Skip to main content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Search Publications by: Scott Rose (Fed)

Search Title, Abstract, Conference, Citation, Keyword or Author
Displaying 1 - 25 of 55

Implementing a Zero Trust Architecture: High-Level Document

June 10, 2025
Author(s)
Alper Kerman, Oliver Borchert, Gema Howell, Scott Rose, Murugiah Souppaya, Jason Ajmo, Yemi Fashina, Parisa Grayeli, Joseph Hunt, Jason Hurlburt, Nedu Irrechukwu, Joshua Klosterman, Oksana Slivina, Susan Symington, Allen Tan, Karen Scarfone, William Barker, Peter Gallagher, Aaron Palermo, Madhu Balaji, Adam Cerini, Rajarshi Das, Jacob Barosin, Kyle Black, Scott Gordon, Jerry Haskins, Keith Luck, Dale McKay, Sunjeet Randhawa, Brian Butler, Mike Delaguardia, Matthew Hyatt, Randy Martin, Peter Romness, Corey Bonnell, Dean Coclin, Ryan Johnson, Dung Lam, Darwin Tolbert, Tim Jones, Tom May, Christopher Altman, Alex Bauer, Marco Genovese, Andrew Campagna, John Dombroski, Adam Frank, Nalini Kannan, Priti Patil, Harmeet Singh, Mike Spisak, Krishna Yellepeddy, Nicholas Herrmann, Corey Lund, Farhan Saifudin, Madhu Dodda, Tim LeMaster, Ken Durbin, James Elliott, Earl Matthews, David Pricer, Joey Cruz, Tarek Dawoud, Carmichael Patton, Alex Pavlovsky, Brandon Stephenson, Clay Taylor, Bob Lyons, Vinu Panicker, Peter Bjork, Hans Drolshagen, Imran Bashir, Ali Haider, Nishit Kothari, Sean Morgan, Seetal Patel, Norman Wong, Zack Austin, Shawn Higgins, Rob Woodworth, Mitchell Lewars, Bryan Rosensteel, Don Coltrain, Wade Ellery, Deborah McGinn, Frank Briguglio, Ryan Tighe, Chris Jensen, Joshua Moll, Jason White, Joe Brown, Gary Bradt, Jeffrey Adorno, Syed Ali, Bob Smith
A zero trust architecture (ZTA) enables secure authorized access to enterprise resources that are distributed across on-premises and multiple cloud environments, while enabling a hybrid workforce and partners to access resources from anywhere, at any time

Zero Trust Architecture

August 10, 2020
Author(s)
Scott W. Rose, Oliver Borchert, Stuart Mitchell, Sean Connelly
Zero trust (ZT) is the term for an evolving set of cybersecurity paradigms that move defenses from static, network- based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. A zero trust architecture (ZTA) uses zero trust principles to plan industrial and

Trustworthy Email

February 25, 2019
Author(s)
Scott W. Rose, J. S. Nightingale, Simson Garfinkel, Ramaswamy Chandramouli
This document gives recommendations and guidelines for enhancing trust in email. The primary audience includes enterprise email administrators, information security specialists and network managers. This guideline applies to federal IT systems and will

Evolution and Challenges of DNS-Based CDNs

November 1, 2018
Author(s)
Zheng Wang, Scott W. Rose
DNS-based server redirecting has been realized as the most popular way to deploy CDNs. However, with the increasing use of remote DNS, DNS-based CDNs faces a great challenge in performance degradation. To address this challenging issue, encouraging

Energy-Aware Server Allocating

September 1, 2018
Author(s)
Zheng Wang, Scott W. Rose
Faced with the scalability and reliability challenge, the DNS is increasingly operated by geographically dispersed data centers. Energy management across those distributed diverse data centers is critical to reduce revenue loss for DNS operators. This

Improving the Trustworthiness of E-Mail, and Beyond!

April 25, 2018
Author(s)
Scott W. Rose, Larry Feldman, Gregory A. Witte
This bulletin summarizes the information found in NIST SP 1800-6: Domain Name System-Based Electronic Mail Security, which describes a security platform for trustworthy email exchanges across organizational boundaries.

Domain Name System-Based Electronic Mail Security

January 15, 2018
Author(s)
Scott W. Rose, Karen M. Waltermire, Santos Jha, Chinedum Irrechukwu, William C. Barker
This document describes a security platform for trustworthy email exchanges across organizational boundaries. The project includes reliable authentication of mail servers, digital signature and encryption of email, and binding cryptographic key

Updating the Keys for DNS Security

September 27, 2017
Author(s)
Scott W. Rose, Larry Feldman, Gregory A. Witte
To help maintain the reliability and integrity of the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS), NIST is working with specialists from around the world to update the keys used by the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) protocol to authenticate DNS data and avoid

The Emergence of DANE Trusted Email for Supply Chain Management

January 3, 2017
Author(s)
Scott Rose, Joseph Gersch, Daniel Massey
Supply chain management is critically dependent on trusted email with authentication systems that work on a global scale. Solutions to date have not adequately addressed the issues of email forgery, confidentiality, and sender authenticity. The IETF DANE

Making Email Trustworthy

October 24, 2016
Author(s)
Scott W. Rose, Larry Feldman, Gregory A. Witte
This bulletin summarizes the information presented in NIST SP 800-177: Trustworthy Email. This publication gives recommendations and guidelines for enhancing trust in email. This guideline applies to federal IT systems and will also be useful for any small

Trustworthy Email

September 6, 2016
Author(s)
Ramaswamy Chandramouli, Simson L. Garfinkel, J. S. Nightingale, Scott W. Rose
This document gives recommendations and guidelines for enhancing trust in email. The primary audience includes enterprise email administrators, information security specialists and network managers. This guideline applies to federal IT systems and will

Trust Issues with Opportunistic Encryption

February 28, 2014
Author(s)
Scott W. Rose
Recent revelations have shed light on the scale of eavesdropping on Internet traffic; violating the privacy of almost every Internet user. In response, protocol designers, engineers and service operators have begun deploying encryption (often opportunistic
Was this page helpful?