

Smart Grid Interoperability and Cybersecurity Workshop

NIST Smart Grid Program

November 13-14, 2018

Welcome & Workshop Objectives – Chris Greer



Note: If you want to order lunch for delivery to NCCoE and have not yet done so, please see Konstantina in the registration now.

Tuesday, November 13, 2018	
9:30 am	REGISTRATION
10:00 am	WELCOME AND WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES Chris Greer, NIST
10:15 am	KEYNOTE: GRID MODERNIZATION AND THE CASE FOR INTEROPERABILITY John Gibson, Avista Utilities
11:00 am	PANEL SESSION: GRID MODERNIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY <i>Panelists discuss some of the opportunities, challenges, and technologies at the nexus of grid modernization and interoperability.</i> Dwayne Bradley Duke Energy Chris Irwin U.S. Department of Energy Joe Peichel Xcel Energy Alvin Razon National Rural Electric Cooperative Association Naza Shelley District of Columbia Public Service Commission MODERATOR: David Wollman, NIST
12:00 pm	LUNCH
1:15 pm	KEYNOTE: THE ECONOMICS OF INTEROPERABILITY Wade Malcolm, Open Energy Solutions
2:00 pm	PLENARY: INTRODUCTION TO NIST'S SMART GRID CONCEPTUAL MODELS Avi Gopstein, NIST
2:30 pm	INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION: MAJOR CONCERNS FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY <i>Participants will identify and give perspectives on important Smart Grid Conceptual Model, and key Aspects and Concerns related to grid modernization and interoperability</i>
3:30 pm	BREAK
3:45 pm	PLENARY: THREE KEY THEMES FOR CYBERSECURITY AND GRID INTEROPERABILITY <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Risk Profiles—Jeffrey Marron, NIST• Interface Categories—Nelson Hastings, NIST• Securing Communications—Michael Bartock, NIST
4:45 pm	WRAP UP AND CHARGE FOR NEXT DAY
5:00 pm	ADJOURN

Smart Grid Interoperability and Cybersecurity Workshop

Chris Greer

Director, Smart Grid and Cyber-Physical Systems Office
National Institute of Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

November 13-14, 2018

Measurements are critical...

to commerce




“Uniformity in the currency, weights, and measures of the United States is an object of great importance, and will, I am persuaded, be duly attended to.”

George Washington, State of the Union Address, 1790

to innovation

If you know how to measure something, you can design it, compare it, understand it, and improve it



NIST Illustrated, <https://youtu.be/2j9BGVKbzS4>

and to international trade

- Up to 92% of U.S. exports affected by standards/technical regulations

NIST measurement science provides the foundation for innovation in every industry and economic sector, from manufacturing to health care to defense

NIST Mission



To promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing **measurement science**, **standards**, and **technology** in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life



Measurement Science – Creating the experimental and theoretical tools – methods, metrics, instruments, and data – that enable innovation



Standards – Disseminating physical standards, providing technical expertise to documentary standards that enable interoperability and commerce



Technology – Driving innovation through knowledge dissemination and public-private partnerships to bridge gap between discovery /marketplace

NIST Laboratory Programs



Material
Measurement
Laboratory



Physical
Measurement
Laboratory




Engineering
Laboratory




Information
Technology
Laboratory



Communication
Technology
Laboratory



Center for
Nanoscale
Science and
Technology



NIST Center
for Neutron
Research

Metrology Laboratories

Technology Laboratories

National User Facilities

Driving innovation through
Measurement Science and
Standards

Accelerating the adoption and
deployment of advanced
technology solutions

Providing world class, unique,
and cutting-edge research
facilities

Energy Independence and Security Act

NIST has *“primary responsibility to **coordinate** development of a **framework** that includes protocols and model standards for information management to achieve **interoperability** of smart grid devices and systems...”*



Interoperability Frameworks to date

NIST Special Publication 1108

NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0

Office of the National Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology • U.S. Department of Commerce

2010

NIST Special Publication 1108R2

NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 2.0

Office of the National Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability,
Engineering Laboratory
in collaboration with
Physical Measurement Laboratory
and
Information Technology Laboratory

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology • U.S. Department of Commerce

2012

This publication is available free of charge from <http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1108r3>

NIST Special Publication 1108r3

NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 3.0

Smart Grid and Cyber-Physical Systems Program Office
and Energy and Environment Division,
Engineering Laboratory

in collaboration with
Quantum Measurement Division,
Semiconductor and Dimensional Metrology Division,
and Electromagnetics Division,
Physical Measurement Laboratory
and
Advanced Network Technologies Division
and Computer Security Division,
Information Technology Laboratory

<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1108r3>

NIST
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

2014

A break for context...

Figure 4.4 Unit costs of key emerging electricity technologies




Figure 2.5 Household electricity consumption of appliances and other small plug loads




Figure 1.1 Global internet traffic






Figure 2.1 Digitalization's potential impact on transport, buildings, and industry



Source (all): IEA 2017, Digitalization & Energy

Smart Grid Conceptual Model (2018, Draft)

- Generation including DER
- Intelligent distribution system
- Empowered consumers
- Emerging Markets



Workshop Agenda & Purpose


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Wednesday, November 14, 2018

8:30 am	REGISTRATION
8:45 am	WELCOME AND OBJECTIVES
9:00 am	KEYNOTE: CYBERSECURITY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS Ron Ross, NIST
9:30 am	PANEL SESSION: CYBERSECURITY AND GRID MODERNIZATION <i>Panelists discuss some of the cybersecurity challenges and practices emerging from grid modernization, with a focus on device and domain communication pathways and interoperability.</i> Carol Hawk U.S. Department of Energy David Lawrence Duke Energy Michael Murray BlackRidge Technology Candace Suh-Lee Electric Power Research Institute MODERATOR: Elizabeth Sisley, Calm Sunrise Consulting
10:30 am	BREAK
10:45 am	PARALLEL BREAKOUT SESSIONS <i>Breakout sessions repeat during the afternoon. Participants can join discussions in two different topics.</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning from other Sensor Networks: Translating and Linking Logical Interface Categories • Risk Profiles for Grid Architectures and Services • Securing New Communications Architectures: Brokered vs. Brokerless Cybersecurity
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3:15 pm	REPORT OUT PANEL
3:45 pm	NEXT STEPS
4:00 pm	ADJOURN

Grid Mod. & the Case for Interoperability – John Gibson



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Innovation for Future Utility Business Model


John Z Gibson, P.E.

Avista Utilities Chief R&D Engineer

November 2018

About Avista


- Incorporated in 1889
- Investor-Owned Utility with headquarters in Spokane, Washington
- Over 1,700 employees
- Electric and natural gas service
 - 379,000 electric customers
 - 342,000 natural gas customers



Capture opportunity from the changing electric utility business model

Avista's Business to Invent

Avista's Projects of Grid Edge Journey of Discovery



Introduction: Avista's Use Case Chronology

Movement from inward system improvements to outward customer experience


- Smart Grid
- Turner Energy Storage Project
- Shared Energy Economy
- Smart City
- Eco-District

Smart Grid Deployment

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

Smart Grid Investment Project

- Fifty Nine Distribution Feeders



Smart Grid Demonstration Project

- Thirteen Distribution Feeders




Smart Grid Technologies



Communication

- Tropo Radios
- Fiber Backhaul



Control Software

- Distribution Management System (DMS)
- Fault Detection Interruption Restoration (FDIR)
- Integrated Volt Var Compensation (IVVC)




Distribution Equipment

- Switches (S&C) Scada-Mate
- Reclosers (G&W)
- Switch Capacitor Banks (Cooper)
- Individual Phase Regulator (Cooper)

Smart Grid Architecture

Client/Server

- Technology Debt
- Legacy Architecture
- Vendor Eco-System



Turner Energy Storage

Utility versus Customer Value

- 1MW – 3.2 MWh Battery
- Locate on SEL Manufacturing Campus
- UET Vanadium Flow Battery



Turner Energy Storage


Use Cases

- Ancillary Markets
- Reserve Markets
- Grid Services
- Resiliency Services


Use Case and application as described in PNNL Catalog	Avista	PSE	Sno – MESA1	Sno – MESA2	Sno - Controls Integration
UC1: Energy Shifting					
Energy shifting from peak to off-peak on a daily basis	Y	Y	Y	Y	
System capacity to meet adequacy requirements	Y	Y	Y	Y	
UC2: Provide Grid Flexibility					
Regulation services	Y	Y		Y*	
Load following services	Y	Y		Y*	
Real-world flexibility operation	Y	Y		Y*	
UC3: Improving Distribution Systems Efficiency					
Volt/Var control with local and/or remote information	Y		Y	Y	
Load-shaping service	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Deferment of distribution system upgrade	Y	Y			
UC4: Outage Management of Critical Loads		Y			
UC5: Enhanced Voltage Control					
Volt/Var control with local and/or remote information and during enhanced CVR events	Y				
UC6: Grid-connected and islanded micro-grid operations					
Black Start operation	Y				
Micro-grid operation while grid-connected	Y				
Micro-grid operation in islanded mode	Y				
UC7: Optimal Utilization of Energy Storage	Y	Y			Y

Turner Energy Storage

Voltage Sag Compensation



Base Case vs. Revenue Requirements – Utility Perspective



Benefits vs. Revenue Requirements – Inclusive of Customer Reliability Benefits

Develop a roadmap to the future utility business model

Avista's Road Map / Grid Edge 3

Utility Business Model Road Map



Personalized
Energy Choice



Local Energy
Choice




Peer Energy
Choice

Shared Energy Economy


Spokane Udistrict Micro-Transactive

Assets

- Two Roof Top 100 kW Solar Systems
 - 100 kW and 500 kW
- Two Energy Storage Assets
- Two Building Management Systems



Shared Energy Economy/ Valuation




Shared Energy Economy/Interoperability

Multiple Partner Products

- Spirae Business Optimizer
- SEL Microgrid Controller
- McKinstry Building System
- Itron Riva Meter System

Research Partners


- Washington State University
- Pacific Northwest National Lab



Shared Energy Economy/Communication Latency

Distinct Operational Systems


- DER Field Bus - *Minutes*
 - Business Optimizer
- SCADA Network - *Seconds*
 - Distributed Management System
- AMI Network – *Batched 4 hours*
 - Billing/Application Platform
- Goose Messaging - *Milliseconds*
 - Microgrid Controller Platform



Shared Energy Economy/Distributed Applications

Distributed Capability

- Enterprise/Central Control
 - Volt/Var
 - Demand Response
 - Forecasting
 - Market
- Site/Microgrid Control
 - Island Detection
 - Decoupling
 - Re-synchronization
- Local/Autonomous Control
 - Inverter Settings
 - Energy Management System
 - Protection Settings
 - Building Management Operational Parameters



Blurring the line between utility and municipal infrastructure

Avista Smart City - Urbanova

- Benefiting Cities and Citizens

- Healthier citizens
- Safer neighborhoods
- Smarter infrastructure
- Sustainable Environment
- Stronger economy

- Partners

- City of Spokane
- Avista Utilities
- University District
- Itron
- Washington State University
- McKinstry
- Gallup
- Version

- Urbanova Projects

- Smart and Connected Streetlights Pilot
- Shared Energy Economy Model Pilot
- Gallup People-centered Research




Avista Smart City Street Light Architecture

Use Case

- Adaptive Lighting Based on Traffic Volume
- Leverage Utility Infrastructure for Broader Purpose

Architecture

- Utility AMI Infrastructure
- Urbanova Platform / Amazon Web Services
- City Internal Traffic Management System



Disrupt the utility business model to ensure fair customer rate reform

Eco-District

Commercial Development



- Eco-District
- Conditioned Environment
- Electric Service
- Self-Generation



Eco-District

Distributed Capability

- Enterprise/Central Control



Eco-District

Certification Elements

- Best in Class Building Design
- Energy load offset with on-site and off-site renewables
- Zero energy performance not modeling
- No combustion allowed



Versus

Grid Optimal / Grid Opportunities

- Capacity Offsets
- Load Transfer
- Generate Renewable Resource into Load
- Voltage Support
- Phase Balancing

Grid Optimal

Eco-District – Rate Reform

Goal

- Develop a rate mechanism to incentivize developments to be grid optimal without unfairly burdening other customers with the cost of the utility infrastructure

Observation

- The eco-district proforma is a financial model which provides insight on how future performance base rate making might be accomplished

Challenge

- Existing rate structures do not support the business model for the grid of the future
 - Schedule 21 Energy and demand charges – Infrastructure costs rolled into consumption charges
 - Schedule 51 Line extension allowances calculated buy energy consumption
 - Schedule 90 Electrical energy efficiency programs – Socialized benefits and application
 - Schedule 63 Net metering – kW limit on local generation due to cross subsidy
 - Schedule 65 Interconnection standards
 - Schedule 62 PURPA rates – 5 year schedule

Eco-District – Rate Reform

Opportunity

- To be successful, a special contract would be developed to allow for the developer to obtain economic efficiency, operational flexibility and fair allocation of the utility fixed asset costs
- So, what would this look like?
 - A utility revenue and cost model comparative to the assumptions made in the proforma
 - Unlimited amount of generation behind the meter owned and operated by customer
 - Incentivize the developer to build highly efficient buildings
 - Incentivize the developer to limit utility capacity required to support the development
 - Create a regulatory methodology which can provide a road map for future utility rate reform

An architecture for our customer OpenDSP

Avista Distribution Management System

Micro-Services Requirements

DISTRIBUTION SCADA	OUTAGE RESTORATION	DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES	DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT	ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION
Current System Status	Estimate Restoration Time	Demand Response	Switch Order	Optimal Crew Dispatch
Tagging	Damage Assessment	Distributed Generation	Automatic Generation Control	Optimal DER Dispatch
Alarming	Incident Management	Distributed Storage	Integrated Volt VAR Control	Optimal Feeder Utilization
Remote Control	Crew Management	Microgrid	Fault Detection Isolation and Restoration	Optimal DER Locational Benefits
	Reliability Reporting	Electric Vehicles	State Estimation	Transactive Markets



Open Architecture



For a Distribution Management System

Today Platform

- Proprietary
- Silo Solutions
- Integration

Future Platform

- Open Platform Services
- Enables Interoperability
- Establishes Application Eco-System
- Scalable Framework for Vendors



Legend

 Vendor-specific

 3rd Party

 Open-Source

OpenDSP Core Services

Utility Perspective

Core Platform Services Layer

Application Management Services

- Distribution and orchestration of distributed Applications
- Firmware Management

Sensor and Measurement Services


- Field Message Bus
- Device Discovery

Grid Management Service

- Topology Awareness
- State Awareness
- Content Awareness
- Simulation Engine

Core IT Services

- Stream Processor
- Big Data
- Security
- Time Synchronization




OpenDSP Core Services

Customer Centric

Utility Customers


- Prosumers
- Consumers
- Aggregator
- Eco-Districts
- In Home Service Providers
 - Google
 - Apple
 - Tesla
- Building Management Systems



Questions



Grid Modernization & Interoperability – Panel



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Chris Irwin – U.S. Department of Energy



Alvin Razon – NRECA






Unlocking the Value of Data Optimizing the Distribution System

TODAY: NRECA Distribution Optimization (DO) Team

Practical Optimization Solutions
"Enabling Value of DATA"



1. SAFETY
IEEE 1547, NESC, NEC, TDEC,
Cybersecurity, Testing &
Certification

2. Distribution Reliability
SAIDI Outages, Power
Quality, Data Analytics,
Reliability Benchmarking,
DER, Dynamic
Planning/Operations

3. Cost Effective Integration
MultiSpeak connectivity,
De-Risking Technology
Integration, Innovative
Apps/Tools



Ecosystem of Solutions

Cyber Security	RFP Templates	Testing & Certification	MultiSpeak Portal
NIST-SGIP	Available Online	V5 Comprehensive Testing	Selection of product solutions
	Step-by-step Help	Function Sets	Use Cases/Best Practices
		Full Profile	Online Testing
		Work Process	Multimedia Training



MultiSpeak Marketplace, MultiSpeak App-Store & More...


FUTURE “Tomorrow” (DO): *Enabling the Electric Utility of the Future*




Dwayne Bradley – Duke Energy




OpenFMB Life Cycle Framework




Co-existence of Legacy and Future Architectures



Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB) Framework



Protocol Translation: OpenFMB Adapters



Naza Shelley – D.C. Public Service Commission





Customers & the Future Grid

A State Regulatory Perspective

THE VIEWS AND OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN THIS PRESENTATION ARE THOSE OF THE PRESENTER AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICY OR POSITION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OR THE DISTRICT GOVERNMENT.



What Customers Want

- Customers are in the driver's seat
- What we are hearing –
 - Clean Energy
 - Competition
 - Data Access & Control
- It's industry's job to figure out what customers want
- What's the regulator's job?

A Regulator's Concerns

- ▶ Customer vs. Prosumer
 - ▶ Data ownership vs. data protection
- ▶ Reliability
- ▶ Safety
- ▶ Cost



A Regulator's Responsibility

- ▶ Protect and empower customers
- ▶ Reduce/remove regulatory barriers
- ▶ Establish a clear/flexible regulatory framework
- ▶ Tell stakeholders what you need to make a decision
 - ▶ Ask the right questions
 - ▶ Put the risk on industry to present solutions to problems
 - ▶ Put the burden on industry to justify the solution they present if cost sharing is required for implementation
 - ▶ Favor the carrot but be willing to use the stick

The background of the slide is a dark, textured surface covered with numerous question marks. The question marks are rendered in a 3D, embossed style with a metallic, golden-brown finish. They are scattered across the frame, with some appearing larger and more prominent than others. The lighting creates highlights and shadows on the question marks, giving them a sense of depth and volume. The overall effect is one of a dense field of questions.

Questions?

Naza Shelley – Attorney Advisor
D.C. Public Service Commission
1325 G. St. NW, Suite 800,
Washington, D.C. 20011
nshelley@dcpsc.gov

Joe Peichel – Xcel Energy



Who Do You Trust?


- Certified Identity
- Devices, Organizations and People
- Delegations of Authority



Elon Musk  @patheuk

I'm giving 10 000 Bitcoic (BTC) to all community!

2017 Enterprise Architecture Strategy and Standards – Identity and Access Management Influences All Of Our Utility Value Chains



Enterprise Systems	Physical Assets	Employees	Cyber Assets	Enterprise Data
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Illustration courtesy of Phil Wilkerson, Xcel Energy

Lunch: 12:00-1:15

Local Restaurants


Travilah Village Center (0.6mi)
9761 Traville Gateway Drive
Rockville, MD 20850

Potomac Pizza-301.279.2234
9709 Traville Gateway Drive
Rockville, MD 20850

Bagel Towne Deli-301.279.7035
9749 Traville Gateway Drive
Rockville, MD 20850

Sushi Oshiji- 301.251.1177
9706 Traville Gateway Drive
Rockville, MD 20850

Cava Meze-301.309.9090
9713 Traville Gateway Drive
Rockville, MD 20850



Local Restaurants

Most restaurants have vegetarian options

Fallsgrove Village Center (0.9mi)
14955 Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850

Moby Dick House of Kabob-301.738.0005
14925 Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850

Chipotle Mexican Grill- 301.838.9222
14925 Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850

Cheesburger-Cheeseburger- 301.309.9555
14921-G Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850

Wingstop-301.309.9464
14925 Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850


Panera Bread- 301.545.1874
14929 Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850

Mama Lucia Restaurant-301.762.8805
14921-J Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850

Taipei Tokyo-301.738.8813
14921-D Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850


Starbucks-301.315.0096
14919 Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850

Krispy Kreme Donuts-240.453.0334
14919 Shady Grove Road
Rockville, MD 20850



Afternoon Keynote
begins at 1:15pm

Economics of Interoperability – Wade Malcolm



Tuesday, November 13, 2018

9:30 am **REGISTRATION**

10:00 am **WELCOME AND WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES**

Chris Greer, NIST

10:15 am **KEYNOTE: GRID MODERNIZATION AND THE CASE FOR INTEROPERABILITY**

John Gibson, Avista Utilities

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Panelists discuss some of the opportunities, challenges, and technologies at the nexus of grid modernization and interoperability.

Dwayne Bradley Duke Energy

Chris Irwin U.S. Department of Energy

Joe Peichel Xcel Energy

Alvin Razon National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

Naza Shelley District of Columbia Public Service Commission

MODERATOR: David Wollman, NIST

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1:15 pm **KEYNOTE: THE ECONOMICS OF INTEROPERABILITY**

Wade Malcolm, Open Energy Solutions

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Avi Gopstein, NIST

2:30 pm **INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION: MAJOR CONCERNS FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY**

Participants will identify and give perspectives on important Smart Grid Conceptual Model, and key Aspects and Concerns related to grid modernization and interoperability

3:30 pm **BREAK**

3:45 pm **PLENARY: THREE KEY THEMES FOR CYBERSECURITY AND GRID INTEROPERABILITY**

• **Risk Profiles**—Jeffrey Marron, NIST

• **Interface Categories**—Nelson Hastings, NIST

• **Securing Communications**—Michael Bartock, NIST

4:45 pm **WRAP UP AND CHARGE FOR NEXT DAY**

5:00 pm **ADJOURN**

The Economics of Interoperability

November 13, 2018



Wade P. Malcolm, P.E.
Open Energy Solutions Inc.

Why is Interoperability Important?

- Many solutions are not (easily/cheaply) interoperable and are packaged for a single “silo” or ideal for only a single function
- To achieve lower-cost and better performance, an architecture with intelligence “at the edge” is needed
- Multi-function devices should reduce capital and O&M costs
- Standards-based, modular hardware, communications, software and messaging systems will promote interoperability, lower costs, and improve reliability
- Integration and analysis of multiple data sources creates new value based on its timeliness, location, and availability (e.g. close to where things happen)

Getting some context: Four Generations of Interoperability?



1. Energy Management Systems and SCADA

- Integration Protocols

- Linking large centralized systems
- WSCC
- Others
- SCADA Protocols

- Benefits

- Interoperability by definition

2. Automated Meter Reading and Distribution Automation


- Profile, Protocols and the OSI Model

- Utility Communications Architecture

- IEC61850
 - Common Information Model – CIM (IEC61868/70)
 - ICCP / TASE.2

- Additional Benefits

- Reduced integration costs
 - Reduced training costs
 - Reduced maintenance and upgrade costs
 - Vendor lock-in avoided
 - Reduced stranded assets
 - “Best of breed” deployments




Sources: GE, EPRI

3. Advanced Metering Infrastructure, Smart Grid and Advanced Distribution Automation

- Architectures
 - GridWise
 - IntelliGrid Architecture
- Systems Engineering
- Use Cases

- Additional Benefits
 - Re-use
 - Multi-function H/W, S/W




4. Distributed Energy Resource Integration, Resiliency and Transactive Energy

- Grid Architecture
 - Laminar Coordination Framework
- Distributed Intelligence
- Grid Edge Interoperability
 - Pub/Sub
- Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB)
- “Open Distributed Systems Platform” (OpenDSP)
- Conformance and Certification


- Additional Benefits
 - Perhaps a necessity?
 - Managed migration
 - Distributed Intelligence Business Model (DIBM)
 - Stacked Benefits

DOE PNNL's Grid Architecture 2.0:
Laminar Coordination Framework (LCF)



PNNL-25480 (Courtesy of JD Taft)
Available at <http://gridarchitecture.pnnl.gov/>

SEPA's Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB):
Internet of Things (IoT) Interoperability Framework



NAESB RMQ.26 Version 3.1
Please contact naesb@naesb.org


Laminar Coordination Framework for ...

- Expect additional intelligent devices on the grid
- Today we have gaps of control and uncoordinated control
- No one vendor provides a true end-to-end solution
- “Local Optimization Inside Global Coordination”



Sources: Adam Smith Institute, PNNL-24044 Grid Architecture, OES Analysis

What Happens When We Outgrow our Centralized Control Systems?



Example – Duke Energy

The power of interoperability and distributed intelligence for the future

Distributed intelligence in the electric grid has the potential to significantly increase benefits realization through additional cost savings by:

- Achieving improved operational performance
- Improving system response times
- More effectively managing the scalability associated with field devices
- Driving greater insight for more efficient decision making



Interoperability is important to Duke Energy because of the benefits it creates for customers by giving them value-added services off the electric grid, and the benefits it creates for the company, making disparate systems work well together at a lower cost

Sources: Duke Energy, Accenture

OpenFMB – The Industry Catalyst for Interoperability

- Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB™) is a reference architecture and framework for distributed intelligence
- Leverages existing standards to federate data between field devices and harmonize them with centralized systems
 - IEC Common Information Model (CIM) for semantic data model
 - Internet of Things (IoT) publish/subscribe protocols for peer-to-peer communications
- Allows scaling of operations independently, without a system-wide rollout
 - Flexible integration of renewables and storage with the existing grid
- NAESB's OpenFMB standard was led by utilities and developed by SEPA/SGIP



What is OpenDSP?


- OpenDSP (Open Distributed Systems Platform) is a collaborative effort led by utilities to develop a real-time operational technology (OT) platform as an extension to the DOE/PNNL DSPx concept
- OpenDSP characteristics
 - Can manage the operation of both **utility and customer assets** allowing for new service and revenue opportunities
 - Leveraging **distributed intelligence (DI) and grid edge interoperability** facilitating interaction with all vendor equipment and software
 - Delivered as an **Open Source core** with a mix of proprietary and open extensions
 - Built upon **other open source applications**
- Creating an “Energy Operating System”
- Broad market support to share cost and risk

OpenDSP: Activity and Roadmap

Where we are

- *Seeing significant OpenDSP industry engagement and interest*

OpenDSP Activity to Date



- *Arizona Public Service, Avista, Consolidated Edison, Duke Energy, Entergy and Xcel Energy have all made contributions to the effort to date*

OpenDSP Future: Initial Strategic Development Plan



Distributed Intelligence Functions and Use Cases for DER Integration

Function	Use Case
<i>Voltage Management and Optimization</i>	<i>1. DER Circuit Segment Management</i>
	<i>2. Volt/VAR Management</i>
	<i>3. Solar Smoothing with PV and Advanced Inverter, and Energy Storage</i>
Planning and Engineering	DER Integration and Interconnection
Capacity Management and Optimization	DER Optimization with Utility-Owned Inverter
	DER Optimization with Customer-Owned Inverter
	Demand Response Optimization
	DER Forecasting
Microgrid Management and Optimization	Point of Common Coupling Management of Utility-Owned Microgrid
	Point of Common Coupling Management of Customer-Owned Microgrid
Protection and Safety	Inadvertent Island Detection / Anti-islanding
	Localized Protection Alarms and Events
	Adaptive Protection
Operational Performance Improvement	Remote Device Configuration
	SCADA Point Aggregation
Resiliency & Reliability Improvement	Self Healing-Network, Radial
Market Interactions	Transactive Energy

} Foundational for Distributed Coordination

Why OpenDSP? -Duke Energy



- Increasing DER penetration is forcing a new resiliency approach
- Committed to distributed intelligence and new grid-edge solutions
 - Augmenting existing legacy systems for enhanced functionality and performance
 - Addresses existing scalability and performance limitations
 - Improves cybersecurity of grid devices and telecommunications
- Interoperability emphasis provides additional benefits:
 - Enables greater choice of functionality and suppliers
 - Helps better manage integration efforts
 - Accelerates development and deployment cycles

Distributed Intelligence (DI) As An Emerging Architecture

- **DI is an architecture that supports building layered intelligence on the grid**
 - DI can occur at many locations, including the headend, node, and grid edge
 - It is a method of optimizing the location a decision is made based on primary needs – sensitivity, timeframe, system updates. It dramatically reduces the transportation of data

- **What does DI look like?**


**Communications
and Controls**



DI represents an opportunity to proactively and efficiently manage grid operations on distribution circuit segments to account for growing DER and microgrid activities

Duke Energy Distributed Intelligence Business Model Project: Objectives


- **To quantify the value of DI** in a manner that recognized the value created by DI *above the value* created by individual sensors, controls, and equipment.
- Develop a comprehensive and granular theoretical model that applies 22 DI use cases to **2700 feeders** in North Carolina using 14 representative circuits.



Duke Energy sought to determine whether using DI to optimize distributed grid infrastructure and operations (as new DER assets come online) ultimately drives value for the customer and the utility

DIBM Project Approach

- Navigant’s Grid+™ model was used to support the DIBM development
- DIBM created a comprehensive and highly granular view of DI deployment in North Carolina



Sources: Duke Energy, Navigant

DIBM Use CASE Development


- Use cases were developed and analyzed
- Model provides granular insights for costs, benefits, scalability, and deployment timelines
- Also facilitates stacked benefits analysis to address system challenges

Use Case	Capacity Management	Voltage Management	DER Management	Utility Operations
DER Circuit Segment Management	✓	✓	✓	✓
Baseload Storage Monitoring/Mgmt.	✓		✓	
Peak Power Management	✓		✓	
DER Forecasting w/ Meters	✓		✓	
DER Forecasting w/ Weather Stations	✓		✓	
DER Optimization (Cust. Inverter)	✓		✓	
DER Optimization (DE Inverter)	✓		✓	
Demand Response Optimization	✓			
PCC Monitoring/Mgmt./Opt. (DE µgrid)	✓	✓	✓	
PCC Monitoring/Mgmt. (Cust. µgrid)	✓	✓	✓	
Volt/VAR Management	✓	✓	✓	✓
Grid Connectivity Discovery				✓
Remote Device Configuration			✓	✓
SCADA Point Aggregation			✓	✓
Enhanced COMS Network Ops. Status				✓
Improve Asset Maint. Practices				✓
Localized Protection Alarms & Events			✓	✓
Self Healing Radial Network			✓	✓
Solar Smoothing		✓	✓	
Solar Smoothing (+Battery)		✓	✓	
Inadvertent Island Detection			✓	
DER Integration & Interconnection			✓	

Benefits And Costs Over Deployment Timeframe

Analysis considers benefits and costs accrued over time through a theoretical deployment

Annual DI Costs and Benefits




A Targeted Approach Increases Value

In the early years, an optimal business case should leverage a targeted approach that maximizes system value.


A stronger business case considers:

- Feeder characteristics. Ex: DER penetration, sites, and sizes, as well as customer type and count.
- Segmented installations instead of broad-brush system deployments




Scenario And Sensitivity Analysis

Analysis was conducted on four scenarios representing alternate future states



Every benefit and cost input factor could be individually adjusted for ranges of uncertainty




DIBM Project Insights

- Assuming a theoretical deployment timeline, the DIBM results informed Duke Energy on the incremental value a DI and OpenFMB enabled solution can unlock
- It reinforced the need for utility and vendor community engagement
- A DI enabled product suite will be critical to future success
- DIBM is available to help other utilities investigate Distributed Intelligence approaches
- A positive outcome was determined along with some specific insights
- Duke Energy is working to make more DIBM related work available in 2019

Conclusion

- Regulation and legislation will still significantly impact how utilities continue to transform
- At some point, traditional control may no longer be a viable option
- The evolution of interoperability has enabled new coordination and control schemes to be able to address future needs economically

Introduction to NIST's Smart Grid Models – Avi Gopstein



Tuesday, November 13, 2018

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Chris Greer, NIST

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4:45 pm **WRAP UP AND CHARGE FOR NEXT DAY**

5:00 pm **ADJOURN**

Introduction to NIST's Smart Grid Conceptual Models


Avi Gopstein

Associate Director & Smart Grid Program Manager
National Institute of Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce


November 13-14, 2018

Smart Grid Conceptual Model (2018, Draft)

- Generation including DER
 - Technology diversity
 - Physical proximity to transmission, distribution + customer domains
- Intelligent distribution system
 - Increasing importance
 - Improved controllability + intelligence
 - Connected to service provider domain (e.g., congestion mitigation)
- Empowered consumers
 - Operations & intelligence enters customer domain
 - Customer diversity incorporated
- Emerging Markets
 - Platforms



Conceptual Model Domains (2018, Draft)



<https://www.nist.gov/document/draftsmartgridconceptualmodelupdatev3pdf>


Generation Including DER Domain

Generation Including DER


Source: DRAFT NIST Smart Grid Framework 4.0

Distribution Domain gains role of supply integrator for distributed resources

End-user (Customer Domain) resources (↑ or ↓) participate as supply options



Communication Pathways Diagram—Legacy Utility



NIST perspective

- Grid architectures are changing
 - Driven by technology and policy
- Changes will impact
 - Operations
 - Economics
 - Cybersecurity
 - Testing & Certification
- No single architecture is “correct”
- NIST are not architects

GRID
MODERNIZATION
LABORATORY
CONSORTIUM
U.S. Department of Energy

TECHNICAL AREAS / PROJECTS / RESOURCES / NEWS & EVENTS

HOME » PROJECTS » GRID ARCHITECTURE

Grid Architecture

Topic ID 1.2.1	Duration 3 years	Funding 3.00 M	Technical Area System Operations, Power Flow, and Control	Project Lead Jeff Taft, PNNL
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[^ Related Resources](#)

Fact Sheet

- [Grid Architecture](#)
- [Grid Architecture](#)

Report


- [Glossary of Grid Architecture Terms](#)
- [Glossary of Power Systems Terms](#)
- [Grid Architecture](#)
- [Grid Architecture 2](#)

The Grid Architecture project objectives are to provide a set of architectural depictions, tools, and skills to the utility industry and its extended stakeholders to develop a national consensus on grid modernization and to provide a common basis for roadmaps, investments, technology and platform developments, and new capabilities, products and services for the modernized grid. Every commission, regulator, utility, product and platform vendor, energy services provider, and integrator understands the importance of these efforts.


Expected Outcomes include:

1. Build stakeholder consensus around a DOE-convened vision of grid modernization, expressed as a new set of grid reference architectures
2. Enable superior stakeholder decision-making to reduce risk of poor functionality and stranded investments

Legacy Communication Pathways Scenario




High-DER Communication Pathways Scenario




Source: DRAFT NIST Smart Grid Framework 4.0


Detail—Transmission/Distribution substation




Detail—Customer Domain




Detail—Generation Domain



Microgrid Communication Pathways Scenario



Hybrid Utility Communication Pathways Scenario



Source: DRAFT NIST Smart Grid Framework 4.0

The background features a stylized, light-colored illustration of a modern power grid. It includes several wind turbines on a hillside in the upper right and three high-voltage power line towers in the lower half, all rendered in a semi-transparent, wireframe style. The overall aesthetic is clean and technical.

What does all of this mean for how we operate a modern grid?

Interoperability standards landscape assessment

SEPA/SGIP SG CoS List

Smart Electric Power Alliance CATALOG OF STANDARDS NAVIGATION TOOL

SGIP's Smart Grid Catalog of Standards
Full List of Standards by Entry Number

SGIP Catalog of Standards	Date	SGIP Catalog of Standards	Date
1. ANSI C12.1-2008 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	49. IEC 62993-8 dated 2014-09-21	08/27/2016
2. ANSI C12.1-2008 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	44. IEC 62541 Parts 1-7 listed Nov 2013	10/15/2014
3. ANSI C12.1-2008 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	45. IEEE 1377 dated 2011-02-01	08/17/2016
4. ANSI C12.1-2008 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	46. IEEE 1701	10/15/2014
5. ANSI C12.1-2008 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	47. IEEE 3025-2010 listed Dec 31 2011	10/15/2014
6. ANSI C12.1-2008 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	48. IEEE 1801-2010 listed Jan 31 2013	10/15/2014
7. ANSI C12.1-2008 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	49. IEEE 637-2008	10/15/2014
8. ADR488-1:2010 IEC/IEEE listed Nov 21 2011	10/15/2014	50. IEEE C37.136-2010 listed May 4 2012	10/15/2014
9. CSA 909.1-2:2014 Q3 14Nov14	10/15/2014	51. IEC 61850-2 dated 2013-09-20	06/17/2016
10. CSA 909.2-4:2014 Q3 14Nov14	10/15/2014	52. IEC 61850-2-1:2013 listed July 7 2013	10/15/2014
11. CSA 909.3-2:2014 Q3 14Nov14	10/15/2014	53. IEC 61850-3	10/15/2014
12. CSA 909.4-2:2014 Q3 14Nov14	10/15/2014	54. IEC 61850-4	10/15/2014
13. CSA 909.5-2:2014 Q3 14Nov14	10/15/2014	55. MultiSpeak Security V1 Dated 2013-12-05	10/15/2014
14. CSA 909.6-2:2014 Q3 14Nov14	10/15/2014	56. MultiSpeak V8.0 dated 2013-12-05	10/15/2014
15. CSA 909.7-2:2014 Q3 14Nov14	10/15/2014	57. NABIS 802.10	10/15/2014
16. IEC 62993-8 dated 2013-11-05	08/17/2016	58. NABIS 802.21	10/15/2014
17. IEC 60879-6-101 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	59. NABIS 802.22	10/15/2014
18. IEC 60879-6-102 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014	60. NABIS 802.40-1	10/15/2014
19. IEC 60879-6-103	10/15/2014	61. NISTIR 7618 listed Sept 5 2012	10/15/2014
20. IEC 61850-1	10/15/2014	62. NIS IR 7/13 listed July 7 2011	10/15/2014
21. IEC 61850-2	10/15/2014	63. NIS IR 7/13 dated 2013-09-20	10/15/2014
22. IEC 61850-3	10/15/2014	64. NIS IR 6/92	10/15/2014
23. IEC 61850-4	10/15/2014	65. NISTIR 7845 dated 2014-06-11	8/17/2016
24. IEC 61850-5	10/15/2014	66. OASIS PMX listed Dec 31 2011	10/15/2014
25. IEC 61850-6	10/15/2014	67. OASIS PWS	10/15/2014
26. IEC 61850-7	10/15/2014	68. OASIS Energy Interop	10/15/2014
27. IEC 61850-8	10/15/2014	69. OpenADR-2 Dated 2013-08-31-rh	10/15/2014
28. IEC 61850-9	10/15/2014	70. OpenADR-2 Ob-dated 2013-08-31-rh-w2	10/15/2014
29. IEC 61850-10	10/15/2014	71. SAE J1772-2010 listed July 3 2011	10/15/2014
30. IEC 61850-11	10/15/2014	72. SAE J1772-2013 listed July 3 2011	10/15/2014
31. IEC 61850-12	10/15/2014	73. SAE J2847-1 listed Oct 14 2011	10/15/2014
32. IEC 61850-13	10/15/2014	74. IEC 61850-21 dated 2013-12-02 updated	10/15/2014
33. IEC 61850-14	10/15/2014	75. IEC 61850-22	10/15/2014
34. IEC 61850-15	10/15/2014	76. IEC 61850-23	10/15/2014
35. IEC 61850-16	10/15/2014	77. IEC 61850-24	10/15/2014
36. IEC 61850-17	10/15/2014	78. IEC 61850-25	10/15/2014
37. IEC 61850-18	10/15/2014	79. IEC 61850-26	10/15/2014
38. IEC 61850-19	10/15/2014	80. IEC 61850-27	10/15/2014
39. IEC 61850-20	10/15/2014	81. IEC 61850-28	10/15/2014
40. IEC 61850-29	10/15/2014	82. IEC 61850-30	10/15/2014
41. IEC 61850-31	10/15/2014	83. IEC 61850-32	10/15/2014
42. IEC 61850-33	10/15/2014	84. IEC 61850-34	10/15/2014

Identified SG Standard List of NIST Framework R3.0

This publication is available free of charge from <http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1108r3>

NIST Special Publication 1108r3


NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 3.0

NIST SG Framework V.0-2014 SG List

- ANSI C12.1-2008
- ANSI C12.18-2006
- ANSI C12.19-2008
- ANSI C12.20-2010
- ANSI C12.21-2006
- ANSI C12.21-2006 listed Sep 5 2012
- ANSI C12.22-2008 listed Sep 5 2012
- IEEE 3025-2010
- IEEE 637-2008
- IEEE C37.136-2010
- IEEE 1801-2010
- IEEE 1701
- IEEE 1377
- IEEE 3025-2010 listed Dec 31 2011
- IEEE 1801-2010 listed Jan 31 2013
- IEEE 637-2008
- IEEE C37.136-2010 listed May 4 2012
- IEC 61850-2 dated 2013-09-20
- IEC 61850-2-1:2013 listed July 7 2013
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
Interoperability Profile: Illustrative Landscape

Hardware Functional Requirements



Interoperability landscape assessment


Smart Grid Standards and Associated Testing & Certification



17/61


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
Interoperability Profile: Illustrative Landscape

Hardware Functional Requirements




Interoperability Profile: IEEE 1547 Case Study

Hardware Functional Requirements



Interoperability Profile: California Rule 21 Case Study

Hardware Functional Requirements




The CPS Framework—A Tool to Understand the Smart Grid


Jargon surrounds the electrical grid:

- *Intelligence moving to the edge*
- *Data tsunami*
- *Grid architecture*
- *Cloud / fog computing*
- *Smart grid*
- *Microgrid vs backup power*

The cyber-physical systems (CPS) framework provides a vocabulary of energy sector semantics, or ontology, through evaluation of CPS framework aspects and concerns



CPS Aspects and Concerns



Description of CPS Concerns for the Smart Grid

Aspect	Concern	Description	Grid Context for CPS Concern	Grid CPS Concern Description	Architecture Significance
Functional	Controllability	Ability of a CPS to control a property of a physical thing. There are many challenges to implementing control systems with CPS including the non-determinism of cyber systems, the uncertainty of location, time and observations or actions, their reliability and security, and complexity. Concerns related to the ability to modify a CPS or its function, if necessary.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Controllability requires the condonation of sensing, processing and acting • Multiple inputs are needed to make control decisions • Most grid control systems and hardware were not designed to accommodate large numbers of DERs. • More dynamic monitoring and control to respond to the dynamic network 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to control grid properties (sense, process and change); e.g., intentionally <u>change a</u> phenomenon / property 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination of sensing and processing functions to produce accurate control signals. • Architectures needs to support control applications that input and evaluate multiple optimization factors including carbon usage and market prices • Architecture needs to support use of group commands (e.g. DNP3 settings groups) and third-party aggregator control of DERs • Architecture support of faster input of sensor data from traditional SCADA devices and newer devices including phasor measurement units (PMUs)
Functional	Functionality	Concerns related to the function that a CPS provides	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The constant evolution of the power system creates new grid functions. • Grid control functionality has expanded to include management of generation assets which require different functionality e.g. diverse generation assets require additional control functionality including distributed assets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to provide grid functions e.g. control functions, sensing functions, service-related functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Innovative grid technology needed to facilitate Power Markets, DERs, Microgrids, Electric Vehicles, etc. • Architecture needs to support management of DERs constraints that differ from older types of generation.
Functional	Manageability	Concerns related to the management of CPS function.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need the ability to manage change across multiple devices at different grid levels. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to manage change internally and externally to the grid at the cyber-physical boundary e.g. digital <u>equipment and</u> actuators affected by EMC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication topology views and key externally visible properties for multi-tier distribution communications needed <u>for system</u> control, substations, field operations, and Transmission/Distribution integration⁷⁴

Cybersecurity Threats: Increasing and Diversifying

Source: IEA 2017, Digitalization & Energy

Table 6.1 Open source information regarding cyber-attacks affecting energy infrastructure

Incident	Description (from open-source information)
Shamoon 1 and 2 (Saudi Arabia, 2012 and 2016)	"Shamoon 1" virus carried out cyber-sabotage and destroyed over 30 000 computers at Saudi Aramco. There was no direct impact on oil production, but the company was forced to revert to traditional paper and telephone trading for several weeks. Qatari natural gas company, RasGas, was also impacted. The virus was set to execute after working hours in order to minimise detection. "Shamoon 2" virus targeted similar vulnerabilities and was used to overwrite parts of computer hard discs.
Western Ukraine power grid (2015)	The first confirmed cyber-attack specifically against an electricity network. Attackers accessed substations' supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and firmware with a combination of malware, personnel credentials obtained by means of email phishing, and Denial of Service (DoS) to prevent customers from obtaining call centre information about the blackout. Investigators concluded that a large well-co-ordinated team had prepared the attack over several months.
The Mirai Botnet (2016)	"Mirai" malware exploited low security in connected smart devices, such as cameras, to use a botnet (a network of devices under simultaneous command by the attacker to overload the victim by continuously sending data) to deliver the largest DoS attack to date. This attack did not target or impact energy infrastructure, but illustrates the vulnerability of the Internet of Things (IoT).
Industroyer/ Crash Override (Ukraine, December 2016 – reported May 2017)	A second brief but significant attack on the Ukrainian electricity system, thought to have been a test run for malware "Industroyer" (also known as "Crash Override"). This versatile malware enables attackers to view, block, control or destroy grid control equipment such as circuit breakers. Its design suggests expert knowledge of several standardised industrial communication protocols widely used to control infrastructure – not only electricity grids – throughout Europe, Asia and the Middle East. This was an example of a cyber intrusion into the control systems of critical infrastructure.
Nuclear plant spear phishing attack (2017)	This incident occurred in the United States. It used targeted email messages containing fake Microsoft Word résumés for engineering jobs, potentially exposing recipients' credentials for the control engineering network. The hackers also compromised legitimate external websites that they knew their victims frequented (known as a watering hole attack).
WannaCry (2017)	"WannaCry" ransomware hit hundreds of thousands of computers in thousands of organisations in some 150 countries, taking advantage of an access point in Microsoft operating systems for which some users had failed to install the secure update (or "patch"). These attacks did not target energy infrastructure, but several energy companies reported problems. In the People's Republic of China (hereafter, "China"), over 20 000 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) petrol stations went offline.

Function Unique Identifier	Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category
ID	Identify	ID.AM	Asset Management
		ID.BE	Business Environment
		ID.GV	Governance
		ID.RA	Risk Assessment
		ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy
PR	Protect	PR.AC	Access Control
		PR.AT	Awareness and Training
		PR.DS	Data Security
		PR.IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures
		PR.MA	Maintenance
		PR.PT	Protective Technology
DE	Detect	DE.AE	Anomalies and Events
		DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring
		DE.DP	Detection Processes
RS	Respond	RS.RP	Response Planning
		RS.CO	Communications
		RS.AN	Analysis
		RS.MI	Mitigation
RC	Recover	RC.RP	Recovery Planning
		RC.IM	Improvements
		RC.CO	Communications

NIST Cybersecurity Framework Identifiers

CPS Aspects and Concerns

- **Functional**
 - Actuation
 - Communication
 - Controllability
 - Functionality
 - Manageability
 - Measurability
 - Monitorability
 - Performance
 - Physical
 - Physical Context
 - Sensing
 - States
 - Uncertainty
- **Business**
 - Cost
 - Enterprise
 - Environment
 - Policy
 - Quality
 - Regulatory
 - Time to Market
 - Utility
- **Trustworthiness**
 - Privacy
 - Reliability
 - Resilience
 - Safety
 - Security
- **Data**
 - Data Semantics
 - Identity
 - Operations on Data
 - Relationship between Data
 - Data Velocity
 - Data Volume
- **Composition**
 - Adaptability
 - Complexity
 - Constructivity
 - Discoverability
- **Human**
 - Human Factors
 - Usability
- **Boundaries**
 - Behavioral
 - Networkability
 - Responsibility
- **Timing**
 - Logical Time
 - Synchronization
 - Time Awareness
 - Time Interval & Latency
- **Lifecycle**
 - Deployability
 - Disposability
 - Engineerability
 - Maintainability
 - Operability
 - Procureability
 - Producibility

Which concerns are most important to you?

Break: 3:30-3:45

Tuesday, November 13, 2018

9:30 am **REGISTRATION**

10:00 am **WELCOME AND WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES**

Chris Greer, NIST

10:15 am **KEYNOTE: GRID MODERNIZATION AND THE CASE FOR INTEROPERABILITY**

John Gibson, Avista Utilities

11:00 am **PANEL SESSION: GRID MODERNIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY**

Panelists discuss some of the opportunities, challenges, and technologies at the nexus of grid modernization and interoperability.

Dwayne Bradley Duke Energy

Chris Irwin U.S. Department of Energy

Joe Peichel Xcel Energy

Alvin Razon National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

Naza Shelley District of Columbia Public Service Commission

MODERATOR: David Wollman, NIST

12:00 pm **LUNCH**

1:15 pm **KEYNOTE: THE ECONOMICS OF INTEROPERABILITY**

Wade Malcolm, Open Energy Solutions

2:00 pm **PLENARY: INTRODUCTION TO NIST'S SMART GRID CONCEPTUAL MODELS**

Avi Gopstein, NIST

2:30 pm **INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION: MAJOR CONCERNS FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY**

Participants will identify and give perspectives on important Smart Grid Conceptual Model, and key Aspects and Concerns related to grid modernization and interoperability

3:30 pm **BREAK**

3:45 pm **PLENARY: THREE KEY THEMES FOR CYBERSECURITY AND GRID INTEROPERABILITY**


- **Risk Profiles**—Jeffrey Marron, NIST

- **Interface Categories**—Nelson Hastings, NIST

- **Securing Communications**—Michael Bartock, NIST


4:45 pm **WRAP UP AND CHARGE FOR NEXT DAY**

5:00 pm **ADJOURN**



Key Themes for Cybersecurity & Grid Interoperability

- Speakers:
 - Jeff Marron
 - Nelson Hastings
 - Mike Bartock
- Limited Q&A:
 - Write down your questions
 - Breakout discussions tomorrow (pick two!)



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The logo for NIST Cyber, featuring the text "NIST" above "CYBER" in a white, sans-serif font on a black rectangular background. The background of the entire slide is a light blue color with various faint, glowing icons related to technology and cybersecurity, such as a lightbulb, a laptop, a globe, and a line graph.

NIST
CYBER

Cybersecurity Framework Smart Grid Profile

November 2018

The Cybersecurity Framework

The Basics

- Created by industry, academia and government participants in response to U.S. Executive Order, *Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity*
- Based on workshops, led by NIST, and other outreach to gather input and best practices for improving cybersecurity
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) design:
 - Flexible
 - Leverages existing approaches, standards, practices
 - Internationally applicable
 - Focused on risk management vs checklist



The Cybersecurity Framework

Three Primary Components

Implementation Tiers

A qualitative measure of organizational cybersecurity risk management practices

Core

Desired cybersecurity outcomes organized in a hierarchy and aligned to more detailed guidance and controls


Profiles

Alignment of an organization's requirements and objectives, risk appetite and resources **using** the desired outcomes of the Framework Core



The Framework Core

Establishes a Common Language



- Describes desired outcomes
- Understandable by everyone
- Applies to any type of risk management
- Defines the entire breadth of cybersecurity
- Spans both prevention and reaction



Core

A Catalog of Cybersecurity Outcomes

	Function	Category
What processes and assets need protection?	Identify	Asset Management
		Business Environment
		Governance
		Risk Assessment
		Risk Management Strategy
		Supply Chain Risk Management ^{1.1}
What safeguards are available?	Protect	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control ^{1.1}
		Awareness and Training
		Data Security
		Information Protection Processes & Procedures
		Maintenance
		Protective Technology
What techniques can identify incidents?	Detect	Anomalies and Events
		Security Continuous Monitoring
		Detection Processes
What techniques can contain impacts of incidents?	Respond	Response Planning
		Communications
		Analysis
		Mitigation
		Improvements
What techniques can restore capabilities?	Recover	Recovery Planning
		Improvements
		Communications

An Excerpt from the Framework Core

The Connected Path of Framework Outcomes

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
PROTECT (PR)	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (PR.AC): Access to physical and logical assets and associated facilities is limited to authorized users, processes, and devices, and is managed consistent with the assessed risk of unauthorized access to authorized activities and transactions.	PR.AC-6: Identities are proofed and bound to credentials and asserted in interactions	CIS CSC, 16 COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.9, SR 2.1 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 , A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-16, AC-19, AC-24, IA-1, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, PE-2, PS-3
		PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., single-factor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks)	CIS CSC 1, 12, 15, 16 COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 1.10 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.18.1.4 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-7, AC-8, AC-9, AC-11, AC-12, AC-14, IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11

5 Functions

23 Categories

108 Subcategories

6 Informative References



Risk-Based Decision Making

Expressed Using Cybersecurity Framework Profiles

Risk-Based Approach - recognizing that each organization's business objectives, cybersecurity requirements, and technical environments create unique cybersecurity priorities.

Profile – an expression of priorities using the outcomes within the Cybersecurity Framework Core

- A customization of the Core for a given sector, subsector, or organization
- A fusion of business/mission logic and cybersecurity outcomes
- An alignment of cybersecurity requirements with operational methodologies
- A basis for assessment and expressing target state
- A decision support tool for cybersecurity risk management

Identify

Protect

Detect


Respond

Recover



Profile Foundational Information

A Profile Can be Created from Three Types of Information



Smart Grid Profile – Our Approach

- **Identified high-level business objectives** for a high-DER environment
 - *Business requirements include regulatory requirements and cybersecurity requirements*
 - *Reviewed relevant literature (PNNL smart grid architecture documentation, NIST publications, etc.)*
 - *Interviewed industry experts (i.e., power system owners operators, electric power industry think tanks)*
- **High-level business objectives:**
 - **Maintain safety**
 - **Maintain power system reliability**
 - **Maintain power system resilience**
 - **Support grid modernization**



Smart Grid Profile – Our Approach, continued

- **Prioritized** Subcategory outcomes:
 - *Analyzed Cybersecurity Framework Core Subcategories in relation to identified business objectives*
 - *Does each Subcategory **directly** assist power system owners/operators in achieving the business objectives*
 - *Highlighted relevant Subcategories*
- Provided further **considerations** for implementation:
 - Described the rationale for the selection of each Subcategory
 - Provided implementation considerations for power system owners/operators (e.g., challenges that they may encounter as they seek to achieve cybersecurity outcomes)



An Excerpt from the Smart Grid Profile

Table 2 IDENTIFY Smart Grid Profile

		Maintain Safety	Maintain Reliability+E13	Maintain Resilience	Support Grid Modernization	Considerations for Power System Owners/Operators
Category		Subcategories				
ID	Asset Management	ID.AM-1	ID.AM-1	ID.AM-1	ID.AM-1	<p>Knowing hardware assets is critical for maintaining safety, reliability, and resilience, as well as facilitating the transition to the modern grid. Legacy and modernized assets need to be known and understood. As modernized grids become more distributed, power system owners/operators need to be accountable for all distributed assets that they own.</p> <p>Knowing software assets is critical for maintaining reliability, and resilience, as well as facilitating the transition to the modern grid. Legacy and modernized assets need to be known and understood. This especially applies to modernized assets because the sophisticated logic that they execute is driven by software.</p>
		ID.AM-2	ID.AM-2	ID.AM-2	ID.AM-2	



Smart Grid Profile – Questions

The high-level business objectives defined in the Smart Grid Risk Profile apply generally to all grid architectures. However, cybersecurity and risk considerations for each architecture can differ.

- ***What considerations are unique to different grid architectures?***
 - *Or perhaps unique to specific Functions/Categories (e.g., asset management, maintaining inventory for non-grid devices, etc.) from the Cybersecurity Framework*
 - *Or perhaps to varied owner/operator perspectives (e.g., merchant transmission owner, cooperative utility, microgrid joint venture between utility and developer, etc.).*



Smart Grid Profile – Questions, continued

- *Do you see value in creating additional Risk Profiles to address these considerations, and at what cross-section (e.g., architecture, service level, Functions/Categories, frequency regulation, voltage support within DER, etc.)? If so, Why?*
- *Is the current risk Profile useful to stakeholders other than power system owners/operators? Should we explore Risk Profiles from the perspective of other smart grid stakeholders, e.g., technology vendors, and why?*



Logical Interface Categories Assessment

Nelson Hastings

Electronics Engineer

Applied Cybersecurity Division

Information Technology Laboratory


Agenda

- Background
- NISTIR 7628 Logical Interface Reference Model
- High-DER Architecture and New Logical Interfaces
- Potential Security Requirements for New Logical Interfaces
- Q&A

Background

- What are the cybersecurity implications of a High Distributed Energy Resource (DER) architecture?
- A High-DER architecture will introduce new logical interfaces
- What are the cybersecurity implications associated with the newly introduced logical interfaces?

NISTIR 7628 Logical Interface Reference Model - “Spaghetti Diagram”



Logical Interface Categories - Sample

- Control System and Equipment
 - High Availability, Compute/bandwidth constraints
 - No High Availability, Compute/bandwidth constraints
 - High Availability, No compute/bandwidth constraints (3)
 - No High Availability, No compute/bandwidth constraints (4)
- Control systems
 - Intra-organizational (5)
 - Inter-organizational (6)
- Back office systems
 - Under common management authority
 - Without common management authority
- B2B connections
 - Financial/Market transactions (9)


High-DER Architecture Description

- Extensive Distributed Energy Resource (DER) penetration on distribution feeder (~1000 DERs)
- DERs involve active management of supply and load
 - Four quadrant inverters
 - Demand-response
 - Electric Vehicle (EV)
 - Battery systems
- Extensive distribution automation beyond current practice
- Reconfigurable system topologies

High DER Architecture – New Logical Interfaces

Example

Example Logical Interfaces in a High-DER Architecture



High-DER Architecture – New Logical Interfaces


Example

- Distributed Generation and Storage Management → Distributed Energy Resource Management System (DERMS)
 - New interfaces between the DER devices and DER system controllers
 - New external interface to Distribution System Operations
- Customer Energy Management System → Facilities DER Energy Management System (FDEMS)
 - Three new external interfaces with the Distribution System Operations
- Distribution System Operations
 - New external interfaces to Market Operations, Transmission/ISO/RTO System Operations, and Third Party Aggregator
 - Two new internal interfaces from the DERMS to the Geographic Information System (GIS) and Distribution Management System (DMS)

New Logical Interfaces to NISTIR 7628 Logical Interface Categories

NISTIR 7628 Logical Interface Category (LIC)	NISTIR 7628 LIC Descriptions	New interfaces for High-DER Architecture
3	Control System and Equipment, High Availability	D8
4	Control System and Equipment, No High Availability	D9
5	Control Systems, Intra-organizational	D1, D2
6	Control Systems, Inter-organizational	D3, D4, D5, D7, D52
9	B2B Connections, Financial/Market transactions	D6

High-DER Architecture: Logical Interface Categories



Potential Security Requirements for New Logical Interfaces

- New interfaces D3, D4, D5, D7, and D52 map to NISTIR 7628 LIC 6
- Security requirements for NISTIR 7628 LIC 6:
 - SG.AC-14: Permitted Actions without Identification or Authentication
 - SG.IA-04: User Identification and Authentication
 - SG.SC-05: Denial-of-service protection
 - SG.SC-06: Resource Priority
 - SG.SC-07: Boundry Protection
 - SG.SC-08: Communication Integrity
 - SG.SI-07: Software and Information Integrity

Q & A

Securing Communications

Mike Bartock

IT Specialist

Computer Security Division

Information Technology Laboratory



Agenda

- Background
- Publish Subscribe Communications
 - Brokered
 - Brokerless
- Wrap Up
- Q&A

Background

- Participated in the SEPA OpenFMB Cybersecurity Task Force
- Performed a security review of NAESB RMQ.26 and corresponding OpenFMB CTF output
- Publish and Subscribe communications are required by OpenFMB

Motivations

- As recently as 2011, publish and subscribe communications were not being considered within grid architectures¹
- Publish and subscribe communications provide “improved scalability with regard to the number of communication partners, and ease of application development”²

¹Wayne Weng, Yi Xu, Mohit Khanna. A survey on the communication architectures in smart grid. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2011.07.010>. July 5, 2011

²Michael Hoefling, et. al. Integration of IEEE C37.118 and Publish/Subscribe Communication. <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7248414>. June 8, 2015


Publish and Subscribe Communications

- Messages are associated with topics
- Topics have hierarchical structure
 - Ex. topic1/topic2/.../topicN
- Published messages must have a topic
 - Ex. topic1/topic2/.../topicX/"Message Text"
- Devices subscribe to specific topics, and receive messages published to that topic

Pub/Sub Example

- Device A subscribes to topic devices/Information
- Device B publishes message “I am Device B” to topic devices/Information
- Device A receives message devices/Information/”I am Device B”


Brokered Pub/Sub Communications



Pros	Cons
Reduces computations on devices	Centralized broker adds extra hops/time for messages to be sent and received
Device management can be standardized	Difficulty in getting new/specialized devices registered
Broker can ensure devices receive all intended messages	Single point of failure if broker goes down
Logging and aggregation of all messages	Device registry with access rules could become very complex

OpenFMB PoC Implementation

- Raspberry Pi 2 – 900MHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 CPU
- Ubuntu Linux Operating System
- OpenSSL Crypto Library
- Mosquitto MQTT Broker and Client
- Java Simulation of Grid Devices
- Netgear GS724Tv4 24-Port Gigabit Smart Managed Pro Switch
- Laptops: Windows 10



OpenFMB PoC Implementation Outcomes

*Ethernet

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

tcp.port == 8883 && ip.addr == 192.168.10.202

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Length	Info
2657	32.513233	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data
2837	34.521781	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data
2863	34.524134	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data
3042	36.532325	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data
3068	36.534477	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data
3351	38.542727	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data
3379	38.545214	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data
3566	40.553490	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data
3594	40.555619	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	1514	Continuation Data

> Frame 3068: 1514 bytes on wire (12112 bits), 1514 bytes captured (12112 bits) on interface 0

> Ethernet II, Src: Raspberr_9e:86:ac (b8:27:eb:9e:86:ac), Dst: Raspberr_f0:04:91 (b8:27:eb:f0:04:91)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.10.202, Dst: 192.168.10.205

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 54504, Dst Port: 8883, Seq: 80415, Ack: 3, Len: 1448

```

04e0 74 61 6d 70 3e 32 30 31 38 2d 30 33 2d 31 33 54  t&gt;201 8-03-13T
04f0 31 33 3a 30 32 3a 35 39 2e 32 35 32 5a 3c 2f 6e  13:02:59 .252Z</n
0500 73 31 32 3a 74 69 6d 65 73 74 61 6d 70 3e 3c 6e  s12:time stamp><n
0510 73 31 32 3a 76 61 6c 75 65 3e 3c 2f 6e 73 31 32  s12:valu e></ns12
0520 3a 76 61 6c 75 65 3e 3c 6e 73 32 3a 69 73 43 68  :value>< ns2:isCh
0530 61 72 67 69 6e 67 3e 74 72 75 65 3c 2f 6e 73 32  arging>t rue</ns2
0540 3a 69 73 43 68 61 72 67 69 6e 67 3e 3c 6e 73 32  :isCharg ing><ns2
0550 3a 69 73 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 65 64 3e 74 72 75  :isConne cted>tru
0560 65 3c 2f 6e 73 32 3a 69 73 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74  e</ns2:i sConnect
0570 65 64 3e 3c 6e 73 32 3a 6d 6f 64 65 3e 4d 61 69  ed><ns2: mode>Mai
0580 6e 74 61 69 6e 20 4d 69 6e 69 6d 75 6d 20 42 61  ntain Mi nimum Ba
0590 74 74 65 72 79 20 53 6f 43 3c 2f 6e 73 32 3a 6d  ttery So C</ns2:m
05a0 6f 64 65 3e 3c 6e 73 32 3a 73 74 61 74 65 4f 66  ode><ns2 :stateOf
05b0 43 68 61 72 67 65 3e 35 30 2e 30 3c 2f 6e 73 32  Charge>5 0.0</ns2
05c0 3a 73 74 61 74 65 4f 66 43 68 61 72 67 65 3e 3c  :stateOf Charge><
05d0 2f 6e 73 32 3a 42 61 74 74 65 72 79 53 74 61 74  /ns2:Bat teryStat
    
```

MQTT_TLS1_2.pcapng

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

(ip.src == 192.168.10.205 || ip.dst == 192.168.10.205) && tcp.port == 8883

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length
1239	83.110081	192.168.10.205	192.168.10.202	TCP	74
1240	83.110569	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	TCP	60
1241	83.110571	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	TCP	60
1246	83.113555	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	TLSv1.2	371
1247	83.113557	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	TCP	371
1248	83.113918	192.168.10.205	192.168.10.202	TCP	60
1249	83.113920	192.168.10.205	192.168.10.202	TCP	60
1250	83.180241	192.168.10.205	192.168.10.202	TLSv1.2	1514
1251	83.180244	192.168.10.205	192.168.10.202	TCP	1514
1252	83.180252	192.168.10.205	192.168.10.202	TLSv1.2	772
1253	83.180257	192.168.10.205	192.168.10.202	TCP	772
1254	83.180547	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	TCP	60
1255	83.180548	192.168.10.202	192.168.10.205	TCP	60

> Frame 1246: 371 bytes on wire (2968 bits), 371 bytes captured (2968 bits) on interface 0

> Ethernet II, Src: Raspberr_9e:86:ac (b8:27:eb:9e:86:ac), Dst: Raspberr_f0:04:91 (b8:27:eb:f0:04:91)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.10.202, Dst: 192.168.10.205

> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 51244, Dst Port: 8883, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 371

> Secure Sockets Layer

```

0000 b8 27 eb f0 04 91 b8 27 eb 9e 86 ac 08 00 45 00  .'.....' .....E.
0010 01 65 d8 90 40 00 40 06 ca 1a c0 a8 0a ca c0 a8  .e..@.@. ....
0020 0a cd c8 2c 22 b3 bb 8f fd d4 48 9c 5b 5b 80 18  ...,",... ..H.[[...
0030 00 e5 a4 9a 00 00 01 01 08 0a 02 59 25 5e 03 b8  .....Y%..
0040 72 54 16 03 01 01 2c 01 00 01 28 03 03 97 ee be  rT...., ..(.....
0050 7f 3f 6c d8 02 1d 21 c8 08 0f 02 e3 ce 54 e8 8e  .?1...!. ....T..
0060 bc f7 64 41 cb d4 27 0e 4a f4 79 bc ef 00 00 aa  ..dA..'. J.y.....
0070 c0 30 c0 2c c0 28 c0 24 c0 14 c0 0a 00 a5 00 a3  .0.,.(.$ .....
0080 00 a1 00 9f 00 6b 00 6a 00 69 00 68 00 39 00 38  ....k.j .i.h.9.8
0090 00 37 00 36 00 88 00 87 00 86 00 85 c0 32 c0 2e  .7.6.....2..
00a0 c0 2a c0 26 c0 0f c0 05 00 9d 00 3d 00 35 00 84  .*.&.... ..=.5..
    
```

OpenFMB PoC Implementation Outcomes

Preliminary Performance Results


MQTT_{Init} --> MQTT_{SUBACK}

Authentication / Encryption	None	TLS 1.2
None	.002855	.108071
Username & Password	.003223	.108458
X509 Certificate	N/A	.201232

MQTT_{PUB} --> MQTT_{SUB_RECV}

Authentication / Encryption	None	TLS 1.2
None	.003242	.109013
Username & Password	.003216	.108034
X509 Certificate	N/A	.186208

Brokerless Pub/Sub Communications



Pros	Cons
Direct device to device communication	Increases computations on devices
Device can be updated dynamically per device	Possibly no standard way to manage devices/message access list
Distributed messaging enables resiliency if any device fails	No guarantee messages are received by all intended devices
Simple message access rules on each device	Difficulty logging and aggregating messages

Communications Security Considerations

- Other communication methods applicable to Smart Grid?
- What to do with legacy equipment?
- How to handle device identity and authentication?
- Acceptable performance overhead due to security implementation?
- What are commonly used pub/sub protocols?
- Are devices supporting pub/sub protocols natively?

Q & A

Day 1: Adjourn

- Tomorrow begins at 8:45am
- Keynote by Ron Ross begins at 9:00am!
- Cybersecurity panel at 9:30
- 3x2 breakout structure
 - Morning breakout sessions repeat in the afternoon
 - Pick your favorite two topics and dive in deep!
- Tomorrow's close will be 4pm

Wednesday, November 14, 2018

8:30 am	REGISTRATION
8:45 am	WELCOME AND OBJECTIVES
9:00 am	KEYNOTE: CYBERSECURITY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS Ron Ross, NIST
9:30 am	PANEL SESSION: CYBERSECURITY AND GRID MODERNIZATION <i>Panelists discuss some of the cybersecurity challenges and practices emerging from grid modernization, with a focus on device and domain communication pathways and interoperability.</i> Carol Hawk U.S. Department of Energy David Lawrence Duke Energy Michael Murray BlackRidge Technology Candace Suh-Lee Electric Power Research Institute MODERATOR: Elizabeth Sisley, Calm Sunrise Consulting
10:30 am	BREAK
10:45 am	PARALLEL BREAKOUT SESSIONS <i>Breakout sessions repeat during the afternoon. Participants can join discussions in two different topics.</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Learning from other Sensor Networks: Translating and Linking Logical Interface Categories• Risk Profiles for Grid Architectures and Services• Securing New Communications Architectures: Brokered vs. Brokerless Cybersecurity
12:15 pm	LUNCH
1:30 pm	PARALLEL BREAKOUT SESSIONS <i>Breakout sessions repeated from the morning. Participants are asked to join a different topic.</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Learning from other Sensor Networks: Translating and Linking Logical Interface Categories• Risk Profiles for Grid Architectures and Services• Securing New Communications Architectures: Brokered vs. Brokerless Cybersecurity
3:00 pm	BREAK
3:15 pm	REPORT OUT PANEL
3:45 pm	NEXT STEPS
4:00 pm	ADJOURN