



Reducing Cyber Security Threats: Training computer users to detect spear-phishing emails attacks

Dr. Deanna D. Caputo
Lead Behavioral Psychologist

Changing Behavior in the Workplace Panel

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The Problem


- **Spear-phishing** is a *targeted* form of email phishing!
 - Someone plausible (employer, colleague, association, etc)
 - Seemingly legitimate topic
 - Urgency of a response
 - “Just click on link or open attachment”
- **Why do people click?**
 - No red flags, Curiosity, Haste, Illusion of invulnerability
 - “It’s security’s problem” Mentality
- **What do we want users to do?**
 - Think before clicking
 - Know what to do instead of clicking
 - Report if they click

Symantec's "Unlucky 13" Security Trends of 2010...
#2 Social engineering as the primary attack vector



Research Methodology

■ Embedded Email Training



- Real-time Feedback during regular daily email activity
- Encoding of solution with the problem
- Statistically Significant Reduction in Errors



Hypothesis

If users are provided with training *immediately following* an error in judgment, then they will be less likely to make the same error when presented with a similar judgment.



Experimental Design

- **Participants:** Stratified Random Sampling 1300 employees from a medium-sized corporation in Washington D.C.
- **Control Group:**
 1. Users with annual InfoSec training
- **Experimental Groups:**
 2. Users provided with **gain–framed** and **individually** focused embedded email training to reduce clicking on links provided in emails. **(G&I)**
 3. Users provided with **loss–framed** and **individually** focused embedded email training to reduce clicking on links provided in emails. **(L&I)**
 4. Users provided with **gain–framed** and **other** focused embedded email training to reduce clicking on links provided in emails. **(G&O)**
 5. Users provided with **loss–framed** and **other** focused embedded email training to reduce clicking on links provided in emails. **(L&O)**



Procedure

- **Opt-Out Consent Email**
- **Spear-phishing emails sent to participants (3 Trials, 7 mos.):**
 - **Systematically modifying legitimate emails from each organization to contain 5 issues**
 - Abnormal “from” field
 - Typos, Improper Grammar, or Odd Spacing
 - Motivation to take immediate action
 - Links do not match status bar when mouse is hovered over
 - Intuition – overall feeling that something isn’t right
- **Participant reacts to email**
 - Clicks on link, Deletes, Forwards, Replies, Purges
 - Contacts Help Desk / Security
- **Training page is viewed by participant if he/she clicks on the link in the email**



Challenges and Limitations

- **Balanced Spear-Phishing Emails**—It is imperative that the spear-phishing emails are equal in effectiveness across trials
- **Snapshot in Time vs. Longitudinal**—It is difficult to determine how long behavioral influence effects last if they are only measured across a short time window
- **One Institution Sample**—Only employees from one company included in sample
- **Slightly Over-Educated Sample**—The company's employees tend to be more highly educated
- **Cannot Measure Reading of Training**—We will not be able to know for sure if participants read the one-page embedded training or simply closed the browser



Impact

Human Firewall is Essential

Changing Human Behavior is Difficult

- **Offering an empirically tested recommendation, a methodological approach, and an embedded training tool that will be well-documented and available for public or private sector use**
- **Government and Industry can apply experimental methodology and principles to other concerning behaviors**
 - Facebook links and files
 - Scareware
 - Malicious Pop-ups

It only takes one click to cause severe damage to systems and reduce National confidence in information security!

Thank you for your time!



QUESTIONS?



IRB and Management Issues

- Consent: None, Opt-In, Opt Out...
- Data Control: Ethical Issues
- Deception: Ever okay?
- Stakeholders: Everyone Wants to Know
- ACT: Internal vs. External Emails