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Gorjan Alagic, Maxime Bros, Pierre Ciadoux, David Cooper, Quynh Dang, Thinh Dang, John M. Kelsey, Jacob Lichtinger, Carl A. Miller, Dustin Moody, Rene Peralta, Ray Perlner, Angela Robinson, Hamilton Silberg, Daniel Smith-Tone, Noah Waller, Yi-Kai Liu
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of evaluating public-key digital signature algorithms through a public competition-like process for potential standardization. Any signature scheme eventually selected would augment
An experimental cryptographic proof of quantumness — that is, a proof, based only on well-studied cryptographic assumptions, that a physical device is performing quantum computations — will be a vital milestone in the progress of quantum information
In quantum position verification, a prover certifies her location by performing a quantum computation and returning the results (at the speed of light) to a set of trusted verifiers. One of the very first protocols for quantum position verification was
In the wake of recent progress on quantum computing hardware, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is standardizing cryptographic protocols that are resistant to attacks by quantum adversaries. The primary digital signature scheme that
An expository article (aimed at the general mathematics community) about quantum cryptography and the philosophy of applied mathematics. The article focuses on quantum coin-flipping, a research problem that has a particularly long history.
Yusuf Alnawakhtha, Atul Mantri, Carl A. Miller, Daochen Wang
Trapdoor claw-free functions (TCFs) are immensely valuable in cryptographic interactions between a classical client and a quantum server. Typically, a protocol has the quantum server prepare a superposition of two bit strings from a claw and then measure
Gorjan Alagic, Daniel Apon, David Cooper, Quynh Dang, Thinh Dang, John M. Kelsey, Jacob Lichtinger, Yi-Kai Liu, Carl A. Miller, Dustin Moody, Rene Peralta, Ray Perlner, Angela Robinson, Daniel Smith-Tone
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting public-key cryptographic algorithms through a public, competition-like process. The new public-key cryptography standards will specify additional digital signature, public
Gorjan Alagic, David Cooper, Quynh Dang, Thinh Dang, John M. Kelsey, Jacob Lichtinger, Yi-Kai Liu, Carl A. Miller, Dustin Moody, Rene Peralta, Ray Perlner, Angela Robinson, Daniel Smith-Tone, Daniel Apon
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting public-key cryptographic algorithms through a public, competition-like process. The new public-key cryptography standards will specify additional digital signature, public
When two spatially separated parties make measurements on an unknown entangled quantum state, what correlations can they achieve? How difficult is it to determine whether a given correlation is a quantum correlation? These questions are central to problems
David Cooper, Daniel Apon, Quynh H. Dang, Michael S. Davidson, Morris Dworkin, Carl Miller
This recommendation specifies two algorithms that can be used to generate a digital signature, both of which are stateful hash-based signature schemes: the Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) system and the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), along with
Dustin Moody, Gorjan Alagic, Daniel C. Apon, David A. Cooper, Quynh H. Dang, John M. Kelsey, Yi-Kai Liu, Carl A. Miller, Rene C. Peralta, Ray A. Perlner, Angela Y. Robinson, Daniel C. Smith-Tone, Jacob Alperin-Sheriff
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting one or more public-key cryptographic algorithms through a public, competition-like process. The new public-key cryptography standards will specify one or more additional
How can two parties with competing interests carry out a fair coin flip, using only a noiseless quantum channel? This problem (quantum weak coin-flipping) was formalized more than 15 years ago, and, despite some phenomenal theoretical progress, practical
A prominent application of quantum cryptography is the distribution of cryptographic keys that are provably secure. Such security proofs were extended by Vazirani and Vidick (Physical Review Letters, 113, 140501, 2014) to the device-independent (DI)
Yanbao Zhang, Lynden K. Shalm, Joshua C. Bienfang, Martin J. Stevens, Michael D. Mazurek, Sae Woo Nam, Carlos Abellan, Waldimar Amaya, Morgan Mitchell, Honghao Fu, Carl A. Miller, Alan Mink, Emanuel H. Knill
Applications of randomness such as private key generation and public randomness beacons require small blocks of certified random bits on demand. Device-independent quantum randomness can produce such random bits, but existing quantum-proof protocols and
We introduce a framework for providing graphical security proofs for quantum cryptography using the methods of categorical quantum mechanics. We are optimistic that this approach will make some of the highly complex proofs in quantum cryptography more
Quantum self-testing addresses the following question: is it possible to verify the existence of a multipartite state even when one's measurement devices are completely untrusted? This problem has seen abundant activity in the last few years, particularly
Gorjan Alagic, Jacob M. Alperin-Sheriff, Daniel Apon, David Cooper, Quynh H. Dang, Carl Miller, Dustin Moody, Rene Peralta, Ray Perlner, Angela Robinson, Daniel Smith-Tone, Yi-Kai Liu
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting one or more public-key cryptographic algorithms through a public competition-like process. The new public- key cryptography standards will specify one or more additional
When two players achieve a superclassical score at a nonlocal game, their outputs must contain intrinsic randomness. This fact has many useful implications for quantum cryptography. Recently it has been observed (C. Miller, Y. Shi, Quant. Inf. & Comp. 17
If a measurement is made on one half of a bipartite system then, conditioned on the outcome, the other half achieves a new reduced state. If these reduced states defy classical explanation -- that is, if shared randomness cannot produce these reduced
A game is rigid if a near-optimal score guarantees, under the sole assumption of the validity of quantum mechanics, that the players are using an approximately unique quantum strategy. As such, rigidity has a vital role in quantum cryptography as it
The field of device-independent quantum cryptography has seen enormous success in the past several years, including security proofs for key distribution and random number generation that account for arbitrary imperfections in the devices used. Full
If two quantum players at a nonlocal game G achieve a superclassical score, then their measurement outcomes must be at least partially random from the perspective of any third player. This is the basis for device-independent quantum cryptography. In this