASELINE: GENUINE DATABASE

- EERs: STU (1.4%), Intuos (2.3%), Note-S (0.6%), iPad (0.8%), BB (2.3%)









FORGERY LEVEL IMPACT

- Forgers had to forge, at least, 10 unknown users
- For each level, the forger had to validate 5 forgeries.
  - For each forgery the forger is allowed to use as many attempts as possible
  - No feedback is provided to the forger about each of those attempts.
- Threshold at EER:
  - FPADER (False Presentation Attack Detection Error Rate) = % of forgeries considered as genuine

FORGERY LEVELS (STU)

- L1 (0.4%), L2 (20.6%), L3 (40.8%), L4 (60.9%), L5 (55.1%), L6 (61.3%), L7 (81.3%)















FORGERY LEVELS (INTUOS)

- L1 (0.4%), L2 (23.7%), L3 (40.7%), L4 (60.0%), L5 (53.5%), L6 (52.9%), L7 (72.2%)















FORGERY LEVELS (NOTE-S)

- L1 (0.0%), L2 (19.5%), L3 (42.8%), L4 (56.2%), L5 (56.2%), L6 (55.7%), L7 (78.4%)















FORGERY LEVELS (IPAD)

- L1 (0.2%), L2 (20.0%), L3 (38.4%), L4 (55.3%), L5 (51.4%), L6 (58.0%), L7 (72.7%)















FORGERY LEVELS (BB)

- L1 (0.8%), L2 (14.6%), L3 (27.6%), L4 (50.5%), L5 (40.3%), L6 (43.0%), L7 (64.0%)















FORGERY LEVEL IMPACT

- Behaviour is common to all devices:
  - Results seem to be dependent purely on the algorithm
  - Not dependency on whether the signature is done:
    - With a stylus or with the finger
    - In a professional Tablet, in a Smartphone or in a Tablet
- Major success in achieving forgeries when:
  - Having a static view of the signature
  - Using carbon copy
- Dynamic knowledge improves forgery
  - But not as much as expected
    - Is the algorithm really analysing the dynamics
  - But a non-professional forger obtain excellent results

FORGER PERFORMANCE

- Level 3:
  - Minimum: F03, F12, F02
  - Average: F03, F08, F04
- Level 7:
  - Minimum: F03, F07, F01
  - Average: F03, F05, F04
- Overall:
  - Average: F03, F04, F09







FORGER PERFORMANCE





SIGNATURE ROBUSTNESS

- With all this information, is it possible to conclude some tendency for the “robustness” (or quality) of the signatures?
- It has been taken the users within the 30 best and worst distances
  - Level 4 (only providing static information to the forger)
  - Level 7 (after providing dynamic information to the forger)
- Parameters analysed:
  - Length
  - Velocity (average and std)
  - Acceleration (average and std)

SIGNATURE ROBUSTNESS (L4)



- Not solid conclusion as good ones may have the same values as bad ones!
  - Further analysis to be done

SIGNATURE ROBUSTNESS (L7)



- Tendency for improvement with shorter signatures (??)
- Slight improvement with average acceleration
- Questionable tendency when increasing acceleration std

SIGNATURE ROBUSTNESS

- Not having objective metrics working, how about analysing the signatures subjectively?
- Level 4 (only static information):
  - The worst ones seem to have:
    - Easy to understand drawing (e.g. names clearly written)
    - Conventional writing flow
    - Conventional aspect ratio as of regular writing
  - The best ones are:
    - Complex in strokes and superposition of strokes
    - Not understandable (i.e. only abstract strokes)
    - Not conventional writing flow
- Level 7 (dynamics added):
  - The worst ones present the same characteristics of those at Level 4, but now without the “protection” of non-conventional writing flow
  - The best ones are:
    - Not showing understandable letters
    - Variable and non conventional proportions
    - Some of them even look very simple in drawing
- Are these results dependent on the forger and/or algorithm?

ANTI-SPOOFING INFLUENCE

- Just with the results on the different levels (just the graphics and numbers, not the forgeries), the manufacturer provided a new version of the algorithm with some anti-spoofing mechanisms implemented.
- If the signature was detected as a potential forgery, the system responded with an "artificial score" of 1 (i.e. maximum distance)
  - Request made by the laboratory
- The evaluation was carried out with the same databases:
  - Genuines / Impostors
  - Forgeries (i.e. attacks)

ANTI-SPOOFING INFLUENCE

- Changes in Algorithm Performance:
  - 7.1% of False PAD
  - 48.8% of True Zero-Effort PAD
  - EER with PAD rejections increased to 7.8%
  - EER without PAD rejections (e.g. taken as FTA) = 1.2% (<1.4%)
- Real forgeries detection:
  - 15.7% True PAD







ANTI-SPOOFING INFLUENCE

- FPADER:
  - STU (67.3%) Intuos (67.3%), Note-S (64.4%), iPad (56.7%), BB (47.7%)











CONCLUSIONS

- A tool to evaluate forgeries in handwritten signature has been created
  - Exploiting the different knowledge of the forger
- For the algorithm evaluated:
  - Behaviour is independent of the capture device
  - Major success in achieving forgeries with carbon-copy (is it really a threat?) and with the single static information
  - Dynamic knowledge improves forgery, but not as much as expected
    - Some signatures get benefit of this being protected by non-conventional writing
- Robustness of the signature seems to increase with the lack of use of recognizable letters and non-conventional aspect ratio
- Anti-spoofing mechanisms, impact seriously on the behaviour of the algorithm
  - At least it increases the FTA (or equivalent rate)
  - They reduce FPADER, but its impact may be questionable
- The work done is dependent on the algorithm tested and the forgers used
  - Future work in analysing that dependency

THANKS! QUESTIONS?

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