OSCAL Catalog, Profile, and Implementation Layers

Catalog, Profile, Component Definition, and System Security Plan Models

National Institute of Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

What is OSCAL?



OSCAL is not a tool, but it enables tools to share data

OSCAL provides standardized data formats for exchanging control, control implementation, and control assessment information between tools

- Catalog and baseline information can be easily imported into a tool
- Product and system control implementation information can be shared
- Assessors can generate assessment results to share
- Assessment tools can produce data to import into other tools

The OSCAL Models



OSCAL provides 7 models:

- Offered in XML-, JSON-, and YAML-based formats
- Supports a control-based risk management approach to system security
- Each model build on the models to the left (in the diagram above)

The OSCAL models provide for:

- Improved accuracy and document quality
- Reduced labor costs
- Easy machine-to-machine exchange
- Leverageable, standardized identifiers providing the foundation for assessment automation

Common OSCAL Structure

- **Root Element:** Indicates the model of the data
- **Root UUID:** A RFC 4122 Version 4 Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) that identifies the specific document instance. Changed when the document is modified.
- **Metadata:** Information about the document (i.e., title, last-modified timestamp, OSCAL version). Also used to define roles, parties (people, teams and organizations), and locations referenced in the document.
- **Model-specific Body:** The body is specific to each model.
- **Back Matter:** Used to link to and attach resources, which may contain citations. Used to associate graphics, supporting documentation, etc. with the OSCAL document. A reference entry here can be referenced from within the body of an OSCAL document.



OSCAL Catalog Model

Represents a collection of security and privacy controls, which may be used as part of a risk management program.

- **Metadata:** Same for each OSCAL model
- **Parameter:** Provides a global policy variable used by one or more control
- **Control:** An individual control in the catalog.
  - May contain control-specific parameters, control requirement statements, control objectives, assessment methods, references
  - Controls can have child controls.
- **Group:** Related controls may be grouped. Parameters related to this group may be defined here.
- **Back Matter:** Same for each OSCAL model



OSCAL Profile Model

Used to establish a baseline of controls to be implemented with a system.

- **Metadata:** Same for each OSCAL model
- **Import:** Identifies an OSCAL catalog or other profile to import controls from
  - A control must be imported to be included in a baseline.
  - All parameters and back-matter resources cited by an imported control are also imported.
- **Merge:** Provides directives used to organize controls and to resolve conflicts when the same control is imported multiple times
- **Modify:** Allows tailoring of imported controls, including their parameters, control requirement definitions, references, control objectives, and assessment actions.
- **Back Matter:** Same for each OSCAL model



OSCAL Profile Model - Inheritance

A profile can import controls from:

- **A catalog or multiple catalogs**
- **Another profile or multiple profiles**

This allows a baseline to be established by customizing another baseline.



OSCAL System Security Plan Model

Used to document how controls are implemented for an information system and each component part of an information system.

- **Metadata:** Same for each OSCAL model
- **Import Profile:** Identifies the applicable control baseline for the system as an OSCAL profile.
- **System Characteristics:** Represents attributes of the system, such as its name, description, models, and information processed.
- **System Implementation:** Represents relevant information about the system's deployment, including user roles, interconnections, services, and system inventory.
- **Control Implementation:** Describes how each control in the baseline is implemented within the system.
- **Back Matter:** Same for each OSCAL model



OSCAL System Security Plan Model - Inheritance

A system security plan has a single baseline for the system.

- **The baseline is established by an OSCAL Profile**
- **The controls are inherited from the catalog(s) imported by the Profile and any Profile(s) it imports**

This allows a baseline to be reused by multiple systems and for organizations to create custom baselines.



OSCAL System Security Plan Model - Inventory

The assets that compose a system are defined by the "system implementation".

The system inventory can be compositional.

- **Components are used to describe individual system parts**
- **Components are associated with individual inventory items**

This allows the parts of a system to be individually identified.





OSCAL System Security Plan Model – Control Statements

Control statements are used to document a control's implementation in the system.

Statements can be made for:

- **The entire system using "This System"**
- **A specific component**

This allows a fine-grained definition of the system implementation supporting greater automation and rigor.



OSCAL Component Definition Model

Used to document how controls are implemented for a given software, hardware, service, policy, process, procedure, or validation (i.e. FIPS 140-2).

- **Metadata:** Same for each OSCAL model
- **Import:** Other component definitions from another resource, from which related information is referenced.
- **Component:** A defined component that can be part of an implemented system.
- **Capability:** A grouping of multiple components or capabilities.
- **Back Matter:** Same for each OSCAL model



OSCAL Component Definition Model – Using with a System Security Plan

Components from a Component Definition can make documenting a system easier.

Implementation statements in the SSP can be populated from the Component Definition



* Every SSP, must have a component representing the whole system.

OSCAL Support for Leveraging Existing ATOs

National Institute of Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

Examples of a Leveraged Authorization?

Yes



Cloud (SaaS on IaaS)

Cloud: Several SaaS systems running on a separately authorized IaaS.

Yes



Data Center (System on GSS)

Data Center: Several systems relying on a separately authorized storage array or other general support system (GSS)

No



External Service or Interconnection

Interconnections or External Services are not leveraged authorizations

- Even if they have an authorization
- SaaS A handles the Identity Management Service as a system component

OSCAL supports this, just not as a L.A.

What is a Leveraged Authorization?

A leveraged authorization exists where:

- one or more leveraging systems rely on a leveraged system for operation in a stacked hierarchy; and
- any leveraging system is authorized separately from the leveraged system.



Systems Operating in a Stacked Hierarchy

NOTE:

External services and interconnections are not regarded as leveraged authorizations.



Leveraging ATOs - Three Scenarios

Scenario 1: OSCAL SSP / With Access

The leveraged system is using an OSCAL SSP; and the leveraging system is permitted to access it.

No CRM/SSRM is needed.

Preferred approach! Completed

Scenario 2: OSCAL SSP / No Access

The leveraged system is using an OSCAL SSP; however,

the leveraging system is not permitted to access it.

An OSCAL CRM/SSRM will be used.

Typical FedRAMP Scenario Post 1.0 Release Candidate

Scenario 3: Legacy SSP

A leveraged system is still using a legacy SSP.

A legacy Customer Responsibility Matrix (CRM) or System Security Responsibility Matrix (SSRM) are used/available.

Transition scenario for an imperfect world

Post 1.0 Release Candidate



Control Documentation (Leveraged System View)



Leveraged System:

- The leverag**ed** system's SSP should:
  - identify what **may be** inherited by leverag**ing** systems
    - including a consumer-appropriate description of the control inheritance; and
  - Identify any responsibilities that must be addressed by the leverag**ing** system to fully satisfy a control …

    … including where:
    - the leverag**ing** system must be configured for an inherited capability; or
    - there is a gap in control satisfaction which must be addressed by the leverag**ing** system

Control Documentation (Leveraging System View)



Leveraging System:

- The leverag**ing** system's SSP should:
  - identify what **is** inherited from a leverag**ed** system; and
  - identify any addressed responsibilities (as communicated by the leveraged system's SSP)
- These are linked from the leveraging system's SSP to the leveraged system's SSP using the UUID value associated with the "provided" and "responsibility" statements.
- Any components associated with these statements from the leveraged system's SSP must also be represented in the leveraging system's SSP.

Leveraging System with multiple Leveraged Systems



- **The same syntax is used**
  - It is simply replicated for each leveraged system
- **The Leveraging System's SSP:**
  - Has a separate "leveraged-authorization" assembly for each leveraged system.
  - Has a separate "component" representing each leveraged system.
  - Has a separate "component" representing the leveraged system components associated with inherited capabilities.

When a Leveraging System is also a Leveraged System



Leveraging System

- The leverag**ing** system's SSP should:
  - identify what **is** inherited from a leverag**ed** system
  - identify any addressed responsibilities (as identified by the leveraged system)
- In addition to:
  - identifying what **may be** inherited by the leverag**ing** system's customers
  - any responsibilities the leverag**ing** system's customers must address to fully satisfy a control

Questions?

Have more questions?

Contact us directly at **oscal@nist.gov**
Join the community conversation at **https://gitter.im/usnistgov-OSCAL/Lobby**

National Institute of Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce