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Linear-XOR and Additive Checksums Don t Protect Damgaard-Merkle Hashes from Generic Attacks
Published
Author(s)
Praveen Gauravaram, John M. Kelsey
Abstract
We consider the security of Damgaard-Merkle variants which computer linear-XOR or additive checksums over message blocks, intermediate hash values, or both, and process these checksums in computing the final hash value. We show that these Damgaard-Merkle variants gain almost no security against generic attacks such as the long-message second preimage attacks of Dean: 1999, Kelsey:2005} and the herding attack of Kelsey:2006}.
Proceedings Title
Topics in Cryptology CT-RSA 2008 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science)
Gauravaram, P.
and Kelsey, J.
(2008),
Linear-XOR and Additive Checksums Don t Protect Damgaard-Merkle Hashes from Generic Attacks, Topics in Cryptology CT-RSA 2008 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), San Francisco, CA, US, [online], https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79263-5_3, https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=51344
(Accessed October 10, 2025)